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This dissertation attempts to demonstrate that Luchuan is a language which has a 
grammatical category of evidentiality. Luchuan is the only sister language of 
Japanese; however, since they are considered to have diverged as early as the 
beginning of the 8
th
 century, their vocabularies and grammars have developed in 
somewhat different directions. The grammatical category of evidentiality is one of 
the categories which Luchuan has developed in different ways from Japanese. 
Evidentiality is a linguistic category which marks source of information. 
Evidentials have often been overlooked in the study of Luchuan, and the morphology 
has often been misanalysed as belonging to other grammatical categories because of 
failure to take account of the concept of evidentiality. On the one hand, some existing 
studies classify these evidential markers as temporal categories, such as tense or 
aspect, and on the other hand, some studies claim that these evidential markers 
should belong to the category of modality. I argue that both approaches have failed to 
describe Luchuan grammar accurately, and that the concept of evidentiality can 
resolve problems which other existing approaches could not deal with adequately. 
The main purpose of this study is to analyze the evidentials in Luchuan 
systematically and to formulate a model of the evidential system of this language. 
The proposal I make and defend in this dissertation is that Luchuan has a 
grammatical evidential system which contains one direct evidential and three indirect 
evidentials (Inference, Assumed, and Reportative). I argue that these four evidential 
markers should be considered to belong to a single grammatical category. Further, I 
discuss the relation between evidentials and other grammatical categories such as 
tense, aspect, and modality. It is obvious that these categories are closely related in 
Luchuan, but I attempt to tease apart their functions as clearly as possible. 
The Direct evidential -N is used when the speaker has ‗direct evidence‘, such 
as direct experience or direct perceptions. When direct evidence is unavailable but 
‗the best possible source of information‘ is available, such as a report from a 
participant in the event, the use of -N is licensed. The Inferential evidential tee is 
used when the speaker makes an inference based on direct evidence. The Assumed 
evidential hazi is different from the Inferential evidential in that it does not require 
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direct evidence, but the speaker‘s assumption has to be based on knowledge of habits 
or general knowledge. Finally, Reportative evidential Ndi indicates that the speaker 
acquired information from someone else, mainly orally report but in any case 
through the use of language. 
Luchuan is an endangered or moribund language which has very limited native 
speakers. Therefore, the principal focus of this dissertation is a descriptive study of 
verb forms whose syntactic features have not been fully described: for example, I set 
out whether or not each evidential can appear in negative or interrogative sentences, 
whether or not each evidential can have a non-past or a past form, whether or not 
each evidential markers can co-occur a subject of any person.  
Although my primary focus is a description of the evidential system of this 
language; at the same time, I relate my discussion to cross-linguistic issues such as 
how evidentiality is related to epistemic modality, with the intention that this work 
should constitute a contribution to the typological and theoretical study of 
evidentiality. I propose that evidentiality should be distinguished from the category 
of modality because in Luchuan the Direct evidential and the Reportative evidential 
belong to the category of evidentiality, though the other two indirect evidentials ―
the Inferential and Assumed― might be regarded as an overlap category between 
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In this dissertation I use broad transcriptions.  Instead of using special phonetic 
symbols, I attempt to utilize simple symbols as much as possible. Basically I follow 
the description used in the Dictionary of the Okinawan Language (1963), although 
when citing other authors I respect their descriptions and use the forms as other 
authors have originally described them.  
   
[hw,hu] for a labial fricative 
[ʔ] for a glottal stop 
[c] for a voiceless palato-alveolar affricate 
[z] for a voiced palato-alveolar affricate/fricative 
[sj] for a palatal-alveolar fricative 
[j] for a palatal semi-vowel 
[N] for a syllabic uvular nasal  

















List of Abbreviation 
 
ASSUM : assumed evidential 
AP: adverbial particle 
CON: continuative 
COP: copula 
COMP: complementizer  
FC: focus 
FP: final particle 
GEN: genitive case 
IMPF: imperfective 
IRR: irrealis 




NM: nominative case  
PART : (past) participle 
PAST: past tense 
PAS: passive 





RES: resultative aspect  











Acknowledgement ･･･････････････････････････････････････････ iii 
Conventions ･････････････････････････････････････････････････ v 
List of Abbreviation ･･････････････････････････････････････････ vi 
Contents ････････････････････････････････････････････････････vii 
 
Chapter 1  Introduction ･･･････････････････････････････････････1 
1.1  Aim of the study ･･････････････････････････････････････････1 
1.2  Background of Ryukyu ･････････････････････････････････････3 
1.2.1  Historical background and present situation of Okinawa  
 Prefecture ･･････････････････････････････････････････3 
1.2.2  Present situation concerning language use ････････････････4 
1.3  A brief Introduction of Luchuan and Luchuan Grammar ･･･････････5 
1.3.1  History and variations ････････････････････････････････5 
1.3.2  Sociolinguistic features ･･･････････････････････････････6 
1.3.3  Linguistic features ･･･････････････････････････････････8 
1.3.4  Verb morphology ･･･････････････････････････････････10 
1.4  Data collection ･･･････････････････････････････････････････11 
1.5  Evidentiality in general linguistic theory ･･･････････････････････13 
1.5.1  What is evidentiality? ････････････････････････････････13 
1.5.2  Definitions of evidentials ･････････････････････････････14 
1.5.3  Definition of other related concepts ･････････････････････21 
1.5.4  Classification of evidentiality ･･････････････････････････22 
1.6  Evidentiality in Luchuan ････････････････････････････････････24 
1.6.1  Overview of studies on evidentiality in Luchuan ･･･････････24 
1.6.2  Obligatoriness of evidentials in Luchuan ･････････････････25 
1.7  Organization of the dissertation ･･･････････････････････････････27 





Chapter 2  The Direct evidential ････････････････････････････････30 
2.1  Introduction ･･････････････････････････････････････････････30 
2.2  Overview of the Direct evidential in the literature ････････････････30 
2.2.1  Preceding studies of evidentiality in Luchuan ･････････････30 
2.2.2  Overview of verb morphology ･････････････････････････35 
2.3  Concept of best possible grounds ･････････････････････････････38 
2.3.1  The shared feature between -N in Luchuan and -mi in  
Quechua ･･････････････････････････････････････････39 
2.3.2  The differences between -N in Luchuan and -mi in  
Quechua ･･･････････････････････････････････････････････45 
2.4  Epistemic modality and evidentials ････････････････････････････59 
2.4.1  Speaker‘s degree of certainty ･･･････････････････････････59 
 2.4.2  Direct evidentials in negative and interrogative sentences ････63 
2.4.3  Challengeability tests ･････････････････････････････････68 
2.5  Summary ･････････････････････････････････････････････････76 
 
Chapter 3  Inferential and Assumed evidentials ････････････････････78 
3.1  Introduction ･･･････････････････････････････････････････････78 
3.2  Indirect evidentials in literature ････････････････････････････････79 
3.3  Inferential evidential tee ･･････････････････････････････････････89 
3.3.1  What kind of evidence licenses the use of tee ･･･････････････90 
3.3.2  How tee interacts with aspect/tense and the direct evidential -N･･96 
3.3.3  Whether tee can appear in negative or interrogative sentences･･･99 
3.3.4  Reasons for classifing tee as an evidential ･･････････････････102 
3.4  Assumed evidential hazi ･･････････････････････････････････････109 
3.4.1  What kind of evidence licenses the use of hazi ･･････････････123 
3.4.2  How hazi interacts with aspect and tense ･･･････････････････117 
3.4.3  Whether hazi can appear in negative or interrogative sentences･･122 
3.4.4  Assumed evidential hazi and Inferential evidential tee ････････124 
3.5  Whether Inferential and Assumed evidentials express the speaker‘s degree  
of (un)certainty ････････････････････････････････････････････････127 




Chapter 4  The Reportative Evidential ･･･････････････････････････131 
4.1  Introduction ･･･････････････････････････････････････････････131 
4.2  Reportative evidential Ndi ････････････････････････････････････131 
4.2.1  What kind of evidence licenses the use of Ndi ･･････････････131 
4.2.2  How Ndi interacts with aspect/tense and the Direct 
evidential -N ･････････････････････････････････････････143 
4.2.3  Whether Ndi can appear in negative or interrogative sentences ･･149 
4.3  Whether Reported evidential expresses the speaker‘s degree of  
(un)certainty･････････････････････････････････････････････････157 
4.4  Summary ･･････････････････････････････････････････････････159 
 
Chapter 5  Evidentials as a grammatical category ････････････････････161 
5.1  Introduction ･････････････････････････････････････････････････161 
5.2  Double marking of evidentials ･･････････････････････････････････161 
5.3  Epistemic modality and evidentials in Luchuan ･････････････････････169 
5.3.1  Speaker‘s degree of certainty in the direct and indirect evidentials･169 
5.3.2  Direct and Indirect evidentials in negative and interrogative  
sentences ･････････････････････････････････････････････173 
5.3.3  -N is an evidential not an epistemic modality marker････････････173 
5.4  Summary ･････････････････････････････････････････････････････177 
 
Chapter 6  Conclusions ･･･････････････････････････････････････････179 
6.1 Introduction ･･･････････････････････････････････････････････････179 
6.2  Summary of the arguments ･･････････････････････････････････････179 
6.2.1 Main contributions to the study of evidentiality in Luchuan ･･･････179 
6.2.2 Contributions to the typological and theoretical study ････････････182 
6.3  Remaining issues and possible solutions ･･･････････････････････････183 
6.3.1  Evidentiality and aspect ･･････････････････････････････････183 
6.3.2  Mirativity ･････････････････････････････････････････････190 







Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
1.1  Aim of the study  
 
Evidentiality is a grammatical category which indicates the source of information, or 
how a speaker learns information (Chafe and Nicholas 1986; Aikhenvald 2003; 
2004). Aikhenvald (2004) distinguishes grammatical evidentiality from ‗evidential 
strategies‘ in which evidential-like meanings are conveyed by other grammatical 
categories, such as conditional mood, perfect, or passive. The term ‗evidential‘ in this 
dissertation refers to the grammatical category in which evidential meaning is 
encoded, not merely pragmatically implicated (e.g. Anderson 1986). This also 
excludes lexical evidential expressions such as English I guess or reportedly from the 
target of this study.     
     There are four types of evidentials in Luchuan, illustrated in (1a) - (1d).  
 
(1) a. Yoko ga  juubaN  nic-ee-N. 
     Yoko NM dinner cook-RES-DIR 
     p = Yoko has cooked dinner. 




                                                   
1
 I apply the convention that Faller (2002) adopts for distinguishing propositional meaning and 
evidential meaning since I consider that this convention usefully reflects the two kinds of 
meaning (proposition and evidential) clearly. Moreover, since evidential meaning does not 
correspond to that of lexical verbs such as ‗see‘ or ‗hear‘, including evidential meaning in the 
translation could be misleading. I will use p for referring to the proposition and use EV for 
evidential. I do not apply this convention to examples quoted from other authors, or to 




b. Yoko ga  juubaN  nic-ee-N  tee.   
    Yoko NM dinner cook-RES-DIR INF 
    p = ‗Yoko has cooked dinner.‘ 
    EV = Speaker infers p. (based on visual evidence of cooked meal) 
 
c. Yoko ga  juubaN  nic-ee-ru     hazi.       
Yoko NM dinner  cook-RES-ATTR ASSUM 
p = ‗Yoko has cooked dinner.‘ 
     EV = Speaker assumes p. (based on reasoning) 
 
d. Yoko ga juubaN  nic-ee-N   Ndi
2
.        
Yoko NM dinner cook-RES-DIR REP 
     p = ‗Yoko has cooked dinner.‘ 
     EV = Speaker heard that p. (based on the report of another speaker) 
 
All of the examples in (1) are sentences with resultative aspect. Example (1a) 
is used by a speaker who has direct evidence of the event. Examples (1b)-(1d) show 
how the three indirect evidentials are used. The speaker of example (1b) makes an 
inference based on the visual evidence, namely a cooked meal. The speaker is certain 
that there is a cooked meal but he/she has to infer the identity of the cook. The 
Assumed evidential hazi in example (1c) is used to show that the speaker‘s reasoning 
is based on general knowledge. Example (1d) indicates that the speaker acquired the 
information from another person, in this case, the agent herself or a person who sees 
the agent‘s action.  
This dissertation investigates these evidentials and explores the evidential 
system in Luchuan as a grammatical category on its own. The dissertation has two 
main purposes; the first is language-specific and the second is more general. The first 
purpose is to demonstrate that Luchuan has grammatical evidentials, providing a 
detailed description of the evidential system which, as we shall see, consists of four 
evidentials. This includes specifying evidential types according to a typological 
classification of evidentiality (here we use Aikhenvald‘s). The second purpose is to 
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contribute to current theoretical discussions about evidential systems ―  e.g. 
whether or not evidentiality is marked obligatorily, how evidentiality is differentiated 
from epistemic modality, whether or not evidentials take a higher scope than other 
grammatical categories, and how evidentials are related to other categories such as 
tense and aspect. Moreover, in addition to these typological and theoretical 
contributions, this study will be able to contribute to sociolinguistic study in terms of 
language preservation, through the detailed examination and description of this 
endangered language.  
     To proceed to the investigation, in the remainder of Chapter 1 I will present the 
background of Ryukyu and Luchuan, and then I will provide an overview of the 
current discussions concerning evidentials in general linguistic theory and in 
Luchuan. In Chapter 2 I will examine the functions of the Direct evidential in 
Luchuan. I will then in Chapter 3 discuss the Inferential evidential and the Assumed 
evidential, and the Reportative evidential in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, I will move on 
to the theoretical issues, the conceptual relations between epistemic modality and 
evidentials, examining all four of the evidentials in Luchuan.  A summary of the 
contributions of this study and some remaining issues and possible solutions will be 
presented in Chapter 6. 
 
1.2  Background of Ryukyu 
 
1.2.1 Historical background and present situation of 
Okinawa Prefecture 
 
In this section, I will briefly outline the social and historical background of Ryukyu. 
Luchuan languages are spoken in the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa Prefecture), which 
are the southernmost islands of Japan. Okinawa is composed of about 160 small 
islands, 40 of which are inhabited. These islands are located in the Pacific Ocean and 
the East China Sea and surrounded by beautiful coral reefs. Because Okinawa has a 
subtropical oceanic climate, some varieties of plants and animals found in Okinawa 
are very different from those found in mainland Japan, and many of these species can 
only be seen in Okinawa.    




languages of Okinawa differ considerably from those of the rest of Japan.  
Historically, Okinawa was an independent nation, the Ryukyu Kingdom, from 1429 
to 1879, until mainland Japan invaded the islands. Despite having limited natural 
resources, the Ryukyu Kingdom flourished through overseas trade with many Asian 
countries, and as a transit trade nation in East Asia, under the authority of China. In 
this way the Okinawan culture developed, being influenced by many other countries. 
Shuri was an administrative center as the capital of Ryukyu, where Shuri Castle was 
located.  
Due to the Japanese annexation of Okinawa, the effects of World War II, and 
subsequent control by the U.S. military, the circumstances surrounding Okinawa 
continue to change rapidly. Although tourism is flourishing, some portion of 
Okinawa‘s income still depends on military bases and national government spending. 
Accompanying this change of lifestyle and rapid Japanization, traditional Okinawan 
culture has been fading dramatically.  
In terms of language, at the present day, education at all levels, official 
documents and politics are all in Japanese only. Through these turbulent yeras, 
Luchuan has not been linguistically affected by English, but influence from Japanese 
has been tremendous. 
 
1.2.2  Present situation concerning language use 
 
As a native language, Luchuan is in danger of extinction. This is true of Luchuan in 
the generic sense of all the regional variations, and also of the more strict 
understanding as referring to the Shuri dialect, spoken in Shuri, Naha City. In this 
chapter, I use ‗Luchuan‘ as a generic term, although in the following chapters, where 
I discuss linguistic data and analysis, I will use Luchuan to refer to the Shuri dialect. 
The population of Okinawa is nearly 1.4 million people.
3
 Although accurate figures 
for native speakers of Luchuan are not available, the general picture is that younger 
generations (under the age of fifty) rarely speak Luchuan in daily life, and even 
among people over sixty, the opportunities for speaking Luchuan are very restricted. 
The population of Naha City is about 314,000 people, with about 57,400 people 
living in the Shuri district of Naha. According to the most recent census, carried out 
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by the government in 2005, the number of people over 65 who live in Shuri is about 
10,000, and although this age group would be more likely to speak Luchuan, exactly 
how many of these 10,000 speak Luchuan daily cannot be estimated with accuracy. 
Note that there are more people who speak the Shuri dialect but live in different areas 
in Okinawa or outside of Okinawa, thus an accurate number of the native speakers of 
the Shuri dialect or Luchuan is unknown. 
The younger generations under forty speak standard Japanese or a new 
language variant called the Uchina-Yamato dialect, which is a fusion of Luchuan and 
standard Japanese. Even people who can speak Luchuan are inclined to speak 
Japanese when they talk with younger generations or with people who come from 
different dialectal areas. Thus the number of Luchuan speakers is rapidly declining 
due to the decreased opportunity to use the language, and this is even affecting native 
speakers.  
     Languages which are no longer being learned as a mother tongue by children 
are called ―moribund‖ (Kraus 1992:4). This is a much more serious category than 
mere endangerment. Parents in Okinawa do not speak Luchuan to their children 
anymore; therefore, Luchuan should be classified in the category of moribund 
languages. Show business such as local folk songs, dancing and plays are still 
performed in Luchuan and there are some radio programs in which Luchuan is 
spoken, but there are no TV programs in Luchuan. Although indigenous people have 
started to feel they should protect their language, and some organizations have been 
founded, to date no substantial measures to improve the situation (such as promoting 
bilingual education) have been implemented by the regional government.  
 
1.3 A Brief Introduction of Luchuan and Luchuan 
Grammar 
 
1.3.1  History and variations 
 
The origin of Luchuan has not been completely established, but it is generally 
accepted that Luchuan is a sister language of Japanese, and the two are thought to 
have diverged from each other no later than the eighth century. Hokama (2000) 




second or third century and the sixth or seventh century. Expressions and phonemes 
that are found in Japanese no later than the eighth century are still maintained in 
modern Luchuan (Dictionary of the Okinawan Language 1963
4
). Luchuan and 
Japanese have both been changing, and are now mutually incomprehensible. 
According to Hattori (1959), the first scholar who academically demonstrated the 
kinship between Luchuan and Japanese was probably Chamberlain (1895). Their 
kinship can be illustrated by various similarities such as correspondence of 
phonology, accent patterns, vocabularies and the patterns of verbal conjugations. 
The contemporary dialects of Luchuan are divided into two large major 
groups: the dialects spoken in the north, and the dialects spoken in the south
5
 
(Uemura 1992). According to Uemura (1992), the north dialect group is 
subcategorized into eight kinds of languages, and the south dialect group is further 
subcategorized into three. The north dialects consist of: Kikai-jima, North Amami 
Oshima, South Amami Oshima, Tokunoshima, Okinoerabu, Yoron, North Okinawan, 
and South Okinawan. The south dialects are: Miyako, Yaeyama, and Yonaguni 
(Uemura 2003). The Shuri dialect belongs to the former group.  
It is a striking feature of Luchuan languages that regional variations among 
them are fairly rich and they are often mutually incomprehensible, even though they 
belong to the same language group. The differences between the north dialect group 
and south dialect group are especially huge. Ironically this rich regional variation is 
one of the reasons why the use of Japanese is preferred for communication between 
the speakers of different dialects. Although the Shuri dialect used to be a lingua 
franca among these different variations, it has now been replaced by Japanese. 
 
1.3.2  Sociolinguistic features 
 
Honorifics 
One remarkable feature of the Shuri dialect is its strict honorific system, which 
makes distinctions according to the class, gender, and age of the addressee and 
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 The Japanese name of this dictionary is Okinawa-go jiten. It is written in Japanese and 
published by Kokuritsu Kokugo Kenkyujyo (National Research Institute).  For convenience, in 
this dissertation, I will call it the Dictionary of the Okinawan Language .  
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An alternative classification divides Luchuan into three groups: the north (Amami・Okinawa), 




speaker. According to the Dictionary of the Okinawan Language (1963), the classes 
were divided into three groups; the general population, called hjakusjoo, the 
members of the ruling class dynasty, deemjoo, and the samuree, who were warriors. 
The differences of rank were apparent, being reflected by the color of the belt or the 
design of the clothes, and it was rare for people who belonged to a different rank to 
be in contact with each other. Therefore, difference of language use among all ranks 
was strictly maintained. For example, there were three kinds of ways of saying ‗yes‘, 
namely ʔuu, ʔoo, ʔii, according to the class, gender, and age of the addressee. The 
first one is for a higher class or guests, and the second one is for an addressee who is 
older but lower class, and the third one is for lower class or familiar people. Various 




At the present time, the differences in class do not stand out. Class differences 
are no longer signaled by distinct clothing. Usage now depends mainly on the ages 
and genders of the speakers. Honorifics are necessary even at home, such as from 
children to parents, or from grandchildren to grandmother. Since the gender 
difference is still an important factor, women need to use honorifics to men; from 
wife to husband.   
However, because of the rigidity and complexity of the honorific systems, 
people tend to use Japanese instead of Luchuan in order to avoid honorific mistakes 
in the conversation. Also Japanese is simpler because class and gender are less 
important when Japanese is spoken. This inability to use complicated honorifics is 
possibly one reason which contributes to the diminished opportunity use of Luchuan 
by younger speakers.  
 
Writing system 
It is estimated that Chinese characters and Japanese syllabary characters (kana) were 
imported in about 1265, although it was not till the beginning of the sixteenth century 
that these characters were actually used for purposes such as epigraphs, documents, 
and poems (Hokama 2000).  
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In 1532, the first piece of classical literature in Luchuan, Omoro Soshi, was 
collected and edited by the government of the Ryukyu Kingdom. Twenty-two 
volumes of Omoro Soshi remain, although they have yet to be deciphered completely. 
Omoro Soshi is a collection of poems, written in a combination of Chinese characters 
and Japanese kana and a variant of both Chinese and Japanese characters. However, 
these poems were basically passed on orally, and it was the government of the 
Ryukyu Kingdom who collected and edited the written volumes. For ordinary people, 
Luchuan has been fundamentally only used orally and is not written or read on a 
regular basis. Thus it can justifiably be said that Luchuan has not had a written 
system which is routinely used by a large segment of the population.  
     Nowadays, special characters for Luchuan have been developed based on the 
Japanese kana,
7
 but it has not yet reached the stage where these characters are used 
on a regular basis. Conversations in Luchuan in contemporary literature are written 
in Japanese characters, and a newspaper in Luchuan is also written in Japanese 
characters.  
     Lastly, the fact that there is no fixed written system can be considered to have 
an influence on the whole system of the language. I assume that this fact has helped 
to develop the evidential system in Luchuan, or perhaps rather that this fact has 
helped to preserve the evidential system which the parent language may have 
possessed, because written descriptions of events tend to be objective, while spoken 
utterances are basically always subjectively oriented to the speaker and hearer.  
 
1.3.3  Linguistic features 
 
Since this dissertation aims mainly to investigate evidentials in Luchuan, I will in 
this section provide only very basic information on Luchuan‘s linguistic features so 
that the reader can gain some idea of what kind of language Luchuan is. More 
detailed accounts can be found in Uemura (2003), Tsuhako (1992), and Miyara 
(2000), in addition to the Dictionary of the Okinawan Language (1963). 
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Luchuan has the following phonemes.  
Vowels:/ i, e, a, o, u / 
Consonants: / h, ʔ, ‘, k, g, p, b, m, s, c, z, n, r, t, d,/  
Semi-vowels: / j, w / 
Syallabic phonemes: /N, Q/ 
 
Figure (1) below shows that, as far as short vowels are concerned, basically each 
vowel in Japanese corresponds to a vowel in Luchuan, with the five Japanese vowels 
corresponding to the three Luchuan vowels. Long vowels do not follow this pattern 
and Luchuan makes the same five way distinction that Japanese does. But note that 
not all words can be extracted by this correspondence of phonemes since many items 
in the vocabulary of Luchuan differ from Japanese by more than phonology.  
 
(1) Correspondence of phonemes between Japanese and Luchuan 
   Japanese :  i    e    a    o    u 
  
   Luchuan:     i       a       u  
 
Mora  
The basic constructions of the mora are as follows:  
 /CV/, /CSV/, /CN/, /Q/ 
where /C/ indicates consonant, /S/ semivowel, and /V/ (vowel) (Hattori 1955). (/N/ is 
a syllabic uvular nasal and /Q/ is a syllabic voiceless consonant.) 
 
General Syntax 
The basic word order in Luchuan is SOV (Subject-Object-Verb), and there is no 
grammatical agreement of gender, number or person. In the following chapters, I will 
discuss a phenomenon which looks like a kind of subject-verb agreement, but I will 
argue that this phenomenon is not grammatical agreement but is has its basis in 
evidentiality. There are two suffixes -cha or -taa which indicate plurality and can be 
attached to the noun, but their use is not strictly obligatory; thus, addressees usually 




     Subjects and objects are often omitted when they are obvious between the 
speaker and the hearer. Postpositions and case markers appear after nouns and they 
are more varied than in Japanese. For example, there are two nominative case 
markers in Luchuan, ga and nu, while Japanese has only one nominative case marker, 
ga. One of the noticeable differences between these two languages is that Luchuan 
does not have an objective case marker. The use of the objective case marker wo in 
Japanese is considered to have appeared relatively recently (Chamberlain 1895). 
Luchuan also has a topicalization marker ja, which fuses with the final vowel of the 
word‘s ending; if there is a light syllable word-finally such as i, u, and a, the fused 
forms are ee, oo, aa respectively, although if the word ends with a long vowel or a 
syllabic phoneme, fusion does not occur (Uemura 2003). 
     There are two kinds of tenses, non-past and past, and future is expressed by 
time adverbs or by the context. A detailed discussion of tense and aspect will be 
given in Chapter 6 of this dissertation. There are three negative markers, (r)aN, uraN, 
and nee(ra)N, and there are two question markers, -i for yes-no questions, and -ga for 
content questions.  
 
1.3.4  Verb morphology 
 
There are not many studies of verb morphology in Luchuan except for Kina (1999) 
and Miyara (2000, 2002). Table 1 shows my analysis of verb morphology. This is 
fairly different from the existing work in terms of the slots that I have assumed for 
evidentials. Here I will simply give an overview of the system that I have arrived at, 
with a brief explanation of some of the features in Table 1, and will provide a 
discussion of the literature and a number of associated issues in 2.2.2.  
      





















                     Table 1. Morphology of finite verbs  
 




continuative and -ee- conveys resultative aspect. There is only one tense marker, 
which indicates past tense, as non-past (present) tense is unmarked. I will discuss the 
functions of the mood marker in 3.3.4.  
Where this table significantly departs from the literature is in identifying three 
slots for evidentials (1) - (3). The direct evidential -N appears in the slot for 
evidential (1) and the other two morphemes -ru and -sa which appear in the same slot 
as -N are evidentially neutral elements. I will return to this issue in Chapter 2, 
Section 2.2.2 to explain how my analysis is different from the analyses currently 
available in the literature. The Inferential tee and Assumed evidential hazi occupy the 
slot for evidential (2), and the Reportative evidential Ndi appears in the slot for 
evidential (3).  
 
1.4  Data collection 
 
The fieldwork processes which were undertaken for this thesis can be divided into 
approximately three periods. First, I conducted intensive fieldwork in 1999 with 
nineteen native speakers of Luchuan.  Basic sentence constructions were 
investigated with the assistance of these speakers in elicitation sessions. The sessions 
followed a pattern according to a questionnaire which I had prepared beforehand 
with my supervisors‘ advice. The elicitation sessions took place in a nursing home, 
day-care facilities for elderly, and clubs for the elderly at a community center. I also 
visited the homes of some of the speakers, if they were willing to give more 
information.   
     The second period of data collection started in 2000 and is ongoing. The 
consultant over this long span has been my father, Gikei Arakaki. He was born in 
1938 and his parents (my grandparents), who were born in the 1890s, spoke only 
Luchuan. They did not understand Japanese at all, and could neither read nor write 
Japanese or Luchuan. They moved from Shuri to Kadena when they were young, but 
they continued to speak only the Shuri dialect at home. My father spoke only 
Luchuan until he began to go to school. In general at that time, children used to start 
to learn Japanese at elementary school. However, my father lost the opportunity to 
attend the first four years of school, because of the Battle of Okinawa and the chaotic 




started to go to school, when he was 10 or 11 years old. Because of this background 
and the fact that he had to speak only Luchuan with his parents, he is more fluent in 
Luchuan than many people of the same generation. His job was a village councilor in 
his twenties and thirties, and since then he has been a farmer. Now my parents use 
Luchuan most of the time for their daily life, though they seldom speak Luchuan to 
their children and grandchildren. 
     The third period of data collection was from 2007 to 2009. The consultant 
during this period was Ms. Masako Nakazato, who was born in 1923. Her parents, 
herself and her husband were all originally from Shuri. She was a primary school 
teacher for forty years. Now she is retired and does various kinds of volunteer work. 
She has also helped in the making of a sound database for the Dictionary of the 
Okinawan Language as one of the narrators recording examples. She is very willing 
to contribute to preserve her native language; therefore, she has spent a lot of time 
for my research. I visit her regularly. 
    Based on the survey I conducted in 1999, I developed a questionnaire for these 
two individual consultants, my father and Ms. Nakazato, and asked the two of them 
separately. For the purpose of collecting information relating to evidentiality, I have 
especially taken care to observe two points: 
 
(i) Trying to give the details of the context as much as possible. 
(ii) Trying to make the context one in which more than two people participate. 
 
The first point is important because I do not want to gather literal translations from 
Japanese to Luchuan. Such a translation would sound unnatural and would fail to 
elicit possible variations. Therefore, contexts are set up where attention is paid to 
factors such as whether the speaker and/or the hearer are supposed to see the event or 
not, how much the speaker is supposed to know about the person in the topic, and so 
on. The second point is important in order to determine how the third person is 
described, since the use of evidentials could vary depending on persons. 
Aikhenvald‘s ―Fieldworker‘s guide: How to gather materials on evidentiality 
systems‖ (Aikhenvald 2004) was useful for making appropriate context and 
examples.  




conversation, mainly from my parents and sometimes from relatives. Written 
materials are not used so much, but the data do include some examples from a book, 
a collection of folk tales.  
 
1.5  Evidentiality in general linguistic theory 
 
1.5.1  What is evidentiality? 
 
Evidentiality is a grammatical category which refers to the source of information. 
According to Aikhenvald (2004), about a quarter of the world‘s languages have 
evidential systems, i.e., they specify the type of source of the information, whether 
the speaker saw it, or heard it, or inferred it from indirect evidence, or learned it from 
someone else. Aikhenvald (2004) states that the use of the concept of evidentiality is 
relatively recent, and until attention began to be paid to this concept, evidential 
particles had been misidentified in many languages.
 
 Jacobsen (1986) states that the 
concept of evidentiality in present usage probably derives from the study of Kwakiutl 
by Franz Boas (1911). For example, Boas (1938: 133) states that ―while for us 
definiteness, number, and time are obligatory aspects, we find in another language 
location near the speaker or somewhere else, source of information ― whether seen, 
heard, or inferred ― as obligatory aspect.‖   
     The term ‗evidential‘ is introduced by Jakobson (1957/1971). One of the most 
important points in his study was that he analyzed evidentiality as a grammatical 
category an a par with the categories of person, voice, and tense. Another notable 
advance he made was to subcategorize the category of evidentiality according to the 
type of evidence available: hearsay evidence, relative evidence, and presumptive 
evidence. 
In recent years, as the study of evidentiality has deepened, the meaning of the 
term evidential has diversified. An excellent collection of studies on evidentiality 
edited by Chafe and Nichols, Evidentiality: the Linguistic Coding of Epistemology 
(1986), stimulated the study of evidentiality. In brief, in this collection, Chafe 
presented a narrow sense and a broad sense of the term ―evidential‖: the narrow 




contains the speaker‘s attitude towards the knowledge
8
 (Chafe 1986). The narrow 
sense appears to indicate evidentiality alone, but the broad sense seems to straddle 
the two categories of evidentiality and modality. Since then, the definition of 
evidentiality has been used differently among researchers and a great deal of 
discussion has revolved around whether these two concepts are in the relation of 
disjunction (completely different), inclusion (one category includes the other), or 
overlap (Dendale 2001). There are some studies which consider that evidentiality 
should be used to indicate both the sources of information and the speaker‘s degree 
of certainty toward the proposition.
9
 In fact, some researchers consider that 
evidentiality is a subcategory of modality, or the other way around
10
 (Bybee 1985, 
Palmer 1986), and some regard both categories as partially overlapping categories 
(Izvorski 1997, Garrett 2001, Faller 2002, McCready and Ogata 2007). On the other 
hand, de Haan (1999) claims that these two concepts should be distinguished from 
each other because they are semantically different, in that evidentiality indicates the 
source of information while modality evaluates the speaker‘s commitment to the 
statement; his conclusion, then, is that their overlap in some languages is not 
universal. Similarly Aikhenvald insists that evidentiality is an independent 
grammatical category (2003, 2004). Since the definitions of evidentiality vary 
depending on researchers, it would be premature to conclude that evidentiality 
should be regarded as a part of modality because it can express the speaker‘s degree 
of certainty about the proposition expressed, rather than being regarded as an 
independent grammatical category that indicates the source of information. Therefore, 
careful investigation is necessary to distinguish these categories.  
 
1.5.2  Definitions of evidentials 
 
Let us begin with clarifying the definition of evidentiality. Anderson (1986: 274-275) 
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proposes to define archetypal evidentials based on empirical observations. The 
identification contains four criteria as follows: 
 
(a) Evidentials show the kind of justification for a factual claim which is available to 
the person making that claim.
11
  
(b) Evidentials are not themselves the main predication of the clause, but are rather a 
specification added to a factual claim about something else. 
(c) Evidentials have the indication of evidence as in (a) as their primary meaning, not 
only as a pragmatic inference.  
(d) Morphologically, evidentials are inflections, clitics, or other free syntactic 
elements (not compounds or derivational forms).  
 
The criteria in (a) to (c) of this identification seem to be generally accepted among 
scholars, but criterion (d), which concerns the surface realization of evidentials, is 
more contentious. Faller (2002: 6) claims that criterion (d) might be too restrictive. 
According to Faller, it is too difficult to establish whether an expression has already 
become an element that conforms to criterion (d) for intermediate stages in the 
process, because evidential in many languages develop out of perception verbs. 
Similarly, Aikhenvald (2003:24, 2004:16) states that criterion (d) should not be 
included in the definition because this criterion would not apply in a system in which 
the distinction between inflectional and derivational categories is not clearly made. 
As these arguments show, the point in (d) appears to need to be carefully reexamined, 
but the criteria (a)-(c) stand as reasonable criteria. Anderson (1986:277) presents 
further generalizations about evidentials as follows: 
 
(i) Evidentials are normally used in assertions (realis clauses), not in irrealis clauses, 
nor in presuppositions. 
(ii) When the claimed fact is directly observable by both speaker and hearer, 
evidentials are rarely used (or have a special emphatic or surprisal sense). 
(iii) When the speaker (first person) was a knowing participant in some event 
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(voluntary agent; conscious experiencer), the knowledge of that event is 
normally direct and evidentials are then often omitted. 
(iv) Often, it is claimed, second person in questions is treated as first person in 
statements.  
 
Again, Aikhenvald (2004:16) claims that the points (i)-(iii) above are highly 
debatable, from a typological perspective, citing some languages where evidential 
may be used in irrealis clauses, and she claims further that the distinction in point 
(iv) above is not at all necessarily linked to evidentiality.
12
 These criteria also do not 
seem to fit the data from Luchuan, as we shall see in the following chapters. 
Therefore, so far, only Anderson‘s criteria (a)-(c), which I presented above, should be 
regarded as generally accepted properties of evidentials. 
     Next, we move on to the question of whether or not evidentials are an 
obligatory category. Aikhenvald (2004) claims that marking the grammatical 
evidential is obligatory, and the idea of obligatory marking of information comes 
from Franz Boas (Aikhenvald 2007). As for clarification about what ―obligatory‖ 
means, Aikhenvald (2007:3) states that, ―In languages with obligatory evidentiality, a 
closed set of information source has to be marked in every clause.‖ However, 
whether or not this condition is criterial needs to be discussed, since items that have 
been argued to be evidentials in some languages do not seem to meet this condition. 
For example, the use of evidentials in Cusco Quechua is not obligatory (Faller 2002), 
and evidentials in Japanese are not obligatory (McCready and Ogata 2007), nor are 
evidentials in St‘át‘imcets (Matthewson et al. 2007). McCready and Ogata 
(2007:152) state that, ―Although it is true that many languages that have evidentials 
strongly prefer their use, such use is almost never ― and possibly simply never ―
obligatory.‖  
     As for evidentials in Luchuan, their usage is not obligatory in the strict sense 
that Aikhenvald states above. For example, I do not consider the use of the Direct 
evidential -N in Luchuan to be obligatory in the strict sense, since there are other 
non-evidential morphemes, -ru and –sa, which can occupy the same slot as -N, 
though its usage is obligatory in the sense that the slot in which -N appears is 
necessarily occupied in order for sentences to be grammatically well-formed. I will 
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return to this issue in 1.6.2. However, this does not mean that the case of Luchuan 
supports the hypothesis that evidentials are obligatory in languages that have them. 
What I can suggest from the case of Luchuan and studies of other languages such as 
Quechua, is that whether or not evidentials are obligatory is language specific. Thus, 
I conclude that the obligatory marking of information should probably be excluded 
from the basic definitional properties.  
     The discussion of whether evidentials are obligatory or not is also related to 
the issue of whether evidentials are closed grammatical systems or not. Aikhenvald 
distinguishes languages that have the grammatical category of evidentiality from 
languages in which non-evidential categories express evidential extensions. 
Aikhenvald (2007:1) states that, ―The term ‗evidential‘ primarily relates to 
information source as a closed grammatical system whose use is obligatory.‖ This 
simply means that if a closed set of information sources are not marked in every 
clause, the clause would be ungrammatical in languages with obligatory evidentiality. 
To explain the term ‗closed grammatical system‘, Aikhenvald compares tense and 
time. The term tense expresses a closed set of grammaticalized expressions of 
location in time such as present, past and future. Contrastively time corresponds to 
sets of lexical items that refer to locations in time (such as yesterday, today, and 
tomorrow). Also, Aikhenvald explains that the options of closed grammatical 
systems are restricted, whereas the options of the lexicon are potentially open. 
Should this criterion, ‗closed grammatical system‘, be part of the definition of 
evidential? As far as I can determine, the issue of whether or not evidentials should 
be a closed set of grammaticalized expression does not seem to be handled very fully 
in the literature. Anderson‘s criterion in (d) above appears to be relevant to this issue, 
since he mentions that evidentials should be inflections, clitics, or other free syntactic 
elements. Although this criterion is questioned by Faller (2002) and Aikhenvald 
(2004) as we have seen above, as far as I understand, it does not mean that they 
completely deny Anderson‘s criterion in (d). It seems that the focus of their 
disagreement is the fact that Anderson excludes compounds and derivational forms 
from the definition. In fact, ―inflections, clitics, or other free syntactic elements‖ are 
considered to belong to ‗closed‘ grammatical category.
13
 Therefore, the property of 
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being a closed grammatical category might well be included in the definition of 
evidentiality, although this issue has not yet been widely discussed.  
     My overview of the definitions of evidentiality so far have highlighted that 
there are at least three criteria for evidential (as Anderson presents in (a) to (c)). 
Although these criteria need to be slightly modified (as we shall see below, for 
example for the concept ‗primary meaning‘ in (c)), I consider these three definitions 
to be generally agreed upon among scholars.  
     Now, we need to return to consider the difference between Anderson‘s three 
criteria in (a)-(c) and the broad definition of evidentials that contains the speaker‘s 
degree of certainty or commitment, as Chafe (1986) presents. Jacobsen (1986) 
considers that the speaker assumes that predications with evidentials are true, but that 
the speaker is unable to verify this assumption by direct observation or experience. 
Also, the definition of evidentiality given by Mithun (1986) contains not only the 
source of information, but also the degree of precision, probability, and expectation. 
In this approach, epistemic modality seems to be included in the concept of 
evidentiality. Another different perspective is to consider evidentiality to be able to 
indicate a speaker‘s attitude, but some researchers claim that evidentiality need not 
necessarily signify attitude (Comrie 2000; Aikhenvald 2003). It is not surprising that 
indicating the source of knowledge or information is often accompanied by the 
speaker‘s certainty or attitude, so it is natural to consider this part as an optional 
element; however, it should not be considered as an encoded meaning of evidentials 
since evidentials in some languages do not always have this meaning.  
     As we have seen, if evidentials are able to indicate the speaker‘s attitude at all, 
then we need to consider how to differentiate evidentials from the category of 
modality. Although this issue is probably too complicated to reach a firm conclusion, 
since the number of studies concerning modality is very large, I will nevertheless be 
able to present what can be suggested on the basis of observing the features of 
evidentials in Luchuan. I will return to this issue in Chapter 5, after investigating the 
evidential systems in Luchuan in Chapter 2 to Chapter 4. Now I will turn to more 
general discussions.  
     Palmer (2001) classifies modality into two categories; propositional modality 
and event modality. Propositional modality is concerned with ―the speaker‘s 




attitude towards a potential future event‖.
14
 Furthermore, propositional modality is 
subcategorized into ‗epistemic modality‘ and ‗evidential modality‘. The basic 
difference between these two is that ―with epistemic modality speakers make 
judgments about the factual status of the proposition, whereas with evidential 
modality they indicate what is the evidence they have for it‖ (Palmer 2001:24). It 
seems that here the concept of evidential is included in the category of modality. In 
fact, Palmer (1986:70) claims that ―It would be a futile exercise to try to decide 
whether a particular system (or even a term in a system in some cases) is evidential 
rather than a judgement. There is often no very clear distinction because speakers‘ 
judgments are naturally often related to the evidence they have.‖ But also he admits 
that it would be necessary to pursue whether some systems might be predominantly 
evidential (e.g. Tuyuca).   
     The converse view, which denies the idea that evidentiality is a subcategory of 
epistemic modality, can be found in de Haan (1999). De Haan argues that both 
evidentiality and modality deal with evidence but that they should be distinguished 
as two distinct categories: ―one, evidentiality, deals with the evidence the speaker has 
for his or her statement, while the other, epistemic modality, evaluates the speaker‘s 
statement and assigns it a commitment value‖ (p.25 MS).    
Along the same lines, Aikhenvald (2004:7) claims that ―Evidentiality is a 
category in its own right, and not a subcategory of any modality‖ and supports the 
arguments by de Haan (1999)
15
 and Lazard (1999; 2001), as well as DeLancy (2001). 
Aikhenvald disagrees with the view which considers evidentials to be modals (Bybee 
1985, Palmer 1986, van der Auwera and Plugian 1998, and Willet 1988). Aikhenvald 
claims that, ―To be considered as an evidential, a morpheme has to have ‗source of 
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 According to Palmer (2001:7), the sentences with ‗may‘ or ‗must‘ as in (i) can be paraphrased 
using ‗possible‘ and ‗necessary‘ as in (ii).  
(i) a. Kate may be at home now. 
b. Kate must be at home now. 
c. Kate may come in now. 
d. Kate must come in now.  
(ii) a. It is possible (possibly the case) that Kate is at home now. 
   b. It is necessarily the case that Kate is at home now. 
   c. It is possible for Kate to come in now. 
   d. It is necessary for Kate to come in now. 
Palmer (2001:7) states that ―the important distinction between the two pairs is indicated by the 
words ‗that‘ and ‗for‘. The sentences with ‗that‘ contain propositional modality and the sentences 
with ‗for‘ contain event modality.   
15
 This does not mean that Aikhenvald (2004) agrees with de Haan (1999) on every point. She 




information‘ as its core meaning‖ (p.3); therefore, an evidential may acquire 
secondary meanings such as reliability, probability, and possibilities, but these 
meanings are neither required nor primary meanings.  
Faller (2002:8) considers evidentiality to be a grammatical category its own 
right, but argues that the categories of evidentiality and epistemic modality overlap. 
She provides four reasons for her conclusion: (i) these two concepts are closely 
related, although they are sufficiently distinct conceptually; (ii) ―even though it is the 
case that many languages have elements that express both notions, there are clear 
cases of markers that only indicate one of them‖; (iii) ―there are methodological 
reasons for starting from the assumption that the two categories are distinct: a true 
evidential encodes a type of source of information, as opposed to (conversationally) 
implicating it‖; and (iv) ―the standard definition of epistemic modality is in terms of 
possibility and necessity‖ (p.9). She goes on to show that only the inferential 
evidential can be analyzed in these terms and this is why she considers there is an 
overlap between evidentiality and epistemic modality. 
     I find Faller‘s points (i) to (iii) convincing and I follow her analysis. In (i), 
Faller concurs with the conceptual distinction drawn by de Haan (1999), pointing out 
that the two concepts of evidentiality and epistemic modality are fairly different. The 
point noted in (ii) is cross-linguistically valid and cannot be overlooked. The third 
point concerning encode and implicate is essential in that this distinction improves 
the accuracy of the definition. The distinction is clearer than Anderson‘s criterion (c), 
or ‗core meaning‘ or ‗primary meaning‘ in Aikhenvald‘s terminology. However, the 
last point in (iv) depends on how modality is defined. Faller (2002:81) adapts the 
definition of modality proposed by van der Auwera and Plungian (1998), ―for those 
semantic domains that involve possibility and necessity as paradigmatic variants, that 
is, as constituting a paradigm with two possible choices, possibility and necessity.‖ 
Also Faller quotes the definition of epistemic modality from van der Auwera and 
Plungian (1998:80-1) that epistemic modality ―refers to the judgment of the speaker: 
a proposition is judged to be uncertain or probable relative to some judgement(s)‖. 
Although Faller‘s explanation is comprehensible and consistent, however, I note that 
this conclusion would not hold given a different definition of modality such as that 
proposed in cognitive linguistics by Langacker (1991). Langacker does not consider 




grammatical category, one that indicates the relation between reality and irreality.
16
 
Sentences indicate irreality as long as they contain modal verbs. If the definition of 
modality does not depend on possibility and necessity, as in Langacker‘s approach, 
the fourth point Faller makes may be weakened.  
     However, since I consider Faller‘s arguments in points (i)-(iii) to be 
sufficiently clear and convincing, I follow Faller (2002) in her conclusion that 
evidentiality and epistemic modality are different categories, choosing the narrow 
definition as in Aikhenvald (2004) and de Haan (1999). Considering evidentiality to 
be a category in its own right still does not exclude the possibility that the categories 
of evidentiality and epistemic modality might overlap. These two categories could be 
conceptually distinguished from each other, or they could partially intersect. My 
hypothesis is that these two categories in Luchuan do in fact partially overlap. That is, 
two of the indirect evidentials －  the Inferential and Assumed evidentials － 
belong to both the category of evidentiality and epistemic modality. This will be 
discussed further in Chapter 5. 
 
1.5.3  Definition of other related concepts  
 
I have discussed the definition of evidentials in the previous section. In this section, I 
attempt to clarify the definition of other related concepts. Let us consider what 
―epistemic modality‖ means in this dissertation, reviewing briefly some definitions in 
the literature. According to Palmer (2001:24), ―with epistemic modality speakers 
make judgments about the factual status of the proposition‖, and Haan (1999:25 MS) 
argues that epistemic modality, ―evaluates the speaker‘s statement and assigns it a 
commitment value‖ (p.25 MS). These two definitions indicate that epistemic 
modality express the speaker‘s judgement or evaluation of the statement. Bybee et.al 
(1994) give a similar definition. 
Van der Auwera and Plungian (1998:80-1) state that epistemic modality ―refers 
to the judgment of the speaker: a proposition is judged to be uncertain or probable 
relative to some judgement(s)‖. Similarly Aikhenvald (2004) states that epistemic 
modality is associated with epistemic meanings, the meaning of which is (a) 
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possibility or probablility of an event, or (b) of the reliability of information.  
Considering these definitions, I define epistemic modality as the speaker‘s 
judgement, evaluation of (i) the factual basis of the statement or the reliability of 
information, or (ii) the possibility or probability of an event. Therefore, it is obvious 
that epistemic meanings are fairly different from those associated with evidentiality, 
which clarifies the source of information.  
The next concepts that need to be clarified are ―subjectivity‖ and objectivity‖. 
These concepts are essential in the analysis of natural languages because modality in 
natural languages generally expresses the speaker‘s subjective attitude to the 
proposition or the event (Halliday 1970, Lyons 1977, Coates 1983, Palmer 1986). 
Lyons (1977) uses the concepts of subjective and objective in investigating the 
meaning of epistemic modality.
17
 However, the terms ―subjectivity‖ and 
―objectivity‖ used in this dissertation are more general in that subjectivity indicates 
that ―the level of speaker‘s involvement or commitment is high‖ and objectivity 
indicates that the involvement or commitment is not restricted to the speaker 
him/herself only but it could be shared by others.  
   
1.5.4  Classification of evidentiality  
 
In this section, I will introduce the typological classification of evidentials and clarify 
each subtype of evidentiality. Classifications of evidential types abound,
18
 but 
according to Aikhenvald (2004:66), the most straightforward grouping is to classify 
them as belonging to sensory parameters, inference, and verbal report. Similarly, 
Willet (1988) also classifies evidential types into three categories; ‗attested evidence‘ 
(sensory evidence), ‗inferring evidence‘, and ‗reported evidence‘. According to 
Aikhenvald (2003, 2004), ―the simplest evidentiality systems consist of just two 
distinctions; more complicated ones involve up to six (or possibly more).‖ 
Aikhenvald classifies evidential systems with two choices into five classes (A1-A5), 
evidential systems with three choices into five types (B1-B5), and evidential systems 
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 For example, Lyons (1977:797) distinguishes subjective meaning from objective meaning in 
the sentence ―Alfred may be unmarried‖. 
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 These include Chafe‘s model of knowledge type, (1986) Palmer‘s model of epistemic 
modality (1986), Willett‘s model of the type of evidence (1988), Anderson (1986)‘s framework 
constructing ‗a ―map‖ of evidential meanings, showing which meanings are more closely related 




with four choices into three types (C1-C3). Evidential systems with five choices are 
referred to as D1. 
 
Systems with two choices: 
A1. Firsthand and Non-firsthand 
A2. Non-firsthand versus ‗everything else‘ 
A3. Reported (or ‗hearsay‘) versus ‗everything else‘ 
A4. Sensory evidence and Reported (or ‗hearsay‘) 
A5. Auditory (acquired through hearing) versus ‗everything else‘ 
 
Systems with three choices: 
B1. Direct (or Visual), Inferred, Reported 
B2. Visual, Non-visual sensory, Inferred 
B3. Visual, Non-visual sensory, Reported 
B4. Non-visual sensory, Inferred, Reported 
B5. Reported, Quotative, ‗everything else‘ 
 
Systems with four choices: 
C1. Visual, Non-visual sensory, Inferred, Reported 
C2. Direct (or Visual), Inferred, Assumed, Reported 
C3.Direct, Inferred, Reported, Quotative 
 
Systems with five or more choices: 
D1. Visual, Non-visual sensory, Inferred, Assumed, and Reported 
(Aikhenvald 2004) 
 
Let me briefly explain the meaning of each semantic subtype according to 
Aikhenvald‘s definition. Firsthand evidentials refer to something the speaker has 
seen, heard, or otherwise experienced. On the other hand, the non-firsthand 
evidential contrasts with the firsthand evidential, and refers to something the speaker 
has not seen, heard, or experienced. It may include inferred, assumed or reported 
information. The direct evidential is often treated as being the same as the visual 




broader in that it covers speakers‘ or participants‘ own sensory experience through 
any of the senses. The non-visual evidential covers information that is gained 
directly through means other than visual perception: i.e., hearing, smelling, tasting, 
feeling, and sometimes also touching something. The inferred evidential is based on 
visible or tangible evidence or results, while the assumed evidential covers evidence 
other than visible results, such as logical conclusion or general knowledge and 
experience. The main meaning of the reported evidential is to mark what has been 
learned from someone else‘s verbal report. The quotative evidential also covers 
reported information but with an overt reference to the quoted source. 
My hypothesis is that Luchuan has four types of evidential as illustrated in 
(1a)-(d) above, namely those belonging to C2 (Direct, Inferred, Assumed, Reported) 
in Aikhenvald‘s classification.  
 
1.6  Evidentiality in Luchuan 
 
In this section, I will briefly present the literature which is related to Luchuan 
evidentials and then discuss the obligatoriness of evidentials in Luchuan. 
 
1.6.1  Overview of studies on evidentiality in Luchuan 
 
In this section, I briefly review the development of studies concerning evidentials in 
Luchuan. The concept of evidentiality itself is relatively new and has not been 
applied to the study of Luchuan until recently. It is probably Tsuhako (1989) who 
uses the term ‗witness‘ for the first time. This was a great achievement; however, she 
focuses on aspectual issues rather than evidential meaning, attempting to describe 
this phenomenon as a part of the aspectual system. Tsuhako draws attention to the 
past progressive form that is used to describe an event witnessed by the speaker. In 
the following chapters, I will demonstrate that direct evidential meaning should be 
regarded as carried by the morpheme -N rather than ―the past progressive form‖ and 
will argue that all forms which contain this morpheme indicate that the speaker has 
direct evidence.  
     Shinzato (1991) deepens Tsuhako‘s argument, presenting a more specific 




epistemic information, such as (a) perceptual information from experience, (b) 
perceptual information from observation, and (c) inferentially acquired information. 
Subsequently, Shinzato‘s survey has been explored and developed by Miyara (2002), 
though again similarly to Tsuhako and Shinzato he does not appeal to the concept of 




Kudo et al. (2007) use the term ‗evidentiality‘ and focus on witnessed 
information and inferred information. They explore these topics in detail and develop 
an argument concerning evidentiality which also analyzes aspectual issues. Their use 
of the term ‗evidentiality‘ emphasizes the importance of this concept; however, it 
seems that the concept of evidentiality is not used in the sense I defined above, that is, 
an independent grammatical category on its own. In fact, whether the evidential 
system as seen as a grammatical category is not clarified; nor does this paper address 
whether or not Luchuan has only direct and inferred evidentials, or whether or not 
the category which indicates ‗Non-visual‘ or ‗everything else‘ exists (as in 
classification of evidential systems provided by Aikhenvald (2004) in the previous 
section). Moreover, their study does not mention the Assumed and the Reportative 
evidential.
20
 The data they provide suggest that the inferential form can indicate 
reported information (Kudo et al. 2007:152), but this analysis is not clear about what 
kind of reported information is involved, or what the difference is between the 
information marked by the inferential form and the Reportative evidential -Ndi in 
Luchuan; thus, the functions of the inferential form needs to be investigated further. 
This confusion might be derived from a failure to consider evidential as a 
grammatical category. Therefore, I focus on a systematic study to grasp the whole 
picture of evidentials in Luchuan. 
 
1.6.2  Obligatoriness of evidentials in Luchuan 
 
In 1.5.1 above, I outlined the existing discussions concerning whether evidentials 
should be obligatorily presented or not. Here I explain my view about this issue. As I 
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 Miyara focuses on points (b) and (c) (observation and inferential information), and does not 
mention point (a) about direct experience. 
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 I assume that they do not consider these evidentials (Assumed and Reportative) to exist in 




have mentioned, I consider that the use of evidentials in Luchuan is not obligatory in 
the strict sense that Aikhenvald (2004) identifies. Aikhenvald states that ―In 
languages with grammatical evidentiality, marking how one knows something is a 
must,‖ and consequently, lack of the use of the evidential could cause serious 
problems in communication. This is not true in the use of the evidential in Luchuan. 
Most sentences contain one (or two) evidential markers as in (1a) - (1d), but 
sentences without any evidentials also do exist; therefore, evidentiality is not 
obligatorily marked in Luchuan.  
     In considering the issue of obligatoriness, let us begin with an overall survey. 
The first point I will make clear is that in morphosyntactic terms, the slot for the 
Direct evidential is obligatorily present. The direct evidential -N cannot simply be 
omitted because this slot appears to need to be filled morphosyntactically, as in (2a), 
so it should be substituted by evidentially neutral elements, -sa and -ru as in (2b) and 
(2c).  
 
(2) a. *Yoko ga juubaN  nic-ee. 
      Yoko NM dinner cook-RES 
      Intended meaning: ‗Yoko has cooked dinner.‘ 
 
b. Yoko ga juubaN  nic-ee-sa. 
     Yoko NM dinner  cook-RES-FP 
     ‗Yoko has cooked dinner.‘ 
 
 c. Yoko ga  du  juubaN  nic-ee-ru. 
     Yoko NM  AP dinner   cook-RES-ATTR 
     ‗It is Yoko who has cooked dinner.‘ 
 
I consider that sentences with -sa and -ru like (2b) and (2c) do not encode evidential 
meaning, though they can implicate it.
21
 In other words, -sa can be used when the 
speaker has direct evidence but it can also be used without direct evidence when 
showing the speaker‘s belief or guess. The sentence with -sa sounds objective and 
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tends to be used when the speaker shares the information with other participants. As 
for -ru, it is used with an adnominal particle -du and the combination with -du and 
-ru in the attributed form is called the Kakari-musubi construction. The phrase which 
is focused by -du (in this case, Yoko) expresses new information, and the rest of the 
part is given information. Considering the fact that there are choices among -N, -sa, 
and -ru as in (2a) - (2b), I consider that the choice of the direct evidential is not 
obligatory. 
     Let us move on to the indirect evidentials that I presented in (1b) to (1d) in 1.1. 
Even if these indirect evidentials are omitted, the sentences are grammatical, except 
for the example of the Assumed evidential in (1c). When the Assumed evidential is 
omitted, the adnominal particle -du must be attached, to make the kakari-musubi 
construction just mentioned. The other two indirect evidentials are not obligatorily 
required in order to produce well-formed grammatical sentences. However, when the 
speaker has corresponding evidence, they are required. For example, if the speaker 
acquires information from someone else, the Reportative evidential is required, as in 
(1d). This fact leads us to reconsider the meaning of ‗obligatoriness‘. That is, if 
grammaticality is the only measurement of obligatoriness, the Inferred and the 
Reportative are completely optional; however, if the speaker has certain evidence, 
marking evidentiality in the sentence is obligatory. In this understanding, it should 
not be considered that evidential choice in Luchuan is simply optional. 
     Let me summarize the points I have established in this section. 
(i) The four morphemes presented in (1a) - (1d) are evidentials, while -sa and -ru as 
in (2b) and (2c) are not evidentials. Thus, marking evidentials is not obligatory, 
since sentences without evidentials exist. 
(ii) Sentences with the indirect evidential, like example (1b) - (1d), illustrate that 
evidential marking is necessary when the speaker‘s assertions are based on 
inference, assumption, or reported information. Even without appropriate 
evidentials, sentences are not ungrammatical, but they convey different meanings.    
 
1.7  Organization of the dissertation 
 
In Chapter 1, I have briefly presented the background of Ryukyu and Luchuan. Then, 




linguistic theory and also the discussions relating to this topic in Luchuan. 
In Chapter 2, I propose a radically new analysis that attempts to reexamine 
what has been discussed in the literature, and to establish the evidential system as an 
independent category. Especially I focus on revising the concept of the direct 
evidential from visual evidence to broader concepts, adopting the concept of best 
possible ground presented by Faller (2002) in her investigation of Cuzco Quechua. 
Considering the similarities and the differences in the behavior of the direct 
evidential between these two languages, I will present a specific proposal for the 
interpretation of the Direct evidential in Luchuan. I will also discuss the problem of 
whether or not the Direct evidential conveys the speaker‘s degree of certainty, or how 
the Direct evidential behaves in negative and interrogative sentences, in order to 
argue that in Luchuan, because evidentials take higher scope than other categories 
like negation or interrogatives, therefore evidentiality should be distinguished from 
epistemic modality.  
Chapter 3 concentrates on discussing the semantic and syntactic functions of 
the Inferential and Assumed evidentials, and in Chapter 4, those of the Reported 
evidential will be described. This approach has not been explored so far; therefore, 
establishing the category of indirect evidentials in Luchuan is what has been missing 
and needed.  
     Chapter 5 discusses mainly two issues. First, I discuss double marking of 
evidentials to demonstrate there are no contradictions or inconsistencies in multiple 
uses of evidentials. Second, I return to the theoretical issues, the conceptual relations 
between epistemic modality and evidentials, examining all four of the evidentials in 
Luchuan.  
     In Chapter 6, I summarize the contributions of this study and discuss some 
remaining issues and possible solutions. 
 
1.8  Summary  
 
I have provided an overview of the basic background of Ryukyu and Luchuan, and of 
what has been discussed in the literature concerning evidentiality, both in the general 
linguistic and in Luchuan literature. I have pointed out that so far there has been no 




Luchuan has an evidential system with four choices; Direct, Inferential, Assumed, 
and Reportative. Although they are not all obligatory to make grammatically 
well-formed sentences, in certain contexts they may be required to make felicitous 






























Chapter 2  The Direct evidential  
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
In 1.6, I briefly introduced the major issues in the literature on Luchuan grammar. In 
this chapter, I move on to look at some existing studies in a little more detail; not to 
attempt to dig deeper into those arguments but to demonstrate the necessity of a new 
approach (2.2.1). As a start to presenting my own work, I review my morphological 
template for the Luchuan verb, in 2.2.2.  In 2.3, I introduce a new approach, 
departing from tradition by including evidentials as a grammatical category in the 
description of the Shuri dialect. After presenting my proposal concerning the Direct 
evidential in Luchuan, I will investigate whether the category of evidentiality can be 
distinguished from the category of epistemic modality, in 2.4.   
 
2.2  Overview of the Direct evidential in the literature 
 
2.2.1  Preceding studies of evidentiality in Luchuan 
 
As we have seen in 1.6, although studies have been carried out into Luchuan verb 
forms, the phenomena that seem to bear on evidentiality have not yet been fully 
clarified, because existing studies are limited to the tense, aspect, and modality 
(TAM) system, neglecting the grammatical category of evidentiality. One of the 
factors that makes the existing analyses complicated is the lack of (or inconsistency 
in) morphological analysis. The traditional grammatical approach to the study of 
Luchuan does not clearly state which morpheme corresponds to which grammatical 
category.
1
 For example, in most existing studies, the entire form junuN (read) is 
referred to as ―basic aspect present‖ and judooN (be reading) as ―continuative aspect 
present‖ without any word-internal morphological units/boundaries being indicated.      
The lack of morphological analysis makes it difficult to understand which part 
of the whole form indicates evidentiality, aspect or modality. The complexity of the 
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 Miyara (2002) points out the problem of lack of morphological analysis and provides his own. 




tense, aspect, modality system in Luchuan is pointed out by Kudo et al. (2007), who 
state that it is not possible to describe Luchuan grammar by disconnecting tense, 
aspect and mood from each other. However, it is necessary to attempt to tease apart 
the entangled systems to clarify whether they really cannot be separated, or, if they 
are not separable, whether they should be considered to be a fused system. Without 
such discussion, no one can prove whether Luchuan has a grammatical evidential 
system or not.  
Having provided an overview of existing studies on evidentiality in 1.6.1, we 
now move on to a slightly more detailed look at studies concerning evidentiality in 
Luchuan and some analysis concerning morphology as well, before providing a 
morphological analysis in 2.2.2. Even though in the early stage of traditional studies 
of Luchuan grammar, the term evidentiality is not used to describe the Luchuan verb 
forms, there are some indications that the concept of evidentiality seems to be 
important. Uemura (1963:75) states that positive definite past (judeeN) is used to 
express a past state/event as something with a certain factual basis (2003:145),
2
 
although there is no further explanation of what ‗a certain factual basis‘ refers to. 
Tsuhako states that the definite past is used to make a conjecture about irrealis events 
(Tsuhako 1992:837). Unfortunately there is no further explanation about this form in 
her study, but the table that Tsuhako provides indicates that she interprets this form 
as encoding mood, not evidentiality or modality.  It seems that Tsuhako (1989) was 
the first scholar to use the term ‗witness‘ to explain ‗past continuative aspect‘
3
 
(jumutaN). This was a significant achievement in terms of drawing attention to the 
fact that the aspectual approach is not enough, although she nevertheless classifies 
this form as expressing continuative aspect rather than as a type of evidentiality. 
Uemura (1992:806) also called the progressive past ‗reported past‘ and mentioned 
that the concept of ‗witness‘ is relevant to this form. However, it was mainly 
aspectual properties which received the most attention at that time and the argument 
that the concept of evidential is crucial had not then been clearly presented.  
                                                   
2
 Uemura wrote the grammar section of the Dictionary of Okinawan Language (1963). In this 
section, I use the technical terms Uemura uses, as translated into English by Wayne P. Lawrence 
(2003). But I will employ the terminology based on my morphological analysis which I will 
present in 2.2.2. 
3
 Tsuhako claims that there are two types of continuative aspect; first past continuative 
(judootaN ‗was reading‘) and second past continuative (jumutaN ‗was reading‘). Uemura (1963, 
2003) uses the term ‗continuative past‘ for the former and ‗progressive past‘ for the latter, but the 




Shinzato (1991:59, 2003) presented a fresh approach demonstrating that -aN, 
-taN and -eeN should be investigated in terms of an epistemological rather than a 
temporal account. According to Shinzato, -aN indicates ‗perceptual information 
acquired through experience‘, -taN indicates ‗perceptual information acquired 
through observation‘, and -eeN indicates ‗inferentially acquired information‘. 
Although Shinzato‘s claim has greatly contributed to developing the discussion, there 
are some problems in her analysis. One of them is her morphological analysis. She 
discusses -taN in the context of the progressive past
4
 jumutaN ‗was reading‘; 
however there are other forms which contain -taN, such as judootaN, continuative 
past and judeetaN, resultative past.
5
 Since under this analysis these forms contain 
exactly the same morpheme -taN as the progressive past, if this morpheme really 
realized the feature of observation as Shinzato claims, consequently it would mean 
that these forms should share the same epistemic feature. But she does not mention 
this issue when referring to the other forms that contain -taN, although she introduces 
continuative aspect to distinguish it from progressive aspect. Also since she does not 
set a morphological boundary between -a-, -ta-, -ee- and -N, the contribution of -N is 
not discussed at all (in my analysis, -a- and -ta- are allomorphs which indicate past 
tense, and -N is a direct evidential, as I will explain below). 
Another problem in Shinzato‘s account is the analysis of subject restriction. 
She claims that -taN cannot co-occur with a first person subject, and -aN can only 
co-occur with a first person subject, and that the opposite is true in interrogative 
sentences. This description supports her hypothesis concerning the epistemic 
meaning of these forms. But this phenomenon needs to be observed more carefully, 
as the claims regarding this issue vary depending on scholars. 
6
In brief, then, while 
there are some problems in Shinzato‘s analysis, her point of view casts a new light on 
the subject. 
Miyara (2002) points out the lack of morphological analysis in Shinzato‘s 
                                                   
4
 Since the terminologies are different depending on the scholar, from now on, unless there is a 
statement to the contrary, Uemura‘s (1963) terms will be used in order to be consistent with the 
Dictionary of Okinawan Language.  
5
 I consider that -taN consists of two morphemes, -ta- and -N, but as Shinzato does not separate 
them from each other, in discussing her analysis I follow her in using -taN.  
6
 For example, although Shinzato claims that -aN can co-occur with a first person subject only in 
positive sentences, other scholars do not support this analysis. I consider that this disagreement is 





account. Miyara states that there are two morphemes which indicate modality; tee 
and yɨ. (Miyara states that /yɨ/ has three allomorphs +u, +yi, and +i.) The morpheme 
tee indicates that speakers have made an inference based on their observation of a 
situation. The morpheme yɨ indicates that speakers have directly observed the action 
(witness). The definitions of their meanings given by Miyara are basically the same 
as provided by Shinzato but Miyara takes a closer look at the morphological details, 
claiming that the elements encoding the modal meaning are tee and yɨ, not eeN and 
taN, and separating -N as a mood marker.  This claim of Miyara‘s raises the 
question of whether the morpheme -N is really irrelevant to the epistemic or modal 
meanings. My claim is that -N plays a crucial role in conveying epistemic and 
evidential meanings, as I will discuss below in Section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. There are also 
some further unsolved problems in Miyara‘s morphological analysis, which will be 
discussed in Section 2.2.2 below. Kina (1999) also claims that -u- is an observational 
marker as Miyara does. Although I here use the term ‗witness‘ to describe this form, 
in Arakaki (2002, 2003), I did not give ‗witness‘ as a gloss for -u- because I was 
aware that this morpheme indicates more than witness, i.e., it also includes concepts 
such as inner state or past habit; therefore I simply glossed -u- as ―U‖ in the previous 
discussion. In this dissertation, I regard -u- as imperfective aspect and -N as a direct 
evidential. 
The most recent work on the Shuri dialect is reported in Kudo et al. (2007). In 
stark contrast to Miyara‘s approach, Kudo et al. imply that tense, aspect, and mood 
form a tripartite system which cannot be split apart. Kudo et al. do not present any 
morphological argument but they suggest that these forms have been evolving to 
express evidentiality and mirativity instead of tense and aspect.
7
 Since this 
dissertation does not take a diachronic approach, I will not be able to include any 
discussion concerning the evolution of grammatical categories, but I will show that 
the aspectual analysis of the traditional approach should be reexamined. It should 
also be noted that although it is possible that, as Kudo et al. suggest, tense, aspect, 
and mood should not be split apart, Kudo et al. do not actually show that such a 
separation is impossible, and I believe it is worth attempting to disentangle the 
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 According to Kudo et al., mirativity indicates unexpected or surprised feelings (2007:152).  
They refer to a study of mirativity in Turkish by Slovin and Aksu (1982) and Kudo et al. claim 
that mirativity in Turkish and in Luchuan look similar though they are not completely identical. 
However, details about mirativity in Luchuan – for example whether it is obligatory or unmarked 





I now summarize the claims about the concept of evidentiality in Luchuan 
which have been made in the literature. Note that the concept of evidentiality in this 
case refers to what I interpret as phenomena which should be regarded as part of the 
category of evidentiality, since ‗evidentiality‘ as a grammatical category is not used 
elsewhere in the literature. I will then evaluate whether these claims are defensible, 
and where they are not, I will attempt to modify them.   
 
I. Direct evidentiality 
a. The progressive past jumutaN ‗was reading‘ is used to describe information gained 
from direct observation (Tsuhako 1989, 1992; Uemura 1992; and Kudo et al. 2007). 
b. The morpheme -u- indicates information gained from observation (Kina 1999; 
Miyara 2000, 2002). 
c. The morpheme -aN indicates perceptual information acquired through experience 
and taN indicates perceptual information acquired through observation (Shinzato 
1991). 
 
II. Indirect evidentiality 
a. The positive definite past judeeN ‗must have read‘ is used to express a past 
state/event as something with a certain factual basis (Uemura 1963, 1992). 
b. The definite past is used to make a conjecture about irrealis events (Tsuhako 
1992). 
c. The morpheme -ee- indicates inferential information based on direct evidence 
(Miyara 2002). 
d. The morpheme -eeN indicates inferential information (Shinzato 1991). 
 
This summary highlights three essential points.  
1. There are considered to be two types of evidential in Luchuan in the literature: a 
direct evidential and an inferential evidential. However, some researchers do not 
adopt this analysis and consider that the forms in question express aspect instead 
of evidentiality. 
2. Among researchers, there is no consensus about which part of the verb forms 




3. There is no discussion in the literature of whether the elements which indicate 
evidential meanings are indeed evidential, or whether they express modality or 
something else. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate these problems. To be precise, I will 
address the following three questions: 
(i)  Does Luchuan have two evidentials, direct and indirect?  
(ii)  If Luchuan has evidentials, how are they encoded morphologically? 
(iii)  Do they belong to a distinct category of evidentiality, or are they a subtype of 
modality?  
 
As for question (i), I will argue here and throughout the dissertation that there are 
four evidentials, not two. Concerning question (ii), I will clarify how each evidential 
is morphologically realized by the discussing morphological analysis and sets of 
semantic categories (section 2.2.2). After clarifying the functions of the direct 
evidential in Luchuan in 2.3, the question of whether it is necessary to recognize a 
category of evidentiality separate from epistemic modality, as described in question 
(iii), will be discussed in 2.4.  
  
2.2.2  Overview of verb morphology  
 
As we have seen in 2.2.1, since each scholar uses different technical terms, 
discussions are often difficult to follow. In this section, I will propose a revised 
terminology that attempts to overcome the problems which arise in existing 
discussions. I have already provided a morphological template for the Luchuan verb 
in 1.3.4 just for background information about Luchuan, but I have not explained it 
in any detail or presented any existing morphological study. Thus, the main focus of 
this section is to introduce my account and what has been discussed in literature. 


























                     Table 1. Morphology of finite verbs  
 
Table 1 shows the basic order of the morphemes that make up finite verbs. The stem 
is composed of two elements, the base and the inflectional ending. After the stem, the 
slots for aspect and evidential (1) are obligatorily filled in declarative sentences.  
The morphemes which appear in the slot for aspect are -u- (which indicates 
imperfective aspect), -oo- (continuative), and -ee- (resultative). There are three 
negation morphemes. One is -aN, which is used for negating imperfective aspect. 
However, when this negation -aN is used to make a negative form, the imperfective 
aspect -u- does not appear, as shown in the pair of forms jumuN ‗read‘ and jumaN 
‗not read‘. The other negative markers are -uraN (which is used with continuative 
aspect) and -neeN, which is used with resultative aspect. As for tense, the past tense 
marker is -ta- (with an allomorph -a-); non-past tense is unmarked, i.e., has no overt 
morphology. There is a mood marker -(t)ee- next to the slot of tense, which is used to 
describe irrealis such as subjunctive mood. I will discuss this morpheme in Chapter 3 
(Section 3.3.4) in the relation of the Inferential evidential.  
According to this template, in the slot of evidential (1), –N denotes the direct 
evidential but -ru and –sa, shown in parenthesis, are not evidential markers, though 
they implicate an evidential meaning. When -ru appears in the root clause, the focus 
particle du is required to make the kakari-musubi construction. This construction is a 
descendant of the rule of kakari-musubi in Old Japanese (Tsuhako 1992:839). When 
the adverbial particle du is paired with -ru in the attributive form, the former is called 
kakari-zosi ‗relation opener‘ and the latter is called musubi ‗tying conclusion‘
8
 
(Shibatani 1990:334). The phrase which is focused by -du expresses new information, 
and the rest expresses given information which has already been shared by other 
participants of the conversation. This implication is seen in the sentence with -sa as 
                                                   
8
 Shibatani (1990:334-5) introduces these terms, which were proposed by Yamada (1908), but he 
states that he simply uses the term ‗adverbial particles‘ following the terms used by Sansom 




well. According to Uemura (1961), -sa is used to objectivize the information. When 
the speaker wants to convey direct evidence, the Direct evidential -N is used and 
when the speaker wants to express the information more objectively, -ru or -sa is 
chosen to mark information which is already shared with other participants.  
In the slot of evidential (2), the Inferential evidential tee and the Assumed 
evidential hazi appear. When the Inferential evidential is used, -N should be chosen 
from the slot of evidential (1), while when the Assumed evidential is used, -ru should 
be chosen. The details of how to use these evidentials will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
None of the evidentials from the slot of evidential (2) is required when -sa appears. I 
will discuss the multiple uses of evidentials in Chapter 5. The Reported evidential 
occupies the right edge of the slot, and I will discuss its function in Chapter 4. 
I have explained my morphological analysis above. Now I move on to introducing 
the order of morphemes which has been proposed by Miyara (2002:97). This is 
shown in (1). 
 
(1) root (+ continuative aspect) (+negation) (+modality tee, yɨ) (+tense) +mood
9
 
                                     
According to Miyara, there are two morphemes which indicate modality: tee and yɨ 
(-u-). The former, tee, is used to mark inferential information based on the speaker‘s 
observation of a situation, and the latter, yɨ, marks direct observation of the action 
(witness). However, there are two problems with the analysis shown in (1). First, 
Miyara argues in his discussion that the morpheme -ee- indicates resultative, but he 
gives it no slot in his proposed sequence shown in (1). In my proposal, the resultative 
aspect -ee- falls into the slot for aspect.      
The second problem is that the order in (1) excludes the co-occurrence of -u- 
and -tee, as these are both analysed as modality markers, competing for the same slot. 
However, these two markers -u- and -tee can in fact co-occur, in forms such as 
kam-u-tee-N ‗would have eaten‘. The morphological order I presented in Table 1 
solves this problem, because -u- belongs in the slot for aspect, and -tee appears in the 
slot for tense, so they are correctly predicted to be able to appear simultaneously. 
Miyara proposes that there are two different homonymous morphemes -tee-, one a 
                                                   
9
 I have deliberately omitted the category of politeness and honorification from the 
morphological order because they are not obligatory and irrelevant to this dissertation; Miyara 




resultative and one a modal. In fact I agree with him that there are two distinct 
morphemes with this same form: I will discuss this further in Chapter 3. But this 
analysis still does not solve the problem of the double modal marking such as 
kamuteeN above, because under Miyara‘s approach this form has double evidential 
modality.  
    From here on, I will refer to the morphemes -u-, -oo-, -ee- as markers of aspect, 
-a- and -ta- as past tense, -(t)ee- as an irrealis marker, and -N as the Direct evidential. 
If further investigation were to prove that -u- and -ee- are actually evidential, as 
Miyara and Kina claim, rather than aspectual, I would need to revise my 
morphological analysis, but the argument below will clarify why I believe that this is 
not the case. 
 
2.3  Concept of best possible grounds 
 
In 2.2.1, I gave an overview of the discussions related to evidentiality in Luchuan. In 
this section, I outline my own analysis of the direct evidential, which is rather 
different from any of the existing approaches. No other researchers of Shuri dialect 
have regarded evidentials as grammatical category, although Izuyama (2005, 2006, 
and 2008) studies other dialects spoken on other isolated islands such as Miyara and 
Yonaguni and presents an analysis similar in some respects to mine, but other than 
these, there are no studies which admit the existence of evidentiality as a 
grammatical category in the study of the Shuri dialect, which is a sort of lingua 
franca in Luchuan. Since there are common characteristics in the other dialects 
Izuyama studies and Shuri dialect, it will be worthwhile to do comparative studies 
among these dialects in the future. For example, Izuyama claims that there are three 
kinds of evidentials in the Yonaguni dialect in Luchuan; Direct, Inferred and 
Reported (2008).  
In my analysis, the direct evidential (including the concept of ‗witness‘) is 
encoded by -N; therefore, all forms ending in -N indicate direct evidential. Claiming 
that -N is a direct evidential may sound too bold because this view is quite different 
from the existing work that we have reviewed so far, but I will argue that in fact this 
proposal fits very well into the overall evidential system of Luchuan. To explain my 




needs to be clarified. In 2.3.1, I will introduce the basic and common feature between 
-N in Luchuan and -mi in Quechua, and then in 2.3.2, I will explain the differences 
between them, in order to discuss how I should incorporate the differences into my 
proposal.  
 
2.3.1  The shared feature between -N in Luchuan and -mi 
in Quechua 
 
According to Shinzato (1991:59), ―an entails information that is experienced.‘ 
However, what I am going to clarify first is the fact that aN indicates more than the 
speaker‘s direct experience. It should also be noted that in my analysis, the 
morpheme -a- indicates past tense and -N indicates the Direct evidential; thus, I 
claim that what Shinzato describes as ―perceptual information acquired through 
experience‖
10
 is conveyed by -N, and not by the combination of -a- and -N. Might it 
then be possible to conclude that -N indicates ―direct experience‖? I claim that this is 
not a possible conclusion, since there are some conditions which license the use of -N 
without any direct experience being involved. This is shown in example (2). Suppose 
that it is Saturday morning and Ryu tells his mother that he is going to school at 1pm 
for club activity, although there is no school on Saturday. When his mother comes 
back from shopping at half past one and she finds that Ryu is not there, she 
understands that he has gone to school. Then, a friend of Ryu‘s drops by and asks if 
Ryu is at home. In this case, Ryu‘s mother can use -N, as in (2). 
 
(2) a. Ryu‘s friend : Is Ryu at home? 
    b. Mother:  Ryu ja  gaQkoo Nkai ʔNz-aN.   
Ryu TOP school  to  go-PAST-DIR 
‗Ryu went to school.‘ 
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 I understand that the term ―perception‖ usually refers to the five senses (e.g. sight, hearing, 
etc.) without including ‗experience‘. However, the term ‗perceptual‘ in Shinzato‘s definition of 
aN is different from this general meaning. Shinzato considers that there are two types of 
perceptual information: 1) information acquired through experience, 2) information acquired 
through observation. The first type includes only ―internal stimuli, such as sensations, feelings, or 
thoughts which originate inside oneself and are not accessible to others‖, whereas the second type 
includes ―external stimuli, such as events or external states, which originate outside oneself and 




This example illustrates two facts, regardless of whether -aN or -N is used. First, 
Shinzato‘s analysis that ―an entails information that is experienced‖ is not fully 
accurate because it is clear that the mother does not experience ‗going to school‘; it is 
Ryu who is the agent of the verb ‗go‘. Shinzato claims that ―an entails information 
that is experienced, and for the speaker the information represents something he 
himself performed‖ (1991:59). This would mean that -aN can be used only if the 
mother herself performs the action described in the speech act, but this is not true of 
the example in (2). Second, the felicity of (2) shows that it is not even necessary for 
the speaker to witness an event in order for them to be able to use -aN. Obviously the 
mother did not see Ryu going to school; he left while she was out shopping. What 
then licenses the use of -aN (or -N) in (2)?  
To answer this question, we need to clarify the concept of direct evidence - 
whether or not it should be witness, direct experience, or something else. Here I 
introduce the concept of the direct evidential of Cuzco Quechua presented by Faller 
(2002). This is the most important concept in order to account for the direct 
evidential -N in Luchuan. One of the main proposals in this dissertation is that the 
definition of ―direct evidential‖ which Faller proposes for the analysis of Cuzco 
Quechua should also be adopted for the analysis of -N in Luchuan. Since 
understanding this concept is crucial at this stage, let me introduce examples from 
Cuzco Quechua. 
According to Faller, the direct evidential -mi in Cuzco Quechua conveys that 
‗the speaker has the best possible grounds for making the assertion‘ (Faller 
2002:121). The concept of the ‗best possible grounds’ includes witness but also 
other reliable information such as report from the agent or information from authority. 
According to the typological study of Aikhenvald (2004:65), the direct evidential 
basically covers visual evidence, and other sensory evidence as well, depending on 
the evidential systems of the specific language. But Faller‘s ‗best possible grounds‘ is 
not restricted to visual or even other sensory evidence. So what does the concept of 
‗the best possible ground‘ semantically cover? Consider the example from Cuzco 





(3) Inés-mi llalli-rqa-n.  
    Inés-mi win-PST1-3 
p= ‗Inés won.‘ 
EV= speaker saw that p 
(Faller 2002:125) 
 
According to Faller, a sentence with -mi as in (3) is usually interpreted to convey 
both that the speaker has direct visual evidence and that the speaker is certain that the 
statement is true.
11
 The Cuzco Quechua examples in (4a) and (4b), however, indicate 
that -mi can be used without direct visual evidence.   
 
(4) a. Paqarin Inés-qa  Qusqu-ta-n  ri-nqa. 
     tomorrow Inés-TOP Cuzco-ACC-mi go-3FUT 
     p= ‗Inés will go to Cuzco tomorrow.‘ 
     EV= Inés told speaker that she will go to Cuzco tomorrow 
 
    b. Inés-qa  llakiku-n-mi. 
      Inés-TOP be.sad-3-mi 
      p = ‗Inés is sad.‘ 
      EV= Inés told speaker that she is sad 
(Faller 2002:127) 
 
If direct evidence refers to witness or experience, the speaker of (4a) does not have 
direct evidence because the described event is supposed to happen in the future. An 
event which has not taken place yet can neither be observed nor experienced. In a 
similar way, the internal state of another person such as sad in (4b) is not observable 
nor can it be experienced by the speaker.
12
 In contrast, in sentence (3), the speaker 
must have witnessed the event. That is, the evidential requirement for the use of -mi 
in this case is not optional but obligatory. However, for unobservable events like (4a) 
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 Faller points out that adopting the translation ‗I see…‘ for -mi would be wrong because I see is 
the main predication of the sentence though -mi as in (3) is not. Thus, she uses her own 
representation that separates the proposition from the evidential meaning.  
12
 Faller notes that the experiencer Inés does not look sad in the situation in which (4b) was 
uttered. Therefore, an observable sign such as Inés‘s outlook or facial expression is not a 




and (4b), this evidential requirement cannot be fulfilled, given the nature of future 
events and other people‘s internal states. Therefore, in this case, it is the fact that the 
speaker has ‗the next best thing‘ to direct evidence – the report of the 
agent/experiencer him/herself – which seems to license -mi in (4a) and (4b).  
This feature of -mi in Cuzco Quechua is quite similar to -N in Luchuan. 
Example (2) above (the utterance by Ryu‘s mother with -N) shows that despite the 
claim that aN indicates that the speaker has direct experience (Shinzato 1991), -(a)N 
can in fact appear without the speaker‘s direct experience or witness. Rather, the two 
things that are required to license the use of -N are the report of the agent and the 
observation of some related situation (in (2), the agent‘s (Ryu‘s) absence). In this way, 
-N in Luchuan and -mi in Cuzco Quechua have a shared feature, in that both cover 
more than witnessed evidence. Based on this feature of -N, I suggest that existing 
analyses which view only -u- or (utaN) as indicating witness (Shinzato 1991, Miyara 
2002, Kudo et al. 2007) should be withdrawn and instead, I adopt the concept of the 
best possible ground to characterize -N in Luchuan.  
Faller presents three possible analyses of the Cuzco Quechua direct evidential 
-mi; here I limit myself to discussing one of them, as it is the most relevant for the 
analysis of -N in Luchuan. This analysis is summarized in (5). 
 
(5)  -mi encodes the evidential value that the speaker possesses the best possible 
source of information for the type of information conveyed by the utterance. The 
same evidential value is implicated by simple assertions. 
(Faller 2002:123) 
 
Following Faller‘s terms in (5), I propose that the meaning of -N in Luchuan is as 
follows: 
 
(6) -N encodes the evidential value that the speaker possesses the best possible 
source of information for the type of information conveyed by the utterance. 
 
(6) differs slightly from Faller‘s definition in (5) because, as I mentioned in 2.2.2, 
there are other forms which appear in assertions in Luchuan (-ru and -sa) but they do 




similar evidential value. 
The ‗best possible ground‘ in Faller‘s theory means visual evidence if the event 
is observable; or, if the event is not observable, what licenses -mi is ‗the fact that the 
speaker has the next best thing to direct evidence‘ (Faller 2002:131). Thus, the case 
of (4a) is the report of the agent, Inés herself, which means the speaker of (4a) cannot 
have had witnessed or experienced evidence. This is also true in case of Luchuan, 
example (2). For maximum accuracy, I will use ―direct evidence” to mean ―direct 
experience‖ or ―direct perception‖, and I will use ―the best possible ground” (or, 
best possible source of information) to include both ―direct evidence‖ and the more 
indirect cases. Thus the case of (4a) does not involve ―direct evidence‖, but it does 
involve ―best possible grounds‖, since the best possible grounds in the case of 
example (4a) is the reported information from the agent herself. I will use ―best 
evidence” as a shorthand for ‗best possible ground‘. Therefore, I propose that -N is 
licensed to be used if and only if the speaker has best evidence.  
As I discussed above with respect to (2), aN can co-occur with a third person 
subject when there is ‗best evidence‘ such as a report from the agent. Since under my 
analysis -N conveys the direct evidential and -a- indicates past, the speaker needs to 
have direct/best evidence that shows that the events happened in the past. If the event 
describes the speaker‘s own actions, the direct evidence can be his/her own direct 
experience; however, it is obvious that a second or third person‘s activity cannot be 
experienced by the speaker. Therefore, instead, the speaker needs firm evidence such 
as visual evidence, or alternatively, other best evidence (such as reported information 
from participants in the events) as in the case of example (2). Thus, some existing 
studies refer to the subject restriction,
13
 but it would be better to consider that the 
apparent subject restriction arises from the feature of -N as above rather than as a 
type of syntactic agreement.     
Next, I show that what licenses -N can be different in different situations even 
though the same verb is used. To see a subtle difference, let us consider a very 
slightly different context to that in (2). Suppose that you happened to meet a friend of 
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 Shinzato (1991) claims that aN, which (according to her analysis) indicates the speaker‘s 
direct evidence, can only be used with first person subject. Furthermore, it has been claimed 
in the literature that the past forms containing -u-, imperfective aspect, cannot take first 
person subjects and this restriction is considered to derive from the meaning of observation 




yours, Yuki, in a café when you finished your coffee and were about to leave. You 
had a chat with her and she told you she would go to university after a coffee break. 
You left the café and thirty minutes later, you passed the café again, but she was not 
there anymore. Later you tell your friend that you met Yuki at the cafe. In this case, 
you cannot use -N, as (7) indicates, although you have two sources of information 
just as was the case in (2): hearsay from the agent (Yuki said she would go to 
university) plus visual evidence (Yuki‘s absence from the café), which one might 
expect to qualify as best evidence in this case. 
 
(7) # Yuki  ja   daigaku Nkai  ʔNz-aN.  
Yuki TOP  university to  go-PAST-DIR     
‗Yuki went to university.‘ 
 
There are two factors which make sentence (7) infelicitous in this context. First, the 
relationship between the speaker and Yuki is not as close as the relation between 
mother and son in (2). Second, the given situation in (7) is public (a café) rather than 
private (the home in (2)). These facts decrease the strength of the evidence, and 
therefore the co-occurrence of the third person and -aN is excluded.  
The difference in felicity between (2) and (7) may raise a question about 
whether this difference derives from reliability of information. I will give an example 
that excludes this possibility. For example, suppose there is an autobiography written 
by the popular singer, Bono, from the band ‗U2‘. The front cover of the book shows 
the name of the author, so the name on it is absolutely reliable in terms of evidence 
for who wrote the book. But even in this case, aN cannot be used, as shown in (8). 
 
Context: Speaker finds the book written by Bono at the book store and tells her 
friend that this book is written by Bono. 
(8)  # kunu sjumuce-e Bono ga kac-aN. 
      this  book TOP Bono NM write- PAST-DIR. 
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Example (8) implies that reliable information is not a crucial factor for the use of -N, 
but rather the most significant factor is whether or not the speaker has direct/best 
evidence or not. Then, what about a case in which someone saw Bono finish writing 
this book? If, for example, the speaker had actually seen Bono write the 
autobiography and complete it ― for example, because the speaker is some relative 
of Bono‘s ―then (8) could be used. The only person likely to have seen him write 
the book is a family member, but the crucial thing licensing -N would be here the 
observation of the event. 
My consultants often comment that ‗if you are a member of the family,‘ then 
you can use a sentence like (2) or (8). However, I believe that what is really crucial is 
whether or not the speaker has had the chance to see the events carried out by the 
third person (e.g. the speaker sees the agent do something), or to see the result of the 
action as well (e.g. an empty room). Thus, the important issue is not whether the 
speaker is actually a kin of the agent but how much they share private information.
15
 
A family member is usually supposed to know about other family members‘ habits or 
schedules if they live together.
16
 On the other hand, information arising from coming 
across someone at a café like in example (7) is subject to many unexpected factors; 
for example, Yuki could go to a beauty salon or the department store, not university. 
On its own, Yuki‘s report that she would go to university cannot be considered best 
evidence because, since she is not related to the speaker, her statement of intent alone 
is not considered firm enough evidence. This implies that the criteria for the use of 
-N in Luchuan are stricter than for -mi in Cusco Quechua. I will discuss this issue 
further in the next section, where I will also provide a more accurate definition of -N, 
revising (6) to reflect the differences between -mi and -N.  
 
2.3.2  The differences between -N in Luchuan and -mi in 
Quechua 
 
In the previous section, I introduced the concept of best possible ground as proposed 
by Faller (2002) and adapted this framework to account for the direct evidential in 
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 Uchima (1990) states that the concept of whether one is inside or outside the community is 
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Luchuan. I illustrated the common points observed in the direct evidentials -N in 
Luchuan and -mi in Cuzco Quechua. In this section, I will specify the nature of the 
difference between -N in Luchuan and -mi in Cusco Quechua in order to discuss how 
these differences should be incorporated into my proposal of what the direct 
evidential in Luchuan precisely means. The main claim which I will make is that the 
use of the Direct evidential -N is more restricted than that of -mi in Cusco Quechua. 
First, I will mention the morphosyntactic difference between the two languages, 
although since this difference does not affect the meaning of the direct evidential, I 
will simply remind the reader of the difference and not discuss the details. As the 
ungrammaticality of the sentences in (9a) indicates, the slot in which -N appears 
needs to be filled. In contrast, Cuzco Quechua allows forms both with -mi and 
without -mi.  
 
(9)  a. *waN-nee  juubaN  kam-u. 
       I-TOP     dinner  eat-IMPR 
 
     b.  waN-nee  juubaN  kam-u-N. 
        I- TOP    dinner  eat- IMPR-DIR 
        ‗I will eat dinner.‘ 
 
c.  waN-nee  juubaN  kam-u-sa. 
         I- TOP    dinner  eat- IMPR -FP 
‗I will eat dinner.‘ 
 
d.  waN ga du  juubaN  kam-u-ru.   
         I-TOP  AP  dinner   eat- IMPR -ATTR 
         ‗It is I who eat dinner.‘ 
 
As we have seen in 2.2.2, there are other morphemes in Luchuan which can appear in 
the slot which -N occupies, namely -sa and -ru, which do not encode direct evidence. 
As shown in (10a) and (10b), in Cuzco Quechua, sentences with or without -mi are 
grammatical,
17
 but in Luchuan, if -N is not used, -sa or -ru should be used in 
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affirmative forms as in (9c) and (9d) respectively.  
 
(10) a. Para-sha-n. 
      rain-PROG-3 
      ‗It is raining.‘ 
 
   b. Para-sha-n-mi. 
     para-sha-n-mi 
     ‗It is raining.‘ 
 
    Next, I will move on to the main discussion in this section, which is the 
strictness of the evidential requirement. That is to say, Luchuan has a stricter 
requirement on what counts as evidence that legitimizes the use of -N; and as a result 
-N can be used in only a subset of the contexts in which -mi is used in Quechua. 
Faller (2002) classifies information into two kinds; personal information and 
encyclopedic information. Personal information describes ―events in the speaker‘s 
private life‖ and encyclopedic information includes ―knowledge that is taken for 
granted within a culture, and knowledge that is typically taught in school or found in 
encyclopedias‖ (Faller 2002:133). First, let me briefly review examples of personal 
information from Cuzco Quechua, to compare with the corresponding examples in 
Luchuan, and then move on to investigating encyclopedic information. In 2.3.1, I 
provided examples of ―personal information‖ in (3) and (4), both of which contain 
the direct evidential -mi, but example (3) is a case where the speaker has visual 
evidence, whereas (4a) and (4b) are examples in which the speaker does not have 
visual evidence.  
I now compare examples (3), (4a) and (4b) from Cuzco Quechua with 
corresponding sentences in Luchuan in order to examine the similarities and 
differences between the direct evidentials in these two languages. First, (11), which 
corresponds to (3), is felicitous; so -N and -mi behave in the same way in this type of 
case, where visual evidence is available.   
                                                                                                                                                
sentence without -mi the direct evidential meaning is implicated due to the feature of assertion, 
while on the other hand, -mi encodes the evidential meaning. Thus, the degree of strength varies 
depending on whether or not -mi is present; without -mi, the degree of strength is zero, while with 





(11) Ken ga kaQc-a-N. 
   Ken NM win-PAST-DIR 
   p= ‗Ken won.‘ 
   EV = speaker saw that p 
 
When visual evidence is unavailable, however, -N does not behave exactly like -mi. 
The context that licensed the use of the evidential in Cuzco Quechua in (4a) is not 
sufficient to allow the use of -N in Luchuan, as sentence (12) indicates. 
 
(12) # Hitoshi  ja  ʔacaa  Tokyo  Nkai  ʔic-u-N. 
     Hitoshi TOP tomorrow Tokyo  to   go-IMPR-DIR. 
     ‗Hitoshi is going to Tokyo tomorrow.‘ 
 
Even if the agent of (12), Hitoshi himself, has told the speaker that he will go to 
Tokyo tomorrow, it is still awkward to use the -N ending as in (12). Only a very 
limited situation would allow (12); to utter (12), the speaker ought to know Hitoshi‘s 
schedule very well, for example in the way that his mother, wife, or secretary might.  
Since closeness of relationship appears to be a significant requirement in terms of the 
use of -N in Luchuan, we can pursue this issue further here. 
     As just stated, the acceptability of example (12) can improve in a restricted 
context, for example, if the speaker of (12) is a member of Hitoshi‘s family, 
especially his spouse. Further, in addition to the relation between the agent (or the 
other participant in the event, if there is one) and the speaker, what needs to be 
noticed is the relation between the speaker and the addressee. When the agent‘s wife 
tells information to someone who is less close to her, such as Hitoshi‘s colleague, the 
acceptability becomes higher. However, the crucial thing is not whether the speaker 
is officially married to the agent or a kin of the agent. Rather, the issue is the extent 
to which they share private information. I propose that the theory of territory of 
information presented by Kamio (1997) may be a clue to account for this 
phenomenon. Kamio claims that the crucial factor in evidential choices is whether 
information resides within or outside the speaker‘s territory or the hearer‘s territory. 




whether speaker‘s or hearer‘s) vary depending on individual languages, but the 
concept of territory of the self as opposed to the other is universal. If sentence (12) is 
used by Hitoshi‘s wife to someone in the neighborhood or workplace, this 
information completely falls within the speaker‘s (Hitoshi‘s wife) territory and not 
the hearer‘s. In this case, the awkwardness of (12) decreases markedly. On the other 
hand, if Hitoshi‘s neighbor utters (12) to Hitoshi‘s wife, the sentence sounds fairly 
awkward.
18
 In this way, the territory of information seems to be relevant to the 
evidential requirement.  
Unlike in Luchuan, in Cuzco Quechua, the report from the agent him/herself is 
sufficient to license the use of the direct evidential -mi. As far as I am aware, Faller 
(2002) mentions the theory of territory of information in her discussion about the 
choice of direct evidential and reportative evidential, but this argument is not 
developed further. It would be very interesting to know if the choice of evidential and 
the relation between the speaker and the agent (or the other participant of the 
described event), or the relation between the speaker and the hearer is an important 
factor in Cuzco Quechua as well, but there is no mention of this in Faller‘s work. 
What is clear at this stage is that in Luchuan, even if the speaker acquires this 
information from the agent himself, the direct evidential cannot be used. Instead, the 
reportative evidential as in (13) will be required.  
 
(13)  Hitoshi  ja  ʔacaa   Tokyo  Nkai  ʔic-u-N     Ndi. 
     Hitoshi  TOP tomorrow Tokyo  to   go-IMPR-DIR  REP 
     ‗(Hitoshi said) he is going to Tokyo tomorrow.‘ 
 
Next, let us consider what happens in the past tense. Sentence (14) is the past form of 
(12) with aN, replacing the temporal adverb ʔacaa ‗tomorrow‘ with cinuu 
‗yesterday‘.  
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(14)  Hitoshi  ja  cinuu  Tokyo  Nkai  ʔNz-a-N. 
     Hitoshi TOP yesterday Tokyo  to   go-PAST-DIR. 
     ‗Hitoshi went to Tokyo yesterday.‘ 
 
Sentence (14) can be used if Hitoshi told the speaker that he would go to Tokyo 
beforehand, but additionally the speaker has to be sure that Hitoshi has actually gone. 
Again, the relationship between the speaker, the participant in the event, and the 
hearer influences sentences with the past as well, as we have just seen above in the 
case of the non-past as in (12). That is, if the speaker is close to the agent like 
Hitoshi‘s wife, (14) sounds much better than the case in which the speaker is one of 
Hitoshi‘s colleagues. However, this restriction does not seem to be as strict as in the 
sentence in the non-past as in (12) above, since (12) can be used if a speaker has 
direct evidence. The difference between (12) and (14) seems to be the certainty of the 
realization of the event. Events which have already taken place are inherently more 
certain than events which have not taken place. Therefore, the inherent uncertainty of 
the future tends to prevent the occurrence of -N, although past events known from 
reliable information can be reported with -N.
19
 In fact, cross-linguistically it is 
reported that the frequency of occurrence of the evidential is different among tenses. 
That is, ‗many languages do not distinguish evidentiality in future‘ (Aikhenvald 
2004:263); ‗more evidential choices are likely to be available in past tenses than in 
other tenses‘ (Aikhenvald 2004:266).  
Given what we have seen about how the direct evidential behaves in Luchuan, 
I speculate that this typological feature may be explained by the difference in how 
much direct evidence is available for past, present, and future events. What we have 
seen so far indicates that the relation between the agent, speaker, and hearer is 
involved with the use of -N. The Direct evidential -N in Luchuan can describe a third 
person‘s action if and only if the speaker has reliable information from a person who 
is close to the speaker. If the hearer is closer to the agent than the speaker is, -N 
cannot be used, since the information falls only into the hearer‘s and not the 
speaker‘s territory of information.  
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 This feature of -N does not exclude the use of -N when talking about future. If the speaker has 
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    Now I present one more example which shows that Luchuan -N and -mi in 
Cuzco Quechua are different. Let us return to the example (4b). Example (4b) shows 
that -mi can be used to describe another person‘s inner state when the speaker has 
direct/best evidence; in this case, the report from the experiencer him/herself. But the 
use of -N in Luchuan is not licensed in this context. Even if the conditions are the 
same as the ones in (4b)―where the experiencer him/herself tells the speaker that 
she is sad―sentence (15) is extremely awkward.  
 
(15) #Yoko ja  sikaraasa-N. 
     Yoko TOP sad-DIR     
‗Yoko is sad.‘ 
 
In the case of -mi in Cuzco Quechua, the speaker of (4b) does not need to observe the 
experiencer‘s external expression. Thus, the only evidential requirement for (4b) is 
the report of the experiencer, which is the best possible ground for the speaker.  But 
in the case of -N in Luchuan, even if the speaker hears a report from the experiencer, 
or even if the speaker of (15) directly observes the experiencer‘s external sign such 
as facial expression, (15) is still not licensed. The use of the direct evidential with 
internal states is strictly restricted to the internal states of the experiencer in Luchuan; 
to describe other person‘s internal states, -N cannot be directly attached to the 
adjective ‗sad‘, but the additional element is required as in (16).
20
 By attaching the 
verb soo ‗doing‘ plus -N as in (16), the sentence indicates that the speaker is not an 
experiencer.  
 
(16) Yoko  ja   sikaraasa-soo-N. 
    Yoko  TOP  sad-doing-DIR          
    ‗Yoko seems to be sad.‘ 
 
Even soo ‗doing‘ is attached to -N, the condition that the speaker has to have 
evidence should be maintained for use of (16). In this case, like the case of -mi, a 
report from the experiencer is required as best evidence. In other words, the speaker 
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 The fact that -N can express only the experiencer‘s sensations is one of my pieces of evidence 





can use (16) if he/she has a report from the experiencer (Yoko). Alternatively, if the 
speaker has a report from the experiencer him/herself, the speaker can also use 
sentence (17) with the reportative evidential.  
 
(17)  Yoko  ja  sikaraasa-N  Ndi. 
     Yoko TOP  sad-DIR    REP 
     ‗(Yoko said) she is sad.‘ 
 
Interestingly this restriction is applied to the emotive adjectives only, which 
express human feelings such as ‗sad‘, ‗happy‘, and ‗frightened‘. Contrastively 
descriptive adjectives which are not relevant to human‘s feelings such as ‗big‘, ‗tall‘, 




(18) a. ʔaQtaa kii  ja  takasa-N (doo). 
      their  tree TOP tall-DIR    FP 
      p= ‗Their tree is tall.‘ 
      EV = Speaker knows p because he/she has seen it before. 
 
    b. ʔaQtaa cjakusi  ja   magisa-N (doo). 
      their oldest son TOP  big-DIR   FP 
      p = ‗Their oldest son is big.‘ 
      EV = Speaker knows p because he/she has seen their oldest son before. 
 
Both (18a) and (18b) are acceptable without soo ‗doing‘, although the subject is the 
third person. This fact suggests that the restriction we have seen above is not due to 
syntactic regulations to obligate the third person subject to use soo ‗doing‘ in the case 
of sentences with adjectives. Rather, the usage seems to be dependent on the 
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Kuroshima, variations of Yaeyama dialects (Izuyama 2004). Emotive verbs in these dialects 
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evidence which is available to the speaker. Whereas the experience of a third person 
is not observable, the status of a third person is objectively observable, as in (18a) 
and (18b). Therefore, soo ‗doing‘ cannot be used with descriptive adjectives, as 
shown in (19a) and (19b).  
 
(19) a. #ʔaQtaa kii  ja  takasa-soo-N. 
       their  tree TOP tall-doing-DIR  
       Intended meaning: ‗Their tree looks tall‘. 
 
    b.#ʔaQtaa cjakusi ja     magisa-soo-N. 
       their oldest son TOP  big-doing-DIR  
       Intended meaning: ‗Their oldest son looks big.‘ 
 
     In the case of interrogative sentences, the third person subject with an emotive 
adjective is not acceptable, as in (20b), while the third person subject with 
descriptive adjectives is acceptable, as in (20c). If a speaker wants to ask how the 
experiencer him/herself feels, as in (20a), the question sounds natural, compared to 
putting the same question to a non-experiencer as in (20b).  
 
(20) a. hwiisa-m-i? 
       cold-DIR-Q 
       ―Are you cold?‖ 
 
    b.#ʔare-e hwiisa-m-i? 
       he-TOP cold- DIR-Q 
       ―Is he cold?‖ 
 
    c. ʔare-e magisa-m-i? 
       he-TOP big- DIR-Q 
       ―Is he big?‖ 
 
I have illustrated how the Direct evidential -N behaves in sentence with adjectives. 




but needs to be associated with soo ‗doing‘ as sooN (‗doing‘ + -N) to describe a third 
person‘s experience. Even with soo, -N requires best evidence such as a report from 
an experiencer. If a report from an experiencer is not available, but a speaker wants 
to express his conjecture based on experiencer‘s appearance, the speaker has to use 
an additional morpheme gisa before sooN. This gisa comes from gisa ‗seem‘, which 
is a derivational verb used with adjectives or other verbs.  
 
(21) a. Ryu  ja  hwiisa gisa  soo-N. 
      Ryu TOP cold  seem doing- DIR 
      ―Ryu seems to be cold.‖ 
 
    b.# waN-nee hwiisa gisa  soo-N. 
       I-TOP  cold  seem doing- DIR 
       ―I seem to be cold.‖ 
 
To utter (21a), the speaker needs to see the scene in which the experiencer is feeling 
cold, for example, shivering from cold or having goose bumps. This indirect 
expression with gisa cannot be used to describe the experiencer‘s own experience 
since one‘s own perception is obvious for an experiencer. 
     Now let me summarize what I have discussed in the points concerning the 
direct evidence with adjectives. There are three levels of expression depending on the 
level of information. First, if the experiencer is the speaker him/herself, -N can 
appear alone with an emotive adjective. Second, when the experiencer is a third 
person soo ‗doing‘ needs to appear with -N and the speaker has to have a report from 
the experiencer him/herself. Third, when the experiencer is a third person and a 
report from the experiencer is not available, gisa is required before soo. This 
discussion concerning evidentials with adjectives is really interesting and could be 
expanded further, but since the goal of this dissertation is mainly to clarify the 
evidential system in verb forms, I will not pursue this issue further here. The 
important thing that needs to be grasped from this discussion about evidentials with 
adjectives is the fact that use of the Direct evidential -N is more restricted and subject 
to more complex conditions than -mi in Cuzco Quechua.    




describes ―events in the speaker‘s private life‖. Now let us move on to investigating 
encyclopedic information which includes ―knowledge that is taken for granted within 
a culture, and knowledge that is typically taught in school or found in encyclopedias‖ 
(Faller 2002:133). Faller states that -mi can be used to mark information acquired 
from authority such as encyclopedic information after a process of assimilation.  
 
(22) a. Yunka-pi-n      k‘usillu-kuna-qa  ka-n. 
      rainforest-LOC-mi monkey-PL-TOP  be-3 
      p= ‗In the rainforest, there are monkeys.‘ 
 EV = speaker knows as part of Quechua culture that there are monkeys in the 
rainforest. 
 
   b. Africa-pi-n    elefante-kuna-qa  ka-n. 
     Africa-LOC-mi elephant-PL-TOP   be-3 
     p = ‗In Africa, there are elephants.‘ 
     EV = speaker learned in school that there are elephants in Africa. 
(Faller 2002:20,133) 
 
Faller explains that the proposition in (22a), ‗In the rainforest, there are monkeys‘ 
can be considered a fact of Quechua culture whether or not they have actually been 
to the rainforest. Since this fact is known as general cultural knowledge, -mi is 
licensed in (22a). On the other hand, the proposition in (22b), ‗In Africa, there are 
elephants‘ is something which the speaker might have learned in school or read in an 
encyclopedia for Quechua speakers, which means that the speaker does not actually 
have direct evidence. But in fact -mi is licensed here only when the speaker has 
learned it from an authority such as a teacher. Additionally, the speaker has to have 
‗authority‘ over the information conveyed. Faller states that ―the speaker should have 
authority over this information in the sense that they should be able to expand on the 
topic, that is, (s)he should be able to also say what kind of creatures monkeys and 
elephants are, and that Africa is a continent‖ (p20). Let us now examine whether this 





(23) a. kusa-nu-mii  Nkai ja  habu nu   ʔu-N  (doo). 
      bush-GEN-in LOC TOP  snake NM  be- DIR (FP) 
      p = ‗There are snakes in the bushes.‘ 
      EV = speaker knows as part of Okinawan culture that there are snakes in the 
bushes. 
     
b.? ʔahurika Nkai ja  zoo     nu  ʔu-N (doo). 
       Africa LOC TOP  elephant NM  be- DIR (FP) 
       p = ‗There are elephants in Africa.‘ 
       EV = speaker learned in school that there are elephants in Africa. 
 
Example (23a) sounds natural in Luchuan as did example (21a) in Cuzco Quechua, 
while (21b) sounds a little unnatural. It sounds as if a mother is telling this general 
intelligence to her small children. The fact that there are elephants in Africa is too 
general to be clearly stated, although whether this unnaturalness should be attributed 
to the use of the evidential or the content of the utterance cannot be detected. Thus, 
let me provide a different example.  
 
(24) ? ʔahurika Nkai ja, manatii nu  ʔu-N. 
     Africa  in  TOP manatee NM be- DIR 
In Africa, there are manatees.   
 
The information which example (24) conveys is not as apparent as information in 
(23b), so the content of the sentence should not make the acceptability low, but still 
(24) does not sound fully natural. Example (24) would sound fully natural if the 
speaker has direct evidence, for example, he/she actually seen manatees in Africa 
before. Without such experience, if the speaker of (24) has specialized knowledge 
about animals or particularly manatees, and he thinks that unlike him, the hearer does 
not have such detailed knowledge, he may use (24). The difference of acceptability 
between (22a) and (24a) implies that -N seems to be stricter than the use of -mi.   
     The difference between -N and -mi becomes more clear in past tense. Faller 
(2002) states that historical facts can be also marked with -mi, even when the speaker 




when the speaker was not born at the time, and learned this historical fact in school. 
This is not true of -N in Luchuan.  
 
(25) a. (#)1893nin,  Chamberlin ga Uchinaa Nkai mensooc-a-N.  
1893 year Chamberlin NM Okinawa to come-PAST-DIR 
        ―In 1893, Chamberlin came to Okinawa.‖ 
     
b. (#)1977, ʔuhu nee      nu  juti, ʔuhooku nu cuu nu   maac-a-N.  
        1977 big earthquake NM happen many of people NM die-PAST-DIR 
        ―In 1977, a big earthquake happened, and many people died.‖ 
 
To be exact, two of my main consultants give slightly different judgments on these 
sentences. One consultant said that the use of -N can be acceptable because historical 
facts are completely different from private information, and evidence for such a 
―non-private‖ fact is neither expected nor required. The other consultant said that the 
Reportative evidential or other indirect expression is necessary because the described 
fact has not been actually perceived by the speaker.
22
 However, the judgement of the 
two consultants coincides when a slightly different example is considered. The 
historical events in (25a) and (25b) happened in Okinawa, where they have lived and 
still live in. Obviously these facts are more familiar to them compared with other 
events which happened in other countries. In the next example, the historical event 
took place in a much more distant.  
 
(26) # jooroQpa ʔutooti, pesuto  Ndʔiru  jaNmee  si,  ʔuhooku nu  cuu   nu 
     Europe   in    plague so-called  disease  by  many   of  people NM 
   maac-a-N. 
     die-PAST-DIR 
     ―In Europe, many people died of a disease called plague.‖ 
 
In this case, the two consultants agree that -N is infelicitous and the Reportative 
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evidential or other indirect expressions must be used, for example, report speech or 
its passive ‗It is said that…‘. Considering this judgment of the consultants, we can 
conclude that historical facts should be marked by indirect expressions not by the 
direct evidential. This suggests that the choice of evidentials in Luchuan attaches 
great importance to ‗self‘, the speaker‘s cognition, rather than to authority. As for the 
issue of whether or not the direct evidential is felicitous when the facts are known as 
general cultural knowledge, further investigation will be required in the future.  
Now let us redefine the Direct evidential -N taking into consideration the 
differences between -N and -mi. The first definition I presented in (6) in 2.3.1 is 
repeated below as (27). 
  
(27) -N encodes the evidential value that the speaker possesses the best possible 
source of information for the type of information conveyed by the utterance. 
 
Also in 2.3.1, I defined direct evidence as referring to ―direct experience‖ or ―direct 
perception/sense‖, and I defined ―the best possible ground” (best possible source of 
information) as including both ―direct evidence‖ and ―more indirect cases‖ such as a 
report from a participant in the event. I use ―best evidence” as a shorthand for best 
possible ground. Therefore, -N is licensed to be used if and only if the speaker has 
best evidence.  
     Now, I will add three clarifications as in (28) based on the detailed restrictions 
we have just investigated above. The first and second clarifications are related to 
personal information, and the third one is associated with encyclopedic information. 
 
(28)  
i. When direct (sensory) evidence is not available, the use of -N is determined by the 
relationship between the speaker, agent (or other participants in the event if there 
are any), and the hearer. That is, when the best possible information is not the 
speaker‘s own perception, the speaker has to be close to the agent (or any other 
participant) mentioned in the report; further, if information falls into the hearer‘s 





ii. The use of -N with adjectives is stricter than its use with verbs. That is, when the 
speaker is not the experiencer of the state described by the adjective, -N cannot be 
directly attached to the adjective; additional elements such as soo or gisa-soo are 
needed depending on the kind of information. 
 
iii. Information which is neither direct evidence nor covered by the cases discussed 
above, and which is not taken as general knowledge in the culture cannot be 
marked by -N. Even in the case of well known historical facts, indirect 
expressions such as the Reportative evidential, or reported speech is preferred.
23
   
 
2.4  Epistemic modality and evidentials 
 
2.4.1  Speaker’s degree of certainty 
 
In this section, I investigate the issue of whether or not the Direct evidential in 
Luchuan encodes the speaker‘s degree of (un)certainty. To do so, I apply a test called 
Moore‘s Paradox, which is usually used to illustrate that assertions have the sincerity 
condition that speaker believes that p. The test is used to see whether or not the 
speaker can deny the truth of the asserted proposition,  as in, “It’s raining, but I 
don’t believe it”. A speaker generally has to believe the asserted proposition to be 
true when he/she makes an assertion.
24
  
 In Chapters 3 and 4, I will show that the Inferential evidential tee and the 
Assumed evidential hazi convey the speaker‘s degree of (un)certainty, whereas the 
Reportative evidential does not convey information about the speaker‘s degree of 
certainty or the speaker‘s commitment to the proposition. In this section, I will apply 
this test to the Direct evidential -N and demonstrate that the speaker cannot 
felicitously deny a sentence that they have just uttered if it includes the direct 
evidential -N.  
First, let us consider examples of non-past tense (29). 
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 As I have just stated, this issue needs further investigation; therefore, at this stage, I cannot 
clearly say that -N should be excluded from descriptions of historical facts as I know there is 
variation in the judgments of the native speaker consultants.  
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(29) a. ʔami hut-oo-N. 
      rain rain-CON-DIR 
      p= It is raining. 
      EV = Speaker has direct evidence of p. 
 
    b. # ʔami hut-oo-N.   jasiga ʔaN ʔumuw-aN. 
        rain rain-CON-DIR  but  so  think-NEG 
      # It is raining but I don‘t think so. 
 
Example (29b) shows that the speaker cannot immediately deny the truth of a 
proposition that s/he has just expressed in a sentence that makes use of the Direct 
evidential.  
     Next, let us consider the past tense. 
     
(30) a. ʔami hut-oo-ta-N. 
      rain rain-CON-PAST-DIR 
      p= It was raining. 
      EV = Speaker has direct evidence of p. 
 
    b. # ʔami hut-oo-ta-N.     jasiga ʔaN  ʔumuw-aN. 
        rain rain-CON-PAST-DIR  but  so  think-NEG 
       # It was raining but I don‘t think so. 
 
The awkwardness caused by denying the truth of a proposition that has been 
expressed using a Direct evidential remains when the past tense is used, as shown in 
(30b). The examples (29b) and (30b) show that sentences with the direct evidential 
communicate a high degree of certainty on the part of the speaker.  
     Now we have to consider whether or not the direct evidential should be 
considered to belong to epistemic modality because the direct evidential seems to 
convey the speaker‘s certainty.  In other words, if certain elements convey the 
speaker‘s certainty, must we then conclude that these elements should be regarded as 
epistemic modality? There are two kinds of arguments that suggest it is too soon to 




epistemic modality does not always encode speaker‘s certainty. De Haan (1999) 
claims that the notions of evidentiality and modality should be distinguished as two 
distinct categories: ―one, evidentiality, deals with the evidence the speaker has for his 
or her statement, while the other, epistemic modality, evaluates the speaker‘s 
statement and assigns it a commitment value‖ (p.25 MS). However, Matthewson et al. 
(2007) reject this distinction proposed by de Haan, and claim that modal elements do 
not always encode certainty. For example, they analyze data from St‘át‘imcets and 
demonstrate that ―marking quantificational strength is not an intrinsic property of 
modal elements‖ (2006:2). If their contention is right, expressing speaker‘s degree of 
certainty does not prove that this element encodes epistemic modality. Although it is 
true that their survey provokes a question about how to define epistemic modality, 
this language-specific case of St‘át‘imcets would not be strong enough to draw the 
conclusion that epistemic modality does not have to contain the speaker‘s degree of 
certainty.  
     Second, there is an argument that the element which shows the speaker‘s 
degree of certainty does not have to encode a modal value. For example, Faller 
(2002) states that the direct evidential -mi in Quechua appears to encode a high 
degree of certainty, and this analysis has been supported in the literature;
25
 however, 
in fact, -mi does not encode a high degree of certainty. Faller (2002:125) states that 
―-mi only encodes an evidential value―which is however not direct in the simple 
sense―and that the speaker‘s commitment is a result of the fact that the speaker is 
making an assertion.‖  This means that a high degree of certainty is expressed in all 
assertions in standard speech act theory, and therefore, it is not necessary to consider 
that -mi encodes this meaning.  
     These two perspectives have different grounds; the first argument shows that 
epistemic modality does not always encode speaker‘s degree of certainty, and the 
second one shows that the element that expresses degree of certainty does not have to 
be considered to be epistemic modality since this value is shared in all assertions. 
However it follows from both that indicating the speaker‘s degree of certainty is not 
a necessary condition for epistemic modality. This suggests that the data from 
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 According to Faller (2002:125), ―Previous proposals have attempted to derive the speaker‘s 
commitment to the truth of the embedded proposition from the evidential meaning of -mi (Weber 
1986), to derive the evidential meaning from the claim that -mi is assertive (Nuckolls 1993), and 




Luchuan presented in (29) and (30) does not require us to conclude that the Direct 
evidential -N in Luchuan should be classified as epistemic modality. 
     There is one more important argument that suggests that the Direct evidential 
in Luchuan is not an epistemic modal. In the literature, it has been discussed that 
modal assertions are weaker than non-modal assertions
26
 (Papafragou 1998, Radden 
& Dirven 2007). If the Direct evidential -N is an epistemic modal, the assertions with 
-N would sound weaker than the non-modal assertion; however, I will demonstrate 
that this generalization does not apply to examples in Luchuan. That is to say, a 
sentence with -N does not sound weaker than a sentence without -N. Consider 
example (31). 
 
(31) a. wain  ja  Ken  ga   kooj-u-N. 
      wine  TOP Ken  NM  buy-IMPR-DIR 
      ‗Ken will buy wine.‘ 
 
    b. wain  ja  Ken ga   kooj-u-sa. 
      wine  TOP Ken NM  buy-IMPR-FP 
      ‗Ken will buy wine.‘ 
 
Note that the sentences above are different in terms of the use of the Direct evidential 
-N as in (31a) versus the evidentially neutral -sa as in (31b). Example (31a) with the 
direct evidential is not weaker than the one without the direct evidential at all. Rather, 
example (31a) sounds stronger than (31b).  
     It should be noted that the Inferential evidential tee and the Assumed evidential 
hazi do not behave in the way that -N does in (31). Sentences with tee and hazi sound 
weaker than sentences without them. That is to say, the meanings of (32a) and (32b) 
sound weaker than those of the sentences in (32a), in which the Direct evidential -N 
is used. Compared with (31b) with -sa, (32a) and (32b) sound slightly weaker.   
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 For example, Radden and Dirven (2007:234) compares the modal assertions and non-modal 
assertions to illustrate that sentences with epistemic modality sound weaker than assertions as in 
the examples in (i) below. 
(i) a. There is someone living in the house. [strong assertion] 
   b. There isn‘t anyone living in the house. [strong assertion] 




(32) a.wain ja  Ken    kooj-u-ru     hazi. 
     wine TOP Ken NM buy-IMPR-ATTR ASSUM 
     ‗Ken will buy wine.‘ 
 
     b. wain ja Ken ga  kooj-u-N     tee. 
       wine TOP Ken NM buy-IMPR-DIR  INF 
       ‗Ken will buy wine.‘ 
 
Considering this fact in addition to the two points above, I conclude that the Direct 
evidential -N is not a type of epistemic modality. On the other hand, the Inferential 
and Assumed evidentials could convey modal meaning as epistemic modality. I will 
further show in the following two sections that there is additional evidence in favor 
of the argument that the Direct evidential -N does not belong to the category of 
modality (2.4.2 and 2.4.3). As for tee and hazi, I will show in Chapter 3 that they 
might overlapp with the categories of epistemic modality and evidentiality, but their 
meanings do not contribute to the proposition.  
 
2.4.2  Direct evidentials in negative and interrogative 
sentences 
 
In this section, I investigate whether or not the Direct evidential can be the focus of 
negation or questioning. This will allow us to see whether or not the evidential takes 
wider scope than other grammatical categories including epistemic modality (for 
example, see de Haan (1999)). In brief, the survey will show that the meaning of the 
Direct evidential is not negated in negation, and in questions, the meaning of direct 
evidential is not questioned. In Chapter 3 and 4, I will show that evidential meanings 
in all three indirect evidentials are not negated nor questioned 
     The three negation markers -raN, neeN, and uraN contain the phoneme N, but 
this is morphologically different from the Direct evidential -N.
27
 At a glance, the 
Direct evidential does not seem to appear with any of these negative markers, but it 
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 In addition to the synchronic morphological analysis, it is worth noting that historically this N 
in negation is argued to derive from -nu, which is a negative marker in Old Japanese (Tsuhako 
1992), whereas the Direct evidential -N is assumed to come from -m in Old Japanese, which 




is possible that the Direct evidential -N is actually assimilated by the /N/ sound in the 
negation marker. Consider the examples in (33). 
 
(33) a.  Ken ja   koohii num-aN 
       Ken TOP coffee drink-NEG 
       ―Ken doesn‘t drink coffee.‖  
 
    b. *Ken ja  koohii num-aN-N. 
       Ken TOP coffee drink-NEG-DIR 
       Intended meaning: I have direct evidence that Ken doesn‘t drink coffee. 
 
    c. Ken ja  koohii num-u-N. 
       Ken TOP coffee drink-IMPR-DIR  
       p = ‗Ken drinks coffee‘ 
       EV= Speaker sees Ken drink coffee every day. 
 
While the sentence apparently without the direct evidential sounds fine as in (33a), 
sentence (33b) with the direct evidential appearing as a second N is unacceptable. 
However, I should note that the negative sentence without any apparent direct 
evidential also implies that the speaker has the direct evidence, the same as the 
positive sentence in (33c).  
There are two possible reasons why -N does not appear in negation, the second 
of which is likely to be the more feasible. The first possible analysis is as follows. As 
I have stated, although sentences such as example (33a) do not have an overt 
realization of the direct evidential, the sentence conveys that the speaker has direct 
evidence. This evidential meaning could be considered to be implied rather than 
being encoded. This phenomenon is similar to what Faller (2002) states for Quechua, 
although they are not exactly the same. Faller (2002) states that, in Quechua, 
sentences without the direct evidential are usually interpreted in the same way as 
sentences with the direct evidential. She claims that sentences without the direct 
evidential implicate evidential meaning; on the other hand, the evidential meaning is 
encoded in the sentences with the direct evidential.
28
 In the same way, it might be 
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possible to consider that sentences like (33a) in Luchuan implicate the direct 
evidential meaning, while evidential meaning is encoded in sentences with the direct 
evidential as in (33c). This account about implication could be an applicable to the 
analysis of negative sentences in Luchuan; however, it is rather complex.  
The second hypothesis which I will provide sounds more plausible because of 
its simplicity. The second possible hypothesis is the proposal that the Direct 
evidential -N actually exists after the slot of negation, but it is omitted because it is 
phonetically identical to the final consonant immediately after the negative 
morphemes; ―double N‖ is reduced to a single segment. This hypothesis would 
coherently solve the question why the sentence (33a) without overt evidential marker 
indicates the same evidential value as (33c), which is the sentence with the Direct 
evidential -N. In fact, there is a similar phenomenon of ellipsis of -N as illustrated in 
(34). 
 
(34) ʔari ga  noocj-a-N  Ndi. 
    he NM  fix-PAST-DIR REP 
     p= ‗He fixed.‖ 
    EV=Someone told the speaker that p 
 
There are two ―N‖ sounds in (34); the first N is the Direct evidential and the second 
N is the initial consonant of the Reportative evidential. This initial ―N‖ of the 
Reportative evidential is not realized when it immediately follows the sound of ―N‖ 
(Dictionary of Okinawan Language 1963:435); therefore, the initial consonant of 
―Ndi‖ in (34) is not pronounced, though morphologically it is there. This 
phenomenon supports the hypothesis I presented above. That is, the Direct evidential 
-N is not realized because of this phonological reason. 
There is one more reason why I consider that this second hypothesis is better than the 
alternative proposal. Consider example (35). 
 
                                                                                                                                                
into account that evidence is gradable in terms of strength: ‗Base what you say on the strongest 




(35)   Ken  ja  koohii  num-aN-ta-N 
       Ken TOP coffee drink-NEG-PAST-DIR 
       p= ‗Ken didn‘t drink coffee.‘ 
       EV = Speaker has direct evidence of p. 
 
As example (35) indicates, the Direct evidential -N appears in a past tense sentence 
because ellipsis of N does not occur due to the existence of -ta-. The meaning 
conveyed by the direct evidential in (35) is that the speaker has direct evidence that 
the event did not happen (for example, the speaker was with the agent (Ken), and the 
speaker knows that Ken did not drink coffee). The direct evidential does not scope 
below negation since the evidential meaning cannot be negated. Considering the fact 
that none of the indirect evidentials is the focus of negation as I will illustrate in 5.3.2, 
and the fact that the direct evidential cannot be negated as I have shown above, the 
generalization that can be made is that none of the evidentials in Luchuan can scope 
below negation.  
     Next, I will show that the Direct evidential -N appears in interrogative 
sentences but only in non-past tense. The examples in (36) indicate that evidential 
meaning is retained even in interrogative sentences.   
 
(36) a. Ken ga  sjuku  cukuj-u-m-i? 
      Ken NM desk  make-IMPR-DIR-Q 
      ‗Will Ken make a desk?‘  
      EV = Speaker expects the addressee to base his or her answer on direct  
evidence. 
 
    b. Ken ja sjuku cukut-oo-m-i? 
      Ken TOP desk make-CON-DIR-Q 
      ‗Is Ken making a desk?‘  






    c. Ken ja sjuku cukut-ee-m-i? 
      Ken TOP desk make-RES-DIR-Q 
      ‗Has Ken made a desk?‘ 
      EV = Speaker expects the addressee to base his or her answer on direct  
evidence. 
 
The evidential meaning of -N is maintained regardless of the kind of evidential, as 
illustrated in (36a)-(36c). Since the speaker expects the addressee to base his or her 
answer on direct evidence, these questions are not appropriate if the speaker doubts 
that the addressee has direct evidence. In cases where the speaker does not expect the 
addressee to have direct evidence about the proposition in question, another 
expression without -N would be chosen, as in (37). 
 
(37) Ken ga  sjuku  cukuj-u-ga  jaa. 
    Ken NM desk   make-IMPR-Q FP 
    ‗I wonder if Ken will make a desk.‘  
 
Example (37) can be interpreted as a question but it does not always require ‗yes‘ or 
‗no‘ as a reply; therefore (37) is not really an interrogative sentence in the strict sense. 
However examples like (37) should be used when the speaker does not expect the 
addressee has direct evidence.  
     As for interrogative sentences in the past tense, the Direct evidential -N does 
not appear, as demonstrated in (38a). 
 
(38) a.*Ken ga sjuku cuku-ta-m-i? 
      Ken NM desk make-PAST-DIR-Q 
      Intended meaning: ‗Did Ken make a desk?‘  
 
    b. Ken ga sjuku cuku-ti-i? 
      Ken NM desk make-PART-Q 





    c. Ken ga  sjuku cuku-ti,    Miki ga   ii  cuku-ta-N. 
      Ken NM desk  make-PART, Miki NM chair make-PAST-DIR 
      ‗Ken made a desk, and Miki made a chair.‘ 
 
Let me briefly explain the constitution of (38b). To be precise, the question marker -i 
follows the participial cukuti ‗make‘ rather than cuku-ta-N (make-PAST-DIR)
29
 since 
the past form used in interrogative sentences derives from the participial. The 
participle is usually used in the sentence, being followed by another clause like in 
(38c).
30
 The reason why the Direct evidential -N does not appear in the past in 
interrogatives, even though -N does appear in non-past interrogatives, seems to come 
from the different construction of the sentences rather than for any reason concerning 
evidentiality. That is, the interrogative in the non-past derives from conclusive forms, 
while interrogatives in the past are derived from a participle which does not contain 
-N. The fact that -N cannot appear in the past tense is congruent with my proposal 
that evidential meaning cannot be the focus of a question. As a result, we can 
conclude that the Direct evidential cannot be the focus either of negation or question, 
just like the other evidentials in Luchuan.  
 
2.4.3  Challengeability test 
 
The relation between evidentials and epistemic modality has been discussed by many 
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 The past form ‗cuku-ta-N‘ (make-PAST-N) is considered to derive from the constituent of the 
participial ‗cuku-ti‘ and ‗-a-N‘ (PAST + Evidential). Chamberlain (1895) hypothesizes that past 
forms such as cuku-ta-N ‗make-PAST-N‘ historically derive from the participial and aN 
‗existential verb‘, and it is feasible to consider that the interrogative form of a past sentence was 
originally the interrogative form of the participial.  
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 Uemura (2003:137) explains that the participial can be used in sentence-final position with a 
meaning similar to the past form. This is true, but usage of this form in the root clause is 
restricted. It can be used in a sentence as in (ia), which is used without speaker‘s direct evidence. 
On the other hand, (ib) indicates that the speaker has direct evidence. Also, (ia) can be used when 
the event is still going on. In this sense, these two sentences are fairly different, in addition to the 
feature that a participial that can be combined with other verbs such as cjukuti-kara ‗after 
making‘.  
 
(i) a. ami nu uhooku hu-ti. 
     rain NM much rain-PAST 
    ‗It rains a lot.‘ 
  b. ami nu uhooku hu-ta-N. 
     rain NM much rain-PAST-DIR 
     p=‗It rains a lot.‘ 




scholars, as mentioned in 1.5, and I consider that they constitute two different 
categories. In this section, I demonstrate that these two categories should be 
differentiated from each other within Luchuan. Although I have suggested that the 
two indirect evidentials (Inferential and Assumed) may overlap with the category of 
epistemic modality, because of how they convey the speaker‘s certainty, I will show 
that the test which I apply below indicates that they seem not to operate on the 
propositional level.  
     With respect to the question of how to distinguish evidentiality from epistemic 
modality, several tests have been proposed and used by various scholars (see for 
example, Papafragou 2000, Faller 2002, 2006, Matthewson et al. 2007). Here, I will 
demonstrate how the tests can be applied to Luchuan since investigating this question 
in Luchuan using the same criteria that have been applied in other languages may at 
the least contribute to the typological and theoretical study of modality and 
evidentiality.  
     Faller (2002) distinguishes evidentiality from epistemic modality using what 
she calls the ‗challengeability test‘. There are some claims in the literature that 
epistemic modals do not contribute to the truth conditions of the proposition;
31
 Faller 
demonstrates that the test shows whether or not an element contributes to the 
proposition expressed.
32
 The challengeability test is described in (39). 
 
(39) Check whether the meaning of the element in question can be questioned, 
doubted, rejected or (dis)agreed with. If yes, then it contributes to the truth 
conditions of the proposition expressed, otherwise, it does not. 
(Faller 2002:110) 
 
Let us examine the direct evidential -mi in Faller‘s examples from Quechua. Faller 
explains that consultants all agree that the only questioned or (dis)agreed part in any 
of (41a-c) is the proposition that Inés visited her sister yesterday, not the source of 
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 According to Faller (2002:110), ―Outside of possible world semantics, it is often claimed that 
epistemic modals do not contribute to the truth conditions of the proposition expressed, but only 
comment on it (see, for example, Lyons (1977), Sweetser (1990), Palmer (2001)).‖ 
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Faller points out that the result of the test may look equivocal for epistemic modals; however, 
this does not indicate that the test is defective, but is rather due to the unclear status of epistemic 
modality. She presents three arguments to support the validity of the challengeability test. See 





information. This fact shows that this evidential does not contribute to the 
proposition expressed. 
 
(40) Ines-qa qaynunchay ñaña-n-ta-n    watuku-rqa-n. 
    Inés-TOP yesterday sister-3-ACC-mi visit-PST1-3 
    p=‘Inés visited her sister yesterday.‘ 
    EV = speaker saw that p 
 
(41) a. Chiqaq-chu. 
     tre-QUEST 
     ‗Is that true?‘ 
 
    b. Mana-n chiqaq-chu. 
      non-mi true-NEG 
      ‗That‘s not true.‘ 
 
    c. Chiqaq-mi. 
      true-mi 
      ‗True.‘ 
 
Next, I apply this test to a sentence with the direct evidential in Luchuan (42). The 
test shows that the source of information is not the focus of the question, negation or 
agreement, just as in Quechua.  
 
(42) Yoko  ja  cinuu  waQtaa   jaa  Nkai  cuu-ta-N. 
    Yoko TOP yesterday  our   house  to   come-PAST-DIR 
    p= ‗Yoko came to our house yesterday‘ 








     true-Q 
     ‗True?‘ 
 
    b. ʔar-aN (doo)
34
 
      COP-NEG (FP) 
‗That‘s not true.‘ 
 
    c. makutu ja-N (doo) 
      true COP-DIR (FP) 
      ‗True.‘ 
 
When the addressee questions the speaker as in (43a), what is questioned is the 
proposition that Yoko came to our house yesterday but not the source of the 
information. Similarly in (43b), the addressee negates only the proposition part of the 
sentence. The source of information is not negated, as the infelicity of the next 
example shows. 
 
(44) ʔar-aN doo.  #ʔjaa ‗NNd-aN-ta-N. 
    COP-NEG FP  you see-NEG-PAST-DIR 
    ‗That‘s not true. You didn‘t see (this).‘ 
 
On the other hand, the proposition expressed is the focus of the negation, as example 
(45) illustrates. 
 
(45) a. ʔar-aN doo.   Keiko nu du cuu-ta-ru. 
      COP-NEG FP   Keiko NM AP come-PAST-ATTR 
     ‗This is not true. It is Keiko who came (to our house yesterday).‘ 
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 In this sentence, copula jaN also can appear such as ja-m-i? ‗copula-DIR-Q‘, but I chose the 
simple form with just a question marker attached directly to the predicate ―true‖.  
34 
This sentence-final particle is optional but the sentence with it sounds more natural, so I put it 





    b. ʔar-aN doo.  Yoko  ja  cuu  nu  ʔasa   du cuu-ta-ru. 
      COP-NEG FP  Yoko TOP today GEN morning AP come-PAST-ATTR  
     ‗This is not true. It is this morning Yoko came.‘ 
 
The speaker of (45a) disagrees with the identification of the person who came to 
their house, whereas the speaker of (45b) disagrees with the time that Yoko came to 
their house. As these examples illustrate, the meaning of the direct evidential is not 
negated; only the proposition is negated.  
     In the same way, I move on to the sentences with indirect evidentials, which I 
will examine in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. I have not yet provided the details about 
these indirect evidentials; however, let me apply this test to them here so that we can 
compare them with the results of the Direct evidential. Let us begin with the 
Inferential evidential tee.  
 
(46) a. Yoko  ga juubaN  nic-ee-N    tee. 
      Yoko NM  dinner  cook-RES-DIR INF 
      p= ‗Yoko has cooked dinner.‘ 
      EV= speaker infers p. 
 
    b. makutu-i? 
      true-Q 
      ‗True?‘ 
 
The issue is whether or not the inferential meaning is questioned when the addressee 
replies using (43a), ‗True?‘ as in (46b). There are two logical possibilities; first that 
the proposition that Yoko has cooked dinner is questioned, as in (47a), and second 
that the evidential meaning that speaker infers p is questioned, as in (47b). 
 
(47) a. Is it true that Yoko has cooked dinner? 
    b. Is it true that you infer p?  
 
It seems that (47b) is not what my consultants intend. But it is difficult to conclude 




natural as a response to (46a). That is, in the case of the direct evidential, a response 
such as (43a) to (42) makes sense because the speaker makes an assertion. The 
addressee can ask the speaker if the assertion is true or not. But the Inferential 
evidential already indicates that he/she is not 100% sure as long as inference is 
involved; therefore, I do not expect the addressee would question the truth of the 
sentence with the Inferential evidential as in (46b). Therefore, let us try another case, 
responding with a negation as in (43b). Example (48) is a possible reply to (46a). 
 
(48) ʔar-aN doo.  Keiko nu  du  nic-ee-ru. 
    COP-NEG FP  Keiko NM  AP  cook-RES-ATTR 
    ‗This is not true. It is Keiko who has cooked (dinner).‘ 
 
The use of (48) is restricted to the case in which the speaker of (48) knows the fact 
that it is Keiko, not Yoko, who has cooked dinner. In this case, the negated part is a 
proposition, not evidential meaning. On the other hand, when the truth is not known, 
the speaker would not be able to negate either the proposition or the inferential part. 
This suggests that the evidential meaning cannot be negated regardless of whether 
the truth is known or not.  
Next, let us investigate whether evidential meaning is challenged or not when 
the speaker disagrees with utterance (46a), as in (49). 
 
(49) waN-nee ʔaN  ʔumuw-aN
35
.  Yoko ja ʔicunasa kutu,  zooi nar-aN doo. 
    I-TOP  so    think-NEG   Yoko TOP busy  because  at all can-NEG FP 
   ‗I don‘t think so. Yoko is so busy that she cannot make it.‘ 
 
The speaker of (49) does not know whether Yoko actually cooked or not; however, 
he/she disagrees that Yoko cooked dinner based on what he/she knows. This means 
that the speaker of (49) is again challenging the proposition, and he/she is not 
challenging the fact that the speaker of (46a) makes an assumption. Therefore, a 
sentence which challenges evidential meaning, as in (50), cannot follow the sentence 
which shows disagreement like (49).  
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(50) I don‘t think so. # You did not assume that. You saw that. 
 
     In the same way, Faller‘s challengeability test shows that the Assumed 
evidential hazi also behaves in the same way as the Inferential evidential tee.  
 
(51) a. Yoko ga  juubaN  nic-ee-ru     hazi. 
      Yoko NM  dinner  cook-RES-ATTR  INF 
      p= ‗Yoko has cooked dinner.‘ 
      EV= speaker assumes p. 
 
 b. waN-nee ʔaN  ʔumuw-aN 
       I-TOP    so    think-NEG 
       ‗I don‘t think so.‘ 
 
The speaker of (51b) is replying to (51a) claiming that he/she disagrees with the 
proposition, but (51b) does not disagree with the fact that the speaker of (51a) made 
an inference. This analysis clarifies that evidential meaning cannot be challenged, 
and that both the Inferential and Assumed evidentials pass the challengeability test. 
     Next we move on to test the Reportative evidential Ndi.  
 
(52)  Yoko  ga  juubaN  nic-ee-N     Ndi. 
      Yoko NM  dinner  cook-RES-DIR  REP 
      p= ‗Yoko has cooked dinner.‘ 
      EV= speaker hears p. 
 
(53) a. makutu-i? 
      true-Q 





    b. ʔar-aN (doo)
36
 
      COP-NEG (FP) 
‗That‘s not true.‘ 
 
    c. makutu ja-N (doo) 
      true COP-DIR (FP) 
      ‗True.‘ 
 
The addressee in (52) could respond with any of (53a)-(53c); in each case the 
response would not focus on the evidential but rather on the proposition. For 
example, the speaker of (53a) is questioning the proposition that Yoko has cooked 
dinner.
37
 If the sentence is negated, as in (53b), the addressee would have to know 
that the proposition is not true. The speaker of (54), for example, points out that the 
proposition expressed in (52) is not accurate. 
 
(54) ʔar-aN doo.  Keiko ga du cukut-ee-ru. 
    COP-NEG FP Keiko NM AP cook-RES-ATTR 
    ‗This is not true. It is Keiko who has cooked (dinner).‘ 
 
     To sum up, the direct evidential and all three indirect evidentials cannot be 
challenged, and this result shows that all the evidentials in Luchuan do not operate on 
the propositional level.  
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This sentence final particle is optional but the sentence with it sounds more natural, so I put it 
in parentheses. Without this sentence final particle, the utterance could sound abrupt but not 
unacceptable. 
37
 If the speaker of (52) is notorious as a liar, (53a) might be used to check whether the speaker 
of (52) has really heard the proposition. But in this case, the speaker of (53a) would doubt both 
the proposition itself and the source of information. That is, the speaker of (52) is considered to 
lie in two possibilities: first he/she did not hear that Yoko has cooked dinner but he/she hears 
something different from what is stated, and second, he/she did not hear anything. In the first 
possibility, the proposition is questioned and in the second possibility, the evidential value can be 
questioned. In this way, if there is a premise that the speaker is liar, the evidential part may be 
challenged. But I do not highlight this part because rather, it sounds like a rhetorical question not 




2.5  Summary 
 
This chapter has explored the definition of the Direct evidential -N in Luchuan, 
adapting the concept of ―best possible source of evidence‖ presented by Faller (2002). 
After demonstrating in 2.2 that the existing studies of Luchuan cannot provide an 
account for the evidentiality, I proposed my own analysis based on the conceptual 
similarities and differences between -N in Luchuan and -mi in Quechua in 2.3. The 
Direct evidential -N encodes the evidential value that the speaker has the best 
possible source of information (best evidence) for the type of combination conveyed 
by the utterance. I use the term ‗direct evidence‘ to refer to ―direct experience‖ or 
―direct perception/sense‖. Even if direct evidence is unavailable, -N can appear when 
the best evidence consists of, for example, a report from a participant in the event.  
     In addition to the concept of direct/best evidence, I have proposed that another 
crucial factor is whether or not the information falls into the speaker‘s territory of 
information rather than the hearer‘s. If information falls into the hearer‘s territory of 
information rather than the speaker‘s, -N cannot be used. Furthermore, I have shown 
that the use of -N is restricted when it appears with an emotive adjective. The fact 
that the behavior of -N does not show any such restrictions with descriptive 
adjectives suggests that the concept of evidentiality is important for the use of -N 
with an emotive adjective. The use of -N is also restricted when the speaker is talking 
about encyclopedic knowledge or historical facts. Information to be taken as general 
knowledge in the culture needs to be marked by -N. These facts show that how close 
information is for the speaker is one of the crucial criteria for the use of the direct 
evidential in Luchuan.  
In 2.4, I explored some theoretical aspects of the relation between the 
categories of evidentiality and epistemic modality. The Direct evidential -N conveys 
the speaker‘s degree of certainty, so it may look as if it belongs to the category of 
modality; however, I rejected this idea because the meaning which a sentence with 
-N conveys is not weaker compared with the meaning of a sentence without -N, 
unlike epistemic modality. Moreover, I showed that the meaning of the direct 
evidential cannot be challenged; it cannot be questioned, agreed, or negated. As this 
pattern is that of an evidential rather than a modal, I conclude that -N is indeed an 




Similarly, I argued that the Reportative evidential -Ndi is a pure evidential 
which encodes only the source of information, since it does not convey any epistemic 
meaning, and also the evidential meaning which it conveys is not challenged. It may 
be that the Inferential and Assumed evidentials constitute a category where modality 
and evidentiality overlap. They convey the speaker‘s certainty, and unlike the case of 
the Direct evidential -N, a sentence with tee or hazi sounds weaker than a sentence 
without them. Thus, though the test shows that the Inferred tee and the Assumed hazi 
do not contribute to the proposition, since they possess modal features and convey 
the speaker‘s degree of certainty, I propose that the Inferential evidential and the 

























Chapter 3   
Inferential and Assumed evidentials 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In Chapter 2, I argued that verb forms which contain -N should be considered to be 
the Direct evidential. Direct evidentials indicate that the speaker has the information 
via direct evidence (evidence such as witnessing the event), while Indirect 
evidentials indicate that the speaker acquires the information from indirect evidence, 
such as reported evidence from another speaker or inferred evidence based on the 
situation or on reasoning (Willet 1988). According to Willet (1988), Indirect 
evidentials thus include Reported and Inferring,
1
 and it is my proposal that Luchuan 
has both of these evidentials. Furthermore, Willet (1988) divides the Inferring 
evidential into two kinds, result and reasoning, and again, both these kinds of 
evidentials can be seen in Luchuan. Typologically, INFERENCE
2
 is based on visible 
or tangible evidence, while ASSUMPTION is based on evidence other than visible 
results, such as logical reasoning, assumption, or general knowledge (Aikhenvald 
2004: 63). REPORTATIVE is for information reported by another speaker. In this 
chapter, I will present two Indirect evidentials from Luchuan: (1) Inferential tee,
3
 
and (2) Assumed hazi. These two indirect evidentials occupy the same morphological 
slot, directly after the position for evidential (1) in which the Direct evidential -N 
appears. Luchuan‘s third Indirect evidential, reportative Ndi, will be discussed in 
Chapter 4.  
As mentioned in the overview in 2.2.1, the literature mentions one morpheme 
-ee-, which seems to be treated as a marker of indirect evidentiality, though some 
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 The terms ‗Reported‘ and ‗Inferring‘ are used by Willet (1988:57). In regards the discussion of 
terminology, see Chapter 1.  
2 
Following Faller (2002: 6), I use all capitalized letters for evidential types to distinguish them 
from language-specific evidentials which are expressed with an initial capitalized letter. 
 
3
 The basic function of tee is to make an inference based on visual evidence, but its use is a little 
complicated. Sometimes it does not require visual evidence; therefore, it behaves like the 




scholars discuss it in the category of modality or aspect. In this chapter, I will point 
out the problems of treating this morpheme as an indirect evidential (Section 3.2), 
objecting to the literature. Instead, I will propose that there are two indirect 
evidentials: tee (discussed in Section 3.3) and hazi, discussed in Section 3.4. In 
addition, there is a Reportative evidential, which I will present in Chapter 4. After 
presenting the basic functions of the Indirect and Assumed evidentials, I will 
examine the semantic analysis of these two evidentials, focusing on whether or not 
these evidentials express the speaker‘s degree of (un)certainty, and how they behave 
in negative and interrogative sentences.  
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the functions of these two indirect 
evidentials and to discuss whether these evidentials should be categorized as 
grammatical evidentials. More precisely, I will clarify how these two evidentials 
behave in negative sentences and interrogative sentences in order to investigate 
whether or not these evidentials can be negated or questioned. Indirect evidentials are 
not actually negated nor questioned, which suggests that evidential takes high scope, 
and in particular, taking higher scope than negation could mean that the evidential 
does not contribute to the proposition expressed, since negation in general is a part of 
the proposition. This will support the idea that evidential is different from modality, 
which contributes to the proposition expressed.   
 
3.2  Indirect evidentials in the literature  
 
Verb forms which contain the morpheme -ee- have been characterized as inferential 
in existing studies. For example, Shinzato (1991) states that eeN indicates inferential 
information. Miyara (2002) claims that this observation is not accurate because 
Shinzato does not give a morphological analysis to clarify which morpheme indicates 
inferentiality, and argues that inferential meaning is conveyed by the morpheme -ee- 
rather than -N. Kudo et al. (2007) state that verb forms which contain the morpheme 
-ee- have an inferential meaning, but  they do not clarify whether -N should be 
included as part of the inferential marker. In addition to the lack of morphological 
analysis, the arguments concerning this morpheme are complicated by the existence 
of another, homophonous morpheme eeN, which expresses resultative aspect. The 




researchers (Uemura 1963, 1992, 2003, Shinzato 1991, Miyara 2002). Uemura calls 
this second eeN resultative aspect
4
 and the eeN which carries an inferential meaning 
definite past. It is used ‗to express a past state/event as something with a certain 
factual basis‘ (Uemura 1963: 75, 2003:145).
5
 It should be noted that Uemura uses 
the word ‗definite‘ instead of ‗inferential‘. ‗Definite‘ in Uemura‘s (1963, 1992, 2003) 
definition suggests assertion with a certain factual basis, though Shinzato (1991) 
modified its interpretation and instead uses the term inference.
6
 Shinzato attempts to 
examine the ambiguity caused by the homophony of these two forms. According to 
her analysis, when eeN appears with a non-first person subject, it can have both 
inferential and resultative meaning as in (1); on the other hand, when eeN appears 
with a first person subject, it loses the inferential reading and has a resultative 
reading only, as in (2).  
 
(1)  aree  kazjihici nu kusui   nud-een. 
    the   cold    of medicine  take 
    ‗He must have taken cold medicine.‘ 
    ‗He has just taken cold medicine.‘ 
(Shinzato 1991:59) 
(2) wannee  kazjihici nu kusui  nud-een. 
    I         cold    of medicine  take 
   ‗I have just taken cold medicine.‘ 
(Shinzato 1991:59) 
 
    I do not agree that (1) is ambiguous; my data shows that the inferential reading 
(―He must have taken cold medicine‖) requires in addition the presence of the 
Inferential evidential -tee at the end of the verbal complex. I will set out my claim in 
3.3 and 3.4, but first let me briefly outline what other researchers have said. Miyara 
pointed out the deficiency of Shinzato‘s morphological analysis which treats eeN as 
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 Uemura also uses the term completed aspect (2003:89). 
5
 This direct quote is from Uemura (2003), but he made the same claims in 1963 in the 
Dictionary of the Okinawan Language.  
6
 Based on the claim that eeN is used when the speaker reported reliable, objective information 
(Uemura 1961, 1963; Osio 1985), Shinzato states that ―By ‗reliable‘ and ‗objective‘, they seem to 
mean that it is a ‗reliable‘ and ‗objective‘ inference‖ (1996:56). For this reason, she uses the term 




one morpheme, despite the ambiguity; Miyara says instead that the ambiguity should 
be captured by positing the existence of two distinct but homophonous morphemes 
(2002:96).
7
 Since investigating morphological analysis in detail is not the main aim 
of this dissertation, I do not go too deeply into this discussion; however, I agree that 
resultative -ee- is morphologically different from inferential -ee-, for three reasons. 
First, resultative -ee- can co-occur with the past tense marker -ta-, whereas 
inferential -ee- cannot, as shown in (3). This point is also mentioned in Miyara 
(2002).  According to my morphological analysis, this phenomenon can be easily 
explained because inferential -ee- is a kind of mood marker which appears in a 
different slot to past tense.  
 
(3)   ʔare-e  juubaN  kad-ee-ta-N. 
      he-TOP dinner  eat-RES-PAST-DIR 
      p= ‗He ate dinner.‘ 
      EV= I saw he finished having dinner (eg. empty plate). 
      EV= # I infer he finished having dinner. 
 
As seen in (3), -ee- does not have the inferential reading when it appears with the 
past tense marker -ta-. Utterance (3) conveys a resultative meaning only and the 
direct evidential meaning is contributed by -N.  
    Second, inferential -ee- appears neither in interrogatives nor with negation, but 
resultative -ee- can appear in both of these contexts; see (4).  
 
                                                   
7
 Miyara claims that the resultative -ee- is derived from /+ti a/ (ti + existential verb) (→ [tee]), 
while inferential -ee- is not a derived form. This analysis is different from the traditional 
approach. In the Dictionary of the Okinawan Language (1963), this form is treated as a 
compound, composed of the positive basic participle, the topic marker ja and ʔaN ‗have‘. I do not 
fully understand what Miyara means by /+ti/ because his gloss is just marked in Japanese te, but 
a comes from the existential verb ʔaN ‗be/have‘. For his morphological analysis, see Miyara 




(4) a. ʔare-e  juubaN  kad-ee-m-i? 
      he-TOP dinner  eat-RES-DIR-Q 
      p = ‗Has he eaten dinner?‘ 
      EV= Speaker is asking if the addressee has direct evidence. 
      EV= # Speaker is asking if the addressee infers p. 
 
   b. ʔare-e  juubaN  kad-ee-neeN. 
     he-TOP dinner   eat-RES-NEG 
     p= ‗He hasn‘t eaten dinner.‘ 
     EV= Speaker sees the evidence of p. 
     EV= # Speaker infers p. 
 
Sentence (4a) shows that only a resultative reading is expressed in an interrogative 
and that in this context, eeN has no inferential reading. Similarly, in a negative 
sentence, the inferential reading cannot be conveyed and only a resultative reading is 
available, as (4b) shows.
8
  
    The third piece of evidence for treating this as a case of homophony between 
two distinct morphemes is that the two morphemes can co-occur, as sentence (5) 
shows. The first -ee- has a resultative meaning and the second -(t)ee- expresses 
irrealis.
9
 The speaker of (5) would use this sentence when he/she acquires the source 
of information that makes him/her infer the event took place and was completed; for 
example, it is used when the speaker infers that Kimiko cooked dinner based on 
visual evidence, in this case, a cooked meal.   
 
(5) Kimiko  ja  juubaN  nic-ee-tee-N   tee. 
   Kimiko TOP dinner  cook-RES-M -DIR  INF 
   ‗Kimiko must have cooked dinner.‘ 
 
Based on the three differences observed in (3), (4), and (5), I have distinguished 
―resultative -ee-‖ from inferential -ee-, which is a kind of a mood marker used in 
irrealis such as subjunctive. I will refer to sentence final tee in (5) as ―the Inferential 
                                                   
8
 Negative neeN conveys direct evidential reading. This aspect has been discussed in 2.4.2. 
9





evidential‖ (glossed by ‗INF‘), distinguishing it from ―resultative -ee-‖ (glossed by 
‗RES‘) and ―mood marker -ee-‖ (glossed by ‗M‘). The details about these three (t)ee 
forms will be discussed again in 3.3.4. The third reason presented in (5)—the 
co-occurrence of these two morphemes—argues strongly that they are different 
morphemes. Resultative -ee- appears in the slot of aspect, and the other -ee- appears 
in the slot of mood in my morphological analysis in 2.2.2.  
     Now that I have demonstrated that these two morphemes are different, here let 
me clarify the terms for these two once again. I will use ―the resultative -ee-‖ versus 
―the irrealis mood marker -(t)ee-‖. Additionally, there is the Inferential evidential tee 
which I classify as an grammatical evidential, to be discussed in 3.3
10
.  
     In various languages it has been found that perfect and inferential markers are 
identical in form (Comrie 1976, 2000, Bybee 1994), for example in Bulgarian, 
Georgian, and Estonian. Although this difficulty has hampered the accurate 
description of these two forms in Luchuan, I will attempt to distinguish them as 
much as possible. 
     What I want to clarify here is that the -ee- form which ends with -N conveys 
resultative meaning only. That is, -N indicates that the speaker has direct/best 
evidence, as I have demonstrated in 2.3; therefore I analyze ee-N as a resultative plus 
the Direct evidential, not an inferential, unlike existing studies. However, the mood 
marker -ee- can also occur before -N; but only if -N in turn is followed by what I am 
calling the Inferential evidential tee in final position. If there is no Inferential tee 
after -N, as in example (6), -sa appears instead of -N. Therefore example (1) above is 
not actually ambiguous because eeN alone, without sentence final tee, does not 
express inferential but resultative only.
11
 It might appear that I am being rather bold 
because my claim is quite different from other researchers (Uemura 1963, 1992, 
2003, Shinzato 1991, Miyara 2002). However, if we examine carefully, we can see 
that existing studies do not pay attention to the difference between -N and -sa. For 
example, Kudo et al. (2007) presented sentence (6) as an example of inference. In 
this example the speaker makes an inference based on sensory evidence. 
                                                   
10
 When I cite the data from other authors, I will use their glosses as they originally used. If there 
are no glosses, I will use my own glosses or capitalized letters such as EE if their meaning is not 
clear. 
11
 I assume that the reason for example (1) being treated as ambiguous in the literature is because 
the Inferential evidential tee is ignored, and mistakenly considered as merely a final particle 





Context: The speaker smells alcohol in the room.  
(6) juubi  kumaNzi  saki  nudeeN /  nudeesa    jaa. 
    last night here  alcohol drink-EEN /drink-EE SA  FP 
    ‗Someone must have drunk here last night.‘
12
 
(Kudo et al. 2007) 
 
Note that this example includes both eeN and eesa jaa, separated by a slash. Since 
they are presented as alternatives, it appears that they should convey the same 
meaning. However, in fact, eeN and eesa jaa behave differently when they are used 
with an adverb which expresses uncertainty such as ‗maybe‘ or ‗perhaps‘ as shown in 
(7). 
 
(7) a. ?? ʔuukata,  juubi  kumaNzi  saki  nud-ee-N. 
        maybe  last night  here   alcohol drink-RES-DIR 
       ‗Maybe, (someone) must have drunk here last night.‘ 
 
   b.   ʔuukata,  juubi  kumaNzi  saki    nud-ee-sa jaa. 
        maybe  last night  here  alcohol  drink-M-FP  FP 




As can be seen in (7), the acceptability of these two sentences is different; (7a) with 
eeN sounds awkward, while (7b) with eesa jaa sounds acceptable. The difference in 
acceptability between them indicates that these two expressions should be treated 
differently. This is the reason why I claim that the distinction between -N and -sa is 
important and why it is important to separate the -ee- morpheme from -N and -sa. In 
fact, there is no example in which an inferential ends with -N in Miyara‘s data either.  
Let me briefly explain why sa jaa is not treated as an evidential here. There are two 
reasons. First, sa jaa itself does not convey inferential meaning, as illustrated in 
example (8).  
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 I have assigned this gloss because there is no gloss in original text. 
13
 Although the English translation is awkward because of the epistemic disparity between 




Context: The speaker walks in the room and sees Yoko writing a letter. Then the 
speaker utters (8) to the addressee (who is not Yoko). 
(8)  Yoko  ja  tigami  kac-oo-sa   jaa. 
Yoko TOP  letter  write-CON-FP   FP 
    ‗Yoko is writing a letter.‘ 
 
The speaker of (8) does not have to do any inference: it is immediately obvious that 
Yoko is writing a letter in front of the speaker at the time of utterance. I therefore 
argue that this example demonstrates that sa jaa does not encode inference.  
Second, sa jaa is not a pure evidential, because the inferential meaning that sa 
jaa conveys is cancelable. This is a crucial difference between sa jaa and tee. These 
two expressions have a similar meaning, as examples (9a) and (9b) show, but I will 
also present cases which show that they are different.  
 
Context: The speaker finds dinner is ready on the table. It is the specialty of the 
speaker‘s daughter. 
(9) a. Miki  ga   nic-ee-sa   jaa.  
      Miki NM  cook-RES-FP FP   
     ‗Miki must have cooked (the meal).‘ 
     
b. Miki ga  nic-ee-N      tee.  
     Miki NM  cook-RES-DIR  INF 
     ‗(I infer) Miki has cooked the meal.‘ 
 
With this context, both examples (9a) and (9b) appear to carry a fairly similar 
meaning. To use these sentences, the speaker needs to have sufficient information 
that implies that the meal was cooked by Miki. The speaker of examples (9a) and 
(9b) is able to infer this because of Miki‘s habit, for example, the meal is Miki‘s 
specialty, or Miki cooks every day. Also if the context is restricted, for example, Miki 
is the only person who has been in the house, (9a) and (9b) are licensed to be used. 
As examples (9a) and (9b) show, there is a common point between sa jaa and tee, but 
the next example shows that they are significantly different. Whereas eesa jaa can be 





Context: Speaker sees a cooked dinner on the table.  
(10) a. juubaN nic-ee-sa   jaa. 
      dinner cook-RES-FP FP   




b. #juubaN  nic-ee-N    tee.  
       dinner  cook-RES-DIR INF 
       ‗(I infer) dinner has been cooked.‘ 
 
The speaker of example (10a) simply states the fact that there is a cooked dinner. It 
sounds like an objective description of the present situation rather than inference. On 
the other hand, example (10b) is unacceptable once the speaker sees the evidence. 
The unacceptability of example (10b) implies that tee cannot describe a present 
situation, without inference, unlike eesa jaa. Moreover, the fact that example (10a) is 
acceptable demonstrates that sa jaa does not necessarily convey inferential meaning. 
That is, the inferential meaning that sa jaa conveys is cancelable, depending on the 
context.  
    The unacceptability of example (10b) thus suggests that tee is purely inferential 
because it cannot be used when the speaker has visual evidence. This means that the 
inferential meaning and the fact that the object is observable in front of the speaker 
conflict with each other, as stated earlier. On the other hand, eesa jaa in example 
(10a) does not give rise to such a conflict because it simply describes the situation. It 
is true that eesa jaa can convey an inferential meaning, as example (9a) indicates. In 
example (9a), the speaker is certain that the meal is cooked because of the visual 
evidence; but there is room for inference about who the agent is because the speaker 
has not seen the meal actually being cooked. Therefore, eesa jaa is compatible with 
an inferential interpretation when the speaker infers who cooked dinner. On the other 
hand, tee always carries inferential meaning, as the unacceptability of example (10b) 
suggests. Also, when tee appears with aspects other than resultative -ee-, the sentence 
always conveys an inferential meaning, as we will see in 3.3.2. Also, inferential 
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 I have used passive for the corresponding translation in English for (10a) because the meaning 




meaning is always maintained in negation, as we have seen in 3.3.3. This is the 
reason why I classify tee as an inferential. As I have discussed in 1.5, in order to 
classify an element as belonging to a distinct category of evidentiality, the evidential 
meaning should not be just a pragmatic implicature (Anderson 1986, Faller 2002, 
Aikhenvald 2003, 2004). Inferential tee always encodes inferential meaning and this 
meaning is not cancellable.  
Given this kind of evidence, why is eeN regarded as inferential in the literature 
(Shinzato 1991, Kudo et al. 2007)? The reason for this is the function of the sentence 
final particle tee/dee (which I will refer to as tee from now on.) The investigation of 
this final particle tee, which I call the Inferential evidential, has been neglected but 
its function is significant. When the Inferential evidential tee occurs after -N, as in (8), 
it allows the adverb of uncertainty to co-occur with -ee-, which was otherwise not 
allowed, as we saw in (7a) above. Therefore, it is not a sentence final particle which 
does not change the meaning of the sentence, but rather, it plays an important role in 
terms of evidentiality. So, I consider that tee which appears after the slot of -N is an 
Inferential evidential. I will discuss this evidential in more detail in the next section. 
 
(11)  ʔuukata,  juubi  kumaNzi  saki  nud-ee-N   tee. 
     Maybe  last night  here  alcohol drink-M-DIR  INF 
    ‗Maybe (someone) must have drunk here last night.‘ 
 
Generally the particles which appear in the end of the sentence, an additional element 
to the verb conjugations, are considered as sentence-final particles which do not 
contribute to the meaning expressed. Although the study of sentence-final particles in 
Luchuan has been neglected, Japanese sentence-final particles have attracted a lot of 
attention lately, being classified as a part of modality. According to Nitta (2003:239), 
‗communicative attitude modality‘ possesses a dialogical feature which expresses the 
way that speakers try to convey information to hearers. This communicative attitude 
modality is realized by sentence-final particles such as ne and yo in Japanese. This 
function seems to be a cross-linguistically unique and distinct feature found in 
Japanese (Masuoka 1991:92). Masuoka (1991:93) states that the meaning which 
sentence-final particles conveys does not contribute to the proposition expressed, and 




communicative attitude modality is expressed by sentence-final particles. Because 
this observation has been applied to studies of Luchuan, sentence-final particles have 
been omitted from the data in the literature; they are simply considered not to 
influence the grammaticality of the sentences. For instance, Kudo et al. (2007:156) 
explicitly state that sentence-final particles such as doo are frequently used in actual 
discourse, but they are omitted from the data because sentences are still grammatical 
even without them; although when sentences do not sound natural without them, they 
are to be included (such as sa jaa).
15
  
In this way, sentence-final particles are not examined consistently; sometimes 
they are included and sometimes not. This omission causes serious error. As I have 
shown above, although sentence (7a) without tee is grammatical, as Kudo et al. state, 
it nevertheless expresses a different meaning from sentence (11) which does contain 
tee. In the same way, according to Miyara (2002:91), the sentence-final particle doo 
which Kudo et al. omit from their data is reported to play an important role in 
changing the meaning of the sentence.
16
 The important point is not only whether a 
certain component decides grammaticality or not but also whether its presence or 
absence changes the meaning of the sentence. For this reason, although 
sentence-final particles are regrettably often omitted, they should never be neglected. 
I assume that it is this mistake which allows for an analysis of eeN as inferential. To 
be precise, basically the mood marker -ee- cannot occur with -N, unless -N is in turn 
followed by the inferential evidential tee. As a result, sentences with -ee- followed by 
-N alone can only be interpreted as resultative.  
    Let us briefly summarize what we have discussed so far. I introduced the studies 
in the existing literature which claim that there are two ee(N) forms; namely one with 
a resultative interpretation, and one with a mood interpretation which also carries the 
meaning of inference. I claim that -eeN without tee is a resultative, and that the 
inferential meaning should be expressed by either the Inferential tee or sa jaa. These 
two expressions usually do not appear with a first person subject since speakers are 
basically supposed to know what they did. Thus, tee cannot be attached after 
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 Kudo et al. call sajaa a sentence-final particle, but -sa in sajaa should not be regarded as a 
part of a sentence-final particle because, as we have seen in 2.2.2, this morpheme appears in the 
same slot as -N. If the morpheme -sa is omitted, the sentence will be ungrammatical. Thus, as jaa 
can be omitted, only jaa should be considered as a sentence-final particle. 
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 Miyara (2002) claims that there are cases where unacceptability can be recovered by assigning 




resultative eeN, as in (12b), and sa jaa also sounds unnatural, as in (12c). 
 
(12) a. waNnee  juubaN  nic-ee-N.
17
 
      I-TOP  dinner   cook-RES-DIR 
      ‗I have cooked.‘ 
 
   b. #waNnee  juubaN  nic-ee-N    tee. 
      I-TOP    dinner   cook-M -DIR  INF 
      ‗I must have cooked.‘ 
 
   c. #waNnee  juubaN  nic-ee-sa   jaa. 
      I-TOP   dinner   cook-RES-FP  FP 
      ‗I must have cooked.‘ 
 
But in a situation in which a speaker has completely forgotten what he or she did, 
which is unlikely to happen often, but is not inconceivable, speakers can infer what 
they did. That is, the acceptability of (12b) and (12c) is contextually determined.  
In this section, I have argued that when -ee- is followed by the Direct 
evidential -N alone, it can only be interpreted as resultative. When -ee-+N is in turn 
followed by the Inferential evidential tee, or when sa occurs instead of -N, the mood 
marker -ee- can appear. In this section, I have demonstrated how my position toward 
the analysis of the inferential evidential differs from what has elsewhere been 
proposed in the literature. In the next section, I will present what I consider to be the 
Inferential evidential and discuss its semantic and syntactic functions. Then, I will 
move to the Assumed evidential in 3.4. 
 
3.3  Inferential evidential tee  
 
I have mentioned this morpheme in section 3.2, in the section providing the literature 
review. I argued that the basic meaning of ee+N in the absence of a following tee is 
resultative. In this section I will closely examine the function of the Inferential 
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 This sentence sounds more natural with the sentence final particle doo, but in order to avoid 




evidential tee. The main points that I will examine in order to clarify the function of 
tee are as follows: 
 
(1) What kind of evidence licenses the use of tee 
(2) How tee interacts with aspect/tense and the direct evidential -N 
(3) Whether tee can appear in negative or interrogative sentences  
(4) Reasons for classifying tee as an evidential 
 
Point (1) concerns the description of the semantic features of tee and points (2) and 
(3) concern its morphological or syntactic properties. The last point (4) gives the 
arguments in favor of classifying tee as an evidential. The more complex conceptual 
issue of whether expressions conveying indirect evidence should be classified as 
evidentiality or modality will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
     In the existing literature, tee has been neglected because, as explained in 
section 3.2, it is often assumed to be a final particle which does not contribute to the 
meaning of the proposition.
18
 However, this assumption is not justified when 
evidentiality is taken into account. This particle requires analysis because without it, 
sentences express resultative aspect, but with it, they express inferentiality.  
 
3.3.1  What kind of evidence licenses the use of tee  
 
The first thing that needs to be done is to introduce the primary types of evidence 
that license the use of tee. After that, the other more marginal types of evidence will 
be introduced. First, the primary usage of tee is to mark information based on visual 
evidence. Let us begin by considering a simpler example which has one argument, 
before returning to sentences with two arguments.  
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 Kudo et al. (2007) include this particle in their data, although they note that they generally 
exclude final particles in their paper. They explain that they include it because sentences sound 
better with this particle. However, as we will see more than just ―naturalness‖ is at stake, as tee 




Context : Speaker sees wet ground and infers that it has rained. 
(13) ʔami hut-ee-N      tee. 
   rain   rain-RES-DIR  INF 
   p = ‗It has rained.‘ 
   EV = Speaker infers p 
 
The speaker of example (13) makes an inference based on visual evidence, wet 
ground. In this case, the speaker‘s inference to utterance process can be represented 
as in (14).  
 
(14) Visual evidence  inference  utterance 
 
Since the process of inference to utterance illustrated in (14) has to take place for the 
use of the evidential to be licensed, someone who actually sees it raining cannot use 
sentence (13). Presenting the situation simultaneously as directly observed and 
inferred would create conflict. Moreover, the speaker must be able to see a broad 
area of wet ground; the speaker needs to be sure that the ground is wet because of 
rain, not because of other reasons, such as somebody watering flowers or washing a 
car. If the speaker thinks the ground is wet, but it may not be caused by rain, the 
speaker would use a different form which indicates doubt. Putting all this together, 
we can say that inferential tee can be used when the speaker has sufficient evidence; 
in the case of (13), wet ground because of rain. In other words, first the speaker 
should obtain visual evidence and this evidence should be concrete enough to link 
the cause (rain) and the effect (wet ground). 
     Next, let us consider an example with two arguments, as in (15). The speaker‘s 
inference process to utterance is basically the same as (14), but when the agent is 
animate, naturally the inference process is a little complicated because the number of 





(15) Yoko  ga juubaN  nic-ee-N    tee.   
     Yoko NM dinner  cook-M -DIR  INF 
     p = Yoko has cooked dinner. 
     EV = Speaker infers p. (based on visual evidence of cooked meal) 
 
In the case of (15), it is certain that dinner is ready since it is right before the 
speaker‘s eyes. It is, in fact, unnecessary that the speaker directly sees the object - in 
this case, ‗dinner‘ - he or she can use tee based on other evidence, as long as the 
evidence indicates that the event definitely happened. For example, if there is a cake 
tin which has remains of cake in it, this information is sufficient to infer that 
someone has baked a cake. If the speaker sees an opened packet of flour or an 
eggbeater with a piece of dough, resultative aspect cannot be used because this 
situation implies that somebody is baking a cake, but not that the activity is 
completed, an important element of resultative aspect. In order to use resultative 
aspect with the Inferential evidential tee, it is important for the speaker to directly see 
the object or other evidence that indicates completion of activity. If either type of 
evidence is available, then the element that requires inference is the identity of the 
agent. Drawing an inference just by seeing visual evidence is not enough to utter (15). 
The speaker needs more definitive evidence to combine the visual evidence and the 
person who cooked it, for example, the dish is Yoko‘s specialty, or there was only 
one person in the house who can cook. The combination of the fact that there is a 
cooked meal on the table and the reasonable grounds which convince the speaker of 
who cooked the meal is necessary for the use of tee with this transitive verb. Because 
there are these factors, the inference process that leads up to the utterance in (15) can 
be represented as in (16).  
 
(16) One of the possible paths of deduction underlying (15) 
Cooked meal  Who cooked it?  The dish is Yoko‘s specialty.  Yoko cooked it. 
 
The inference process to utterance in (16) implies that what the speaker needs in 
order to use the inferential evidential is, first, visual evidence and second, substantial 
reasons to combine cause (Yoko did it) and effect (cooked meal). This use of 




primary use of this morpheme. However, it is important to note that tee is also used 
with other sensory - auditory and olfactory - senses. A speaker can use tee based on 
auditory information, as in (17), or olfactory evidence, as in (18).  
 
Context: Speaker hears the sound of rain on the roof and infers that it is raining now. 
(17) ʔami hut-oo-N   tee. 
    rain rain-CON-DIR INF 
    p = ‗It is raining.‘ 
    EV = Speaker infers p. 
 
Context: Speaker smells something which has been burned black in the oven.  
(18) jana kazja su-N.     nuugara  kugarit-oo-N   tee. 
    strange smell do-DIR. something burn-CON-DIR  INF 
    ‗(I) smell (something) strange. Something is burned.‘ 
    p = ‗Something is burned.‘ 
    EV = Speaker infers p. 
 
These examples show that the use of tee can be licensed not only by visual evidence 
but also by other sensory input such as sound and smell. Thus, to be precise, tee can 
be used if the speaker has sensory evidence. This feature of tee corresponds to the 
typological semantic parameter of INFERENCE which Aikhenvald (2004) proposes, 
since it covers visible and tangible evidence gained through perception. 
It should be observed that there are also non-primary usages of inferential tee. 
When sensory evidence is not available, another, less dominant meaning of tee can 
be observed. Other available grounds, such as habit, can serve as evidence for 
inference instead of sensory evidence. Next, I will discuss this usage, which is not 
common.  
Having seen the primary usage of tee, we may now turn to investigate what 
kind of evidence can license the use of inferential tee in more marginal cases. I have 
explained that the primary usage of tee is based on visual evidence and also to a 
lesser extent on auditory and olfactory evidence as in examples (17) and (18) above. 





Context: On the phone, a son says to his mother that there is bread on the table. The 
mother, the speaker, infers that her own mother came, because she is good at 
baking bread and sometimes brings it for her grandson (the speaker‘s son).  
(19)  ʔajaa  ga  muQci-c-ee-N      tee 
     mother NM  bring-come-M -DIR  INF 
     p = ‗My mother has come to bring (bread).‘ 
     EV = Speaker infers p. 
 
In example (19), the speaker does not have visual evidence but she acquired reported 
information from her son and makes an inference based on this information and on 
her knowledge of the habits of the relevant people. The speaker‘s inference process 
can be assumed to be as in (20). 
 
(20) Evidence: Son‘s oral report  Information: bread is on the table. 
    Habit: Speaker‘s mother likes baking bread and often brings it to her grandson. 
 Inference: Speaker‘s mother has brought bread. 
 
The ground for the inference is given orally on the phone in example (19). It might 
perhaps be thought that this reported information could be still considered as a type 
of auditory evidence since the reported information is input through the auditory 
sense. However, recall example (17), which I presented as a core case of an 
inferential based on auditory information. In the context for example (17), the 
speaker is directly listening to the sound of rain; this is very different from the 
situation in sentence (19), which does not include the speaker‘s direct perception of 
the event. Having considered this difference, it would seem that inference based on 
reported information and inference based on speaker‘s direct auditory sense should 
belong to different levels of evidence. This implies that the marginal meaning of tee 
is not based on sensory evidence, but other evidence such as reported information as 
in example (19). It is actually more relevant to focus on the point that example (19) is 
uttered based on the reporter‘s (speaker‘s son) visual evidence. When tee is used with 
resultative aspect, sensory evidence is significant regardless of whether it is acquired 
directly (the speaker‘s own perception) or indirectly (a third party‘s perception).  




evidential. Inferential information is not simply a report of someone‘s utterance, but 
the speaker‘s inference based on someone‘s report, hence, the appropriate evidential 
for the context in (19) is the Inferential evidential rather than Reportative. 
Consider the next example (21) which shows that the speaker uses tee based on 
reasoning from habitual information when sensory evidence is unavailable. The 
speaker can use tee even though the information he received is written information.  
 
Context: On the departmental meeting agenda, there is a report that someone in the 
department has to attend a linguistics conference. The speaker infers that 
Professor Brown will go because his specialty is linguistics and he never misses 
conferences. 
(21) ʔari  ga  ʔic-u-N    tee.
19
 
    he  NM  go-IMPF-DIR INF 
    p = ‗He will go there.‘ 
    EV = Speaker infers p. 
 
The information which the speaker of (21) obtains is simply that someone has to 
attend the conference. He or she infers the proposition that Professor Brown will go 
based on his or her knowledge about the agent, not sensory information. Again, it 
might be possible to consider that the information is obtained via visual sensory input 
because the speaker reads the sentence on the agenda. But this case is to be 
distinguished from the cases in which speaker sees the result of the event because 
what the speaker sees is just a written sentence. Just as example (19) should be 
distinguished from typical auditory evidence, so sentence (21) should be 
distinguished from typical visual evidence. This example implies that although usage 
of tee frequently requires sensory evidence, sensory evidence is not a ‗must‘.  
It is worth noting that the cases which do not require sensory evidence seem to 
be observed in non-past basic form more often than in other forms. The non-past 
basic form expresses future or habitual events. Tee is probably allowed to appear 
without typical sensory evidence when it appears in the non-past basic because an 
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study of honorification is out of the domain of this dissertation, the sentence in (21) is appropriate 




event which has not taken place cannot be perceived.  
How does this less dominant usage of tee affect the analysis of evidentiality? 
Typologically an Inferential evidential is based on visual or tangible evidence and an 
Assumed evidential is based on general knowledge or reasoning (Aikhenvald 2004). 
According to the typological classification presented by Aikhenvald (2004), the 
evidential system of Luchuan appears to belong to either the B1 system or the C2 
system. Both systems have one Direct (or Visual) evidential but they differ in that the 
B1 system has two indirect evidentials, while the C2 system has three indirect 
evidentials. The indirect evidentials which a B1 system possesses are Inferred and 
Reported,
20
 and a C2 system also has these two evidentials. In addition to these two 
Indirect evidentials, a C2 system also has an Assumed evidential. In a B1 system a 
(Direct, Inferred, Reported) Inferential can cover reasoning in addition to visual 
evidence. That is, when the system does not distinguish the Inferential evidential 
from the Assumed evidential, the domain of Inferential can be extended to reasoning, 
in addition to inference based on visual evidence. On the other hand, in a C2 system 
(Direct, Inferred, Assumed, Reported), Inferential covers visual or tangible evidence 
but not reasoning. In languages which distinguish Inferential from Assumed 
evidential, Inferential does not cover reasoning. Examples (19) and (21) with tee 
appear to be fairly close to reasoning. How we deal with tee will affect how we 
analyze the whole evidential system in Luchuan. I will return to this problem after 
overviewing two other indirect evidentials. For now, I just claim that tee is used 
primarily based on evidence obtained through the sensory system (visual, auditory, 
and olfactory), and that less dominant cases as seen in examples (19) and (21) can 
also be observed. This differentiates it from hazi, in that the primary usage of hazi is 
based on general knowledge, as I will examine in 3.4. The question of how tee and 
hazi are different will be discussed in 3.4.4. 
 
3.3.2  How tee interacts with aspect/tense and the direct 
evidential -N  
 
Now that I have presented the semantic features of tee, I will move on to the question 
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 The terms ―Inferential‖ and ―Reportative‖ in this dissertation correspond to ―Inferred‖ and 




of how this evidential is used, and in particular how tee interacts with aspect and 
tense. I will pay attention to the problem of how tee interacts with the direct 
evidential -N at the same time. Let us start with observing cases of non-past tense.  
 
Context: Yoko is walking. The speaker infers that Yoko is going to school because 
she is heading in the direction of school, wearing a school uniform.  
(22)  Yoko ja  gaQkoo Nkai  ic-u-N     tee.
21
 
      Yoko TOP school  to   go-IMPF-DIR INF 
      p = ‗Yoko will go to school.‘ 




 can be used with tee as (22) indicates. As can be seen, the 
inference is made based on the visual evidence that Yoko is heading to school 
wearing her school uniform. The next sentence—(23)—also indicates that tee can 
appear with non-past continuative aspect when the speaker makes an inference based 
on visual evidence. 
  
Context: Speaker sees black clouds far away and infers it is raining there. 
(23) ʔama-a   ʔami hut-oo-N   tee. 
    there-TOP rain rain-CON-DIR INF 
    p = ‗It is raining there.‘ 
    EV = Speaker infers p. 
 
The speaker infers that it is raining in the area where he or she sees black clouds. 
Examples (22) and (23) indicate that the Inferential evidential tee can be compatible 
with non-past tense both in imperfective and continuative aspect. Moreover, 
resultative aspect can be compatible with tee as (13) shows. 
     As we have seen in examples (17) and (18) in the previous section, the 
Inference evidential can be used based on sensory evidence other than visual. I will 
not repeat those examples here, but I should point out one interesting point: sensory 
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 It is more natural to omit the subject or use a pronoun when both the speaker and the hearer 
know who they are talking about, but I use the person‘s name in examples to avoid confusion.  
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 Recall that the morpheme -u- indicates imperfective aspect as we have seen in 2.2.2. Since 




evidence other than visual (and auditory and olfactory) is frequently associated with 
continuative aspect, though tee is more typically used with resultative aspect. This is 
perhaps because an ongoing event can be easily heard or smelled, but it is more 
difficult to hear or smell a finished event and hence to report it with resultative. 
Conversely, if a speaker sees an ongoing event s/he typically cannot use the 
inferential because s/he should instead use the Direct evidential. Thus, when 
Inferential tee co-occurs with continuative aspect, the sensory evidence is typically 
either auditory or olfactory, whereas when it co-occurs with resultative aspect the 
sensory evidence is mainly visual. 
Note that the question arises: I have claimed that -N is a direct evidential 
marker, but this morpheme also appears with tee which I call an Inferential 
evidential.
23
 This issue will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
Now let us return to the issue of tense and aspect. The sentences above show 
that the particle tee can be used with non-past tense (basic, continuative, resultative); 
the next examples show that this particle cannot appear with past tense. 
 
(24) *Yoko ga   ʔNz-a-N    tee. 
   Yoko NM  go-PAST-DIR  INF 
     Intended meaning: ‗I infer Yoko went (there).‘ 
 
In 2.3.1, I discussed the claim which has been made in the literature that the past 
form -a(N) does not co-occur with the third person (Shinzato 1991), but I 
demonstrated that -a(N) can be used when the speaker has direct evidence. Therefore, 
the unacceptability of example (24) is not triggered by a problem about the person of 
the subject. Instead, the reason why example (24) is unacceptable is that tee is not 
compatible with past tense. The next examples support this conclusion:  
 
(25) a. *ʔami  hut-oo-ta-N       tee. 
       rain  rain-CON-PAST-DIR  INF 
       Intended meaning: ‗I infer it was raining.‘ 
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   b. *ʔami  huj-u-ta-N        tee. 
      rain   rain-IMPF-PAST-DIR INF 
      Intended meaning: ‗I infer it was raining.‘ 
 
c. *ʔami  hut-ee-ta-N       tee. 
      rain   rain-RES-PAST-DIR  INF 
      Intended meaning: ‗I infer it has rained.‘ 
 
As examples (25a)-(25c) show, sentences that contain the past marker -ta- cannot 
also include the inferential marker tee. What is the cause of this incompatibility? I 
consider that tee expresses an inference drawn primarily from sensory evidence 
available at the time of utterance. This is probably one of the reasons why tee 
frequently appears with resultative aspect
 
which describes the result of a past event. 
The morpheme -ta- indicates that the event took place in the past and -N indicates 
that the speaker has direct/best evidence for the event. Thus, since -(t)aN expresses 
that the speaker has direct/best evidence of the event in the past, the co-occurrence of 
(t)aN and the Inferential tee makes them conflict with each other.
24
   
     I have examined two main points so far; first, inference is basically based on 
visual evidence; and second, inferential tee cannot be used with past tense. As for the 
issue that the Inferential evidential tee appears with the Direct evidential -N, I will 
demonstrate in Chapter 5 that there are no redundancies or contradictions with the 
double marking of evidentials and that the Indirect evidential seems to take scope 
over the Direct evidential.  
 
3.3.3   Whether tee can appear in negative or interrogative 
sentences 
 
In this section I will investigate whether tee can appear in negative and interrogative 
sentences. First, let us consider cases of negative sentences. There are three negative 
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In the case of -N in non-past, there is no problem for tee to co-occur with -N as we have seen, 
but it does not co-occur with a past tense with the direct evidential (t)aN. This could suggest that 
(t)aN indicates that the speaker acquired direct/best evidence in the past. However, that implies 
that tense scopes over the evidential, rather than the other way around. This would be different 
from what is generally held, namely that an evidential many not take scope under any operator 




markers in Luchuan, -(r)aN, -neeN, -uraN,
25
 and all of them can be used with tee. 
Consider the following examples (26) and (27). 
 
Context: Speaker hears that Yoko has a prior appointment at the same time as a party 
is being held. Speaker infers that Yoko will not go to the party because she 
always respects her prior engagements. 
(26)  ʔaNshee paatii Nkai  ʔik-aN  tee 
     so      party to    go-NEG  INF 
     p = ‗(Yoko) won‘t go to the party.‘ 
     EV = Speaker infers p. 
 
The speaker of example (26) makes an inference based on information from another 
person and also Yoko‘s character that she always puts previous appointments ahead 
of others. Sensory evidence is not necessarily required. The next examples indicate 
that tee can be used with neeN and uraN as well.  
 
Context: Ryu came back home late and said he was hungry. Speaker infers that Ryu 
has not eaten dinner yet. 
(27)  ʔaNshee naara juubaN kad-ee-neeN  tee. 
     so     yet  dinner  eat-RES-NEG   INF 
     p = ‗(He) hasn‘t eaten dinner yet.‘ 
     EV = Speaker infers p. 
 
Context: Speaker hears Ryu laughing in his room. Speaker infers that Ryu is not 
studying. 
(28)  ʔare-e benkyo sh-ee-uraN
26
 tee. 
     he-TOP study do-CON -NEG  INF  
     p = ‗He isn‘t studying.‘ 
     EV = Speaker infers p. 
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 The last sound N of these three negative morphemes is synchronically a different morpheme 
from the direct evidential -N. This does not mean that they are diachronically irrelevant but this 
issue is not included in the purpose of this dissertation.  
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 -uraN is connected to continuative aspect. It means the negative form of continuative aspect; 




Sentence (27) is a negative form of the resultative with inferential tee and sentence 
(28) is a negative form of the continuative with inferential tee. Sentence (27) is based 
on a report from the subject himself. Sentence (28) is based on auditory information; 
however, it does not have to be directly perceived by the speaker. That is, the speaker 
of example (28) could obtain the information that Ryu is laughing from someone else 
and make an inference based on this information. Hence, as both sentences suggest, 
evidence of inference could be based on speaker‘s sensory input but is not 
necessarily restricted to such sensory evidence.  
     In considering examples (26), (27), and (28) it is important to observe the 
scope of negation. The generalization to be made here is that negation never negates 
indirect meaning but only the proposition: that is to say, negation never takes scope 
over the inferential evidential. For example, sentence (26) never means ―speaker 
does not infer that Yoko will go to the party‖. The speaker in fact, does infer a 
proposition: a negated proposition. 
     As for the past forms of negative sentences, they are not acceptable. This is 
unsurprising because tee is not compatible with past forms as we have seen in 
example (24) and examples (25a)-(25c) above.  
     Concerning the interaction of tee and interrogative sentences, the two are 
incompatible. That is, tee cannot appear in interrogative sentences. Even resultative 
aspect, which is most frequently used with tee, cannot be used in interrogative 
sentences. A question marker cannot be attached either to tee, as in (29a), or to -N 
(-mi), as in (29b). 
 
(29) a.*ʔami hut-ee-N tee-i? 
      rain rain-RES-DIR INF Q 
      Intended meaning: ‗Must it have rained? ‘ 
 
b.*ʔami  hut-ee-m-i   tee? 
       rain rain-RES-DIR-Q INF 
       Intended meaning: ‗Must it have rained? ‘ 
 
Other kinds of aspect such as continuative or imperfective cannot appear in 




not possible. Since there are general properties among all three indirect evidentials 
including the other two, Assumed and Reportative,
27
 I will return to this issue in 
Chapter 5. 
 
3.3.4  Reasons for classifying tee as an evidential  
 
As we have already seen, the discussions concerning the inferential in existing 
studies are rather complicated because—as I have analysed the situation—there are 
two morphemes -ee-, in addition to the Inferential evidential tee. In this section, I 
attempt to demonstrate why I claim the Inferential tee should be categorized as an 
evidential marker but the other two -ee- morphemes should not. I use the terms 
―resultative -ee-‖ and ―mood marker -ee-‖ for the sake of convenience,
 
and I refer to 
final tee as ―the Inferential evidential‖. Table 1, which was presented in Chapter 2, 
Section 2.2.2, is repeated below. 
 





















                     Table 1. Morphology of finite verbs  
 
It is generally agreed among researchers that word-internal -ee- has these two 
meanings (Uemura 1963, 1992, 2003, Shinzato 1991, Tsuhako 1992, Miyara 2002), 
although their terminologies are different. Miyara (2002) calls one -ee- ‗resultative‘ 
and the other ‗modality‘ which indicates the speaker‘s inference. My analysis is 
similar to his approach, although to be precise I use the term ‗mood‘ not ‗modality‘ 
and also my overall picture of the evidential system is quite different from his 
analysis since his study focuses on modality not evidentiality.
28
 According to 
Shinzato (1991), who points out the ambiguity caused by the homophony of these 
two forms, either the inferential or the resultative can occur with a non-first person 
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     In 3.2, I argued that these two morphemes should belong to different categories, 
for three reasons. First, mood marker -ee- cannot co-occur with a past tense marker.
29
 
In other words, when -ee- appears in the past tense, it has the resultative reading, not 
the inferential reading. Second, mood marker -ee- appears neither in interrogatives 
nor with negation. Third, resultative -ee- and mood marker -ee- can co-occur in a 
single verb form. Because of these three morphological properties, I consider that 
these two forms belong to different categories.
30
  
On the other hand, the Inferential evidential tee can clearly be distinguished 
from these two -ee- morphemes. It appears at the end of the sentence. The slot in 
which tee appears is not obligatorily filled; sentences are grammatically well-formed 
without any element occupying this position. Tee occupies this slot only when a 
speaker is conveying inferential information. 
Resultative -ee-, mood marker -ee- and the Inferential evidential tee all occupy 
different morphological slots. Although the Inferential evidential tee occupies the slot 
after -N and no morphemes can follow after tee, resultative -ee- appears in the slot of 
aspect and mood marker -ee occupies the slot of mood.
31
 That is, both resultative 
-ee- and mood marker -ee- share the same characteristic, that they never appear after 
the slot of -N. In this sense, the Inferential evidential tee behaves fairly differently 
from the other two.  
     Now let me provide an example which contains both resultative and mood 
maker -ee- morphemes in one sentence.  
 
Context: Speaker sees that dinner is ready on the table and found a memo from 
Kimiko saying that she cooked the dinner before she left.  
 (30)   Kimiko  ga  juubaN  nic-ee-tee-N. 
       Kimiko NM  dinner  cook-RES-M-DIR  
       ‗Kimiko must have cooked dinner.‘ 
 
                                                   
29
 Miyara (2002) also points out this morphological property to distinguish these two morphemes 
from each other.  
30 
Note that the underlying form of resultative -ee- and modality -ee- should be /tee/ and [t] is 
dropped after any stem which ends in a consonant.
 
31 
When both aspect and mood appear, aspect comes first; stem+aspect+mood+EV(1). For 





Example (30) shows that a sentence can contain both the resultative -ee- and the 
mood marker -ee- without the word-final tee since the speaker is sure that Kimiko 
cooked the dinner because of the note from the agent herself. It is true that the 
speaker does not have visual evidence of the action; however, since he/she has a 
memo from the agent, it is difficult to say that the speaker is making an inference. If 
there is no memo and visual evidence alone is available, the Inferential evidential tee 
is required, as (31) shows. 
 
Context: Speaker sees that dinner is ready on the table. He/she infers that Kimiko 
cooked the dinner because it was her specialty.  
(31)  Kimiko  ga  juubaN  nic-ee-tee-N    tee. 
     Kimiko  NM  dinner  cook-RES-M-DIR  INF 
     ‗Kimiko must have cooked dinner.‘ 
 
Example (31) contains both the resultative -ee- and the mood marker -ee- (as well as 
the Inferential evidental tee). The speaker is certain that dinner has been cooked, but 
as the speaker does not have direct/best evidence about who actually cooked it, the 
Indirect evidential tee is necessary. So what then does this mood marker -ee- convey? 
Consider how it behaves when the agent is the speaker him/herself. Example (32a) is 
simple. It conveys resultative meaning. Example (32b) contains both resultative -ee- 
and modality -ee-, but note that the use of this kind of sentence is fairly restricted. A 
possible context is when the speaker completely had forgotten his/her own action and 
then remembered that the action had already been performed by him/herself basically 
based on evidence such as a cooked meal. It is awkward to add the Inferential 
evidential to (32b) as in (32c).   
 
(32) a. (wannee) juubaN nic-ee-N.   
      (I -TOP) dinner cook-RES-DIR 





  b. (wannee) juubaN nic-ee-tee-N. 
      (I -TOP) dinner cook-RES-M-DIR  
      ‗(Now I remember) I have cooked dinner.‘ 
 
    c.# (wannee) juubaN nic-ee-tee-N tee. 
      (I -TOP) dinner cook-RES-M-DIR INF 
 
The resultative reading with the Direct evidential -N in (32a) is perfectly fine because 
the speaker can have direct evidence for his/her own completed action. If a subject in 
(32b) is a third person, either the sentence can be used when the speaker remembers 
the agent‘s action which he/she had forgotten; or, the sentence will express an 
overtone of surprise, as in (33). 
 
Context: The speaker unexpectedly sees dinner on the table and infers that Kimiko 
cooked dinner. 
(33) Kimiko ga juubaN nic-ee-tee-N! 
    Kimiko NM dinner cook-RES-M-DIR  
   ‗(Surprisingly), she must have cooked dinner.‘ 
 
Since the speaker of (33) does not have direct evidence about the event, he/she would 
have to infer who cooked dinner. The mood marker -ee- carries inferential meaning 
in this context since the process of inference is involved, as some existing studies 
claim. Then, should the mood marker -ee- be classified as evidential as well? To 
recapitulate, I have argued that one of the word-internal -ee- forms is a resultative 
and that the other is a mood marker, and that in addition word-final tee is an 
Inferential evidential. What I need to clarify next are the reasons why I classify them 
as I do, in particular the grammatical categories they should belong to. Resultative 
-ee- is fairly simple: I consider that this morpheme belongs to aspect. It can appear 
both in the non-past and past tense. What about mood marker -ee- ? Does it belong to 
evidentiality or some other category? I will provide the two reasons why I consider 
that modal ―-ee-‖ should indeed be classified as a mood marker rather than an 
evidential. 








(34) namaa  hagimoo jasiga Nkasee  kusa nu  miit-oo-tee-N. 
    now-TOP bare field but  long-ago grass NM grow-CON-EE-DIR 
    ‗The field is bare now but grass used to grow here a long time ago.‘ 
(The Dictionary of the Okinawan Language 1963:75)  
 
According to Uemura (1963) in the Dictionary of the Okinawan Language (1963), 
this form is used to recall past events or states as substantial facts (p.75). In fact, 
Uemura calls this form the definite past, used ‗to express a past state/event as 
something with a certain factual basis‘ (2003:145). This definition sounds different 
from ‗inferential‘ meaning. Example (34) does not seem to express an inferential 
meaning; rather, it seems that the proposition is presented as a certain fact. My 
consultants say that example (34) means that the speaker definitely knows the fact 
about the past and it sounds as if the speaker is recalling facts from the past; 
therefore, it does not convey any inferential meaning. If I slightly modify this 
example by adding the Inferential evidential tee at the end of the sentence, as in 
example (35), the sentence means that the speaker does not have direct evidence. 
 
Context: Speaker sees withered grass and infers that there used to be grass.  
(35) namaa  hagimoo jasiga mee  ja  kusa  nu  miit-oo-tee-N tee 
    now-TOP bare field but  before TOP grass NM  grow-CON-EE-DIR INF 
    ‗The field is bare now but grass used to grow here before.‘ 
 
Examples (34) and (35) illustrate that -ee- which appears in the slot of mood after 
tense sometimes seems to convey inferential meaning, but that in fact the evidential 
meaning is not conveyed by -ee- but rather by tee.  
Tsuhako (1992) mentions in passing that eeN indicates irrealis (p837). Since 
she does not provide any examples,
33
 I can only assume that she means subjunctive, 
as in example (36). 
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 Example (34) is from the Dictionary of the Okinawan Language (1963). I have added the 
translation and glosses. Since the gloss of -ee- is in question, I simply use capitalized EE here. 
33
 Tsuhako does not discuss sentences, but only isolated words, such as kadeeN, kadooteeN, 





Context: Speaker‘s son lives at a distance. She cooked her son‘s favorite food and 
imagines that if her son were here, he would have eaten lots of it.  
(36)  ʔari ga ʔu-teeree,  muru  kam-u-tee-N  tee 
      he NM be-if     all    eat-IMPF-M-DIR INF 
     ‗If he were here, he would have eaten it all.‘ 
 
It is difficult to say that the best label for -ee- is irrealis because this subjunctive 
meaning is not always maintained, like in example (34) and (35). However, there 
seems to be a common point among examples (34), (35) and (36) in terms of irrealis, 
because -ee- is used to describe a speculative scene, which is not observable at the 
time of utterance. In example (34), the speaker recalls a scene of grass growing in the 
past; in example (35), the speaker infers that grass must have grown in the past; and 
in example (36), the speaker imagines that her son would eat or would have eaten his 
favorite food, though he is not there at the time of utterance. Therefore, I have 
proposed that we should classify this morpheme as an expression of irrealis mood.  
One may wonder if this morpheme might be evidential because, for example, in 
example (35), the speaker makes an inference based on the evidence at the time of 
utterance such as withered grass. But as examples (34) and (35) do not indicate any 
source of information, evidential meaning is not always encoded; it is for this reason 
that I classify -ee- as a marker of modality and not evidentiality.  
     The term ‗irrealis‘ stands in opposition to ‗realis;‘ this distinction has been 
focused on in discussions of modality (Lyons 1977, Langacker 1987, Palmer 2001). 
Mithun (1999:173), cited in Palmer (2001:1), states that ‗The realis portrays 
situations as actualized, as having occurred or actually occurring, knowable through 
direct perception. The irrealis portrays situations as purely within the realm of 
thought, knowable only through imagination.‘ This seems to be very close to the 
contrast between -ee- and the past tense marker -ta-. That is, the past tense marker 
-ta- portrays situations as actualized, while -ee- portrays situations as purely within 
the realm of thought, knowable through imagination or deducible from the present 
evidence. Because of this contrastive meaning, these two morphemes exclude each 
other, and hence might be considered to be differing instances of the same category. 




scope of this dissertation. At this point, the main point that I wish to establish is that 
-ee- does not belong to the category of evidentiality because an evidential meaning is 
not always encoded.  
     The second reason I consider that mood marker -ee- should not be classified as 
an evidential is the slot it occupies. I have claimed that there is one direct evidential 
-N, and three indirect evidentials tee, hazi, and Ndi. The direct evidential appears in 
the antepenultimate slot, labeled ―EV(evidential) 1‖ in Table 1 in 2.2.2. The three 
indirect evidentials appear in the final and penultimate slots, labeled ―EV(evidential) 
2‖ and ―EV (evidential) 3‖. Both EV2 and EV3 belong to the indirect evidential, but 
those that are not in complementary distribution must be assumed to occupy different 
slots. To make a grammatically well formed sentence, the ―EV(1)‖ slot needs to be 
filled with some element; but ―EV(2)‖ and ―EV(3)‖ are optional as far as the 
morphosyntax is concerned; however, these slots also may require to be filled in 
certain contexts if the utterance is to be felicitous. .   
Although I have indicated ―mood‖ following ―tense‖, in fact, there is no way 
to determine the relative order of these two categories as they never co-occur
34
 ― 
as I have just suggested, they should perhaps be considered to belong to the same 
category, opposed as realis and irrealis, but I will not pursue this hypothesis further 
here. In either case, the mood marker -ee- appears before the evidential (1) slot. If 
both -ee- in the slot of mood and tee in the slot of ―EV(2)‖ were to be inferential 
evidentials, it would be improbable for one of them to appear before the slot of the 
Direct evidential -N and for the other to appear after -N. Perhaps this point alone is 
not a very strong argument for the claim that modality -ee- is not an evidential, since 
the direct evidential also appears in a different slot from the three indirect evidentials 
and there are two levels of indirect evidentials being divided into ―EV(2)‖ and 
―EV(3)‖. But at least, all three indirect evidentials have in common that they appear 
after the slot of the Direct evidential; hence, it is somewhat implausible to claim that 
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 I follow the crosslinguistic order proposed by Bybee et al. (1994) in that languages tend to 
adhere to a certain order such that suffixes most relevant to the verb are closer to the stem, 
whereas elements that are less relevant are further distant from the stem. According to this 
crosslinguistic pattern, tense proceeds mood; therefore, this is the order which I follow.  
35
 Aikhenvald (2004) claims that in some languages actual evidential markers may not form one 




     Before closing this section, I summarize what I have discussed in 3.3, to 
review the functions of the Inferential evidential tee. 
 
1) The primary usage of Inferential evidential tee is to mark inference based on 
sensory evidence. Basically visual evidence is preferred, but auditory and 
olfactory evidence is also possible. In the absence of such sensory evidence, a less 
dominant usage of tee, marking reasoning based on habit, may occur.  
2) The indirect evidential tee can be used with non-past (basic aspect, continuative 
aspect, and resultative aspect). But it does not appear with any aspect in the past 
tense.  
3) The Inferential evidential tee appears with the direct evidential -N. In this case, it 
means that the speaker makes an inference based on direct/best evidence.  
4) The indirect evidential tee can appear with negation: in this case the meaning is 
that the speaker infers that the proposition expressed is negated. This suggests that 
inferential meaning is out of the scope of negation. Furthermore, tee is not 
compatible with interrogative sentences. 
5) The reason why tee should be regarded as an inferential evidential is because it 
always carries inferential meaning whatever aspect it co-occurs with. Also, 
inferential meaning is maintained in negation as well. The primary meaning of tee 
is inference and we should consider that its meaning is encoded rather than merely 
a pragmatic implicature. 
 
3.4  Assumed evidential hazi  
 
In this section I will clarify the functions of hazi. First, though, I present the existing 
state of study of hazi. The Dictionary of the Okinawan Language simply states that 
hazi indicates inference and that it generally appears at the end of a sentence 
(1963:210); however, it is unclear what kind of inference or assumption is involved, 
or what types of evidence. In the preceding chapters I have pointed out that there is 
no study that investigates evidentials in Luchuan as a grammatical category. 
Therefore, as far as I know there is no study that investigates the function of hazi. 
                                                                                                                                                
enter in different paradigmatic relationships with non-evidentials, and have different restrictions 
on co-occurrence with other categories‖ (p.80). Based on her analysis, there may be a possibility 




Tsuhako‘s work should be mentioned in that she put this form on the list of the verb 
forms as a conjectural mood (1992:838); however, regrettably, no explanation of this 
form was presented, only the Japanese translations.  
According to The Dictionary of the Okinawan Language, hazi is a noun. 
Therefore, the attributive form of verbs should be used before hazi. The attributive 
form is marked by -ru, in contrast to the indicative which ends with the Direct 
evidential -N. When -ru appears in the root clause, either the focus particle du is 
required (to make the kakari-musubi construction) or else the Assumed evidential 
hazi.
36
 This construction is a descendant of the kakari-musubi rule in Old Japanese 
(Tsuhako 1992:839). When the adverbial particle du is paired with -ru in the 
attributive form, the former is called kakari-zosi ‗relation opener‘ and the latter is 
called musubi ‗tying conclusion‘
37
 (Shibatani 1990:334). To understand the feature 
of -ru, let us examine an example of the kakari-musubi construction before moving 
on to the survey of hazi. 
 
(37) a. ʔari ga du  ic-u-ru.   
      he NM AP  go-IMPF-ATTR   
      ‗It is he who will go‘ 
     
b.*ʔari ga du  ic-u-N.   
       he NM AP  go-IMPF-DIR   
       Intended meaning: ‗It is he who will go.‘ 
 
This construction is considered to denote emphasis
38
 and the adverbial particle du 
and the attributive form -ru are in a relation of agreement. As example (37b) shows, 
when the adverbial particle du follows the nominative case marker, the Direct 
evidential -N cannot be used in the predicate. Generally, the Direct evidential -N 
appears only in root clauses.
39
 Although the kakari-musubi construction may look 
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 This particle is sometimes pronounced ru in some districts; but I will use du to distinguish it 
from the other -ru which appears in attributive form. 
37
 Shibatani (1990:334-5) introduces these terms, which were proposed by Yamada (1908), but 
he states that he simply uses the term ‗adverbial particles‘, following the terms used by Sansom 
(1908). 
38
 See the Dictionary of the Okinawan Language (1963) and Miyara (2002). 
39
 When the Reportative evidential appears with verbs such as ‗say‘, the Direct evidential -N can 




different from a typical root clause, I consider that (37a) is nevertheless a root clause, 
since there is no subordinate clause, although the subject is focused and the meaning 
of the sentence is close to a cleft sentence in English, as the translation shows. Once 
the subject is focused, the attributive form ru has to be used. As existing studies 
suggest, this construction conveys emphasis. More precisely, the constituent marked 
by du is presented as new information, in focus, while the rest of the information is 
presented as old. For example, in (37a), ʔari ‗he‘ is new information and the rest of 
information is presented by the speaker as old: participants know that ‗somebody 
will go‘ and the information ‗who‘ will go is newly given information. This 
observation implies that -ru appears to describe presupposed information, 
information that is shared with all the participants, while on the other hand, -N 
should be used in the matrix sentences, which directly indicate the speaker‘s 
judgement. 
The next example in (37) indicates the difference between -ru and -N more 
clearly. They show that the Direct evidential -N should not be used in embedded 
clauses, but ru must be used.  
 
(38) a. ʔic-u-ru     Qcu   ja  ʔu-raN. 
      go-IMPF-ATTR person TOP be-NEG 
      ‗There is no one who will go.‘ 
 
   b.* ʔic-u-N    Qcu   ja  ʔu-raN 
      go-IMPF-DIR person TOP be-NEG 
      Intended meaning: ‗There is no one who will go.‘ 
 
The attributive form ru should be used in the relative clause as in example (38a), 
whereas the Direct evidential -N cannot be, as shown in example (38b). The meaning 
that evidentials convey is related to the speech act, and speech acts are expressed in 
matrix sentences.
40
 Therefore, ru is in complementary distribution with the Direct 
evidential, in that it can only appear in subordinate clauses.  
     The kakari-musubi construction that I have just outlined is the only other case 
                                                                                                                                                
evidential is typically used in matrix sentences.  
40
 Aikhenvald (2003:17) points out that evidentials do not appear in subordinate clauses in many 




(apart from its use with hazi) in which -ru appears in what seems to be a root clause.  
I will now turn to investigate the main characteristic feature of the hazi 
construction, which describes the speaker‘s assumption objectively based on general 
knowledge or habit. This aspect is fairly different from the primary usage of tee 
which is based on evidence which the speaker can perceive. In the following 
subsections I present four criteria which correspond to the analysis of tee which was 
provided in 3.3 above. (The second item, relating to how the assumed evidential 
interacts with the direct evidential -N, is omitted because hazi does not co-occur with 
-N as we have seen above.) 
(1) what kind of evidence licenses the use of hazi 
(2) how hazi interacts with aspect and tense  
(3) whether hazi can appear in negative or interrogative sentences 
(4) Assumed evidential hazi and Inferential tee 
 
3.4.1  What kind of evidence licenses the use of hazi 
 
It should be noted that hazi cannot be used without some kind of evidence. When the 
speaker is not sure about the proposition, he/she will use another expression, ga 
jaa.
41
 The speaker has to have some objective, rational reason for making the 
statement in order to use hazi. Sometimes the grounds are based on sensory evidence, 
but they do not have to be. Compared with tee, sentences with hazi sound more 
objective in that the basis of the assumption is taken to be shared by other people.
42
 
Regardless of how objective the evidence is, it is clear that the speaker needs 
evidence for his or her assumption. Let us investigate what kind of evidence is 
required, applying the method described and used in Izvorski (1997). Izvorski 
analyzes a phenomenon known as the perfect of evidentiality (PE), which expresses a 
particular evidential category, one which is present perfect or historically derived 
from the present perfect. Ivorski analyses this phenomenon in a number of languages 
from various language families and demonstrates that the morphology of the present 
perfect could be interpreted as a perfect of evidentiality. Izvorski argues that the 
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 Tsuhako (1992) presents other forms which expresses uncertainty. Uemura (2002) calls them 
dubitative moods. I do not analyze them in this dissertation because I consider them to be 
peripheral from the viewpoint of evidentiality.  
42
 This does not mean that tee cannot be used when other people share the same evidence with 




perfect of evidentiality in these languages and the adverbial apparently in English 
share the feature that their indirect evidential interpretations can have both a report 
and an inferential reading. Since Izvorski‘s analysis turns out to be very relevant to 
the data in Luchuan, let me begin by presenting it in more detail.
43
  
Izvorski argues that the use of must in an English sentence like (39a) is 
justified by the proposition John likes wine a lot. On the other hand, apparently in 
English cannot be used just knowing that proposition, as shown by the infelicity of 
(39b). Thus, in English epistemic must does not require evidence, just reasoning, 
while the use of apparently does require evidence and mere reasoning is not 
sufficient license its use.  
 
(39) Knowing how much John likes wine… 
   a. … he must have drunk all the wine yesterday. 
   b.# …he apparently drank all the wine yesterday. 
[Izvorski 1997:6] 
 
Izvorski claims that perfect of evidentiality behaves as apparently does. That is, the 
proposition John likes wine a lot does not license the use of perfect of evidentiality, 
as the Bulgarian example (40) indicates.  
 
(40)  Knowing how much Ivan likes wine… 
   a. …toj trjabva da e izpil vsičkoto vino včera.  
       he must is drunk all-the wine yesterday 
      ‗…he must have drunk all the wine yesterday.‘ 
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 Izvorski‘s goals and my primary goal in this dissertation are different because her goals are 
providing a semantics for indirect evidentials and present perfect to render uniform accounts of 
tense, aspect and modality while my focus in this dissertation is mainly to describe the evidential 
systems of a particular language. Also Izvorski analyses PE as epistemic modality while I claim 
that the evidentials in Luchuan belongs to a category of evidentiality, though some parts may be 




  b. #...toj izpil  vsičkoto vino včera. 
       he  drunk-PE all-the wine yesterday 
      ‗…he apparently drank all the wine yesterday.‘ 
[Izvorski 1997:6] 
 
Example (40a), in which an epistemic modal is used, is acceptable, whereas example 
(40b), in which a perfect of evidentiality is used, is not acceptable.
44
 Izvorski claims 
that for the use of English apparently or of the perfect of evidentiality in languages 
where this exists, it is required that there be ―some observable result of John‘s 
drinking all the wine, perhaps many empty bottles or someone‘s account of the event 
of drinking‖ (1997:6). Now let us consider examples of tee and hazi in Luchuan in 
the same context.  
  
(41) Knowing how much Taro likes wine… 
a.# … cinuu   Taruu ga  wain muru  nud-ee-N    tee.  
        yesterday Taruu NM  wine all   drink-RES-DIR  INF 
        ‗(I infer) Taro drank all the wine yesterday.‘ 
     
b.#... cinuu   Taruu ga  wain muru  nud-ee-ru    hazi.  
        yesterday Taruu NM  wine all  drink-RES-ATTR ASSM 
        ‗(I assume) Taro drank all the wine yesterday.‘ 
 
The fact that examples (41a) and (41b) are judged to be infelicitous suggests that 
neither tee nor hazi in Luchuan are licensed to be used just on the basis of the fact 
that John likes wine a lot.
45
 As stated above, Izvorski (1997) claims that the perfect 
of evidentiality requires either an observable result or someone‘s report as the modal 
base, rather than some knowledge of some proposition from which the conclusion 
could be inferred.
46
 The modal base for hazi can be more moderated than tee 
                                                   
44
 Izvorski gives apparently as the translation of PE (perfect of evidentiality). 
45
 The unacceptability of (41) is not due to the fact that the resultative requires the resulting state 
to persist at reference time, since another tense or aspect such as a simple past or continuative 
aspect would still be infelicitous.  
46 
There is another example that Izvorski presents to support the idea that must can be used 
without evidence but apparently does not allow its use, shown here as (i) and (ii) below. 
(i)  A:  John must have drunk all the wine. 




because general or habitual knowledge could be sufficient as its evidence.  
The perfect of evidentiality and the indirect evidentials hazi and tee in 
Luchuan share the property that both require evidence, not merely reasoning on the 
basis of some known proposition.  The primary meaning of tee is based on visual 
(sensory) evidence; when this primary meaning is not available, other evidence such 
as someone‘s report is required to make an inference. Regarding hazi, though it does 
not require sensory evidence, just to know that Taruu likes wine a lot is not sufficient. 
If the speaker knows that there were empty wine bottles in Taruu‘s room and knows 
that it is a habit for Taruu to drink a lot of wine every day, in addition to the 
proposition presented, (41b) would be acceptable. This implies that the speaker has 
to acquire objective evidence; for example the speaker him/herself finds empty 
bottles or someone says he/she finds empty bottles, moreover, the speaker is 
supposed to know some kind of background about the actor‘s habits in order to draw 
a conclusion. For example, if the speaker knows that Taruu does not drink alcohol at 
all because he is allergic to alcohol, neither (41a) nor (41b) could be used even if the 
speaker sees the empty bottles. 
So far we have seen similarities between the perfect of evidentiality as 
described by Izvorski and indirect evidential hazi in Luchuan. But there are also 
differences. The requirements for the use of perfect of evidentiality are an observable 
result or someone‘s report. In the case of hazi, as we have just observed, reasoning 
from habit is also acceptable. As Faller (2002) concisely summed up Izvorski‘s study 
concerning this issue, I will cite her summary.  
 
                                                                                                                                                
    A‘:  (# But I have no reason for believing that.) 
(ii)  A:  Ivan izpil vsičkoto vino včera.  
        Ivan drunk-PE all-the wine yesterday 
       ‗Ivan apparently drank all the wine yesterday.‘ 
  A: # But I have no evidence for that. 
[Izvorski 1997:7] 
Example (i) suggests that the speaker can continue an epistemic statement without evidence for 
the proposition, however, must still requires that the speaker needs to have some set of 
propositions as a premise for the epistemic inference. On the other hand, as example (ii) shows, 




(42)  i. Modal base/indirect evidence: There are empty wine bottles in Ivan’s office. 
       Ordering source: If there are empty wine bottles in someone’s office, that 
person drank the wine. 
      ii. Modal base/indirect evidence: Mary says that Ivan drank all the wine. 
        Ordering source: Normally, Mary is reliable as a source of information. 
[Faller 2002:103] 
 
There are two possible interpretations of perfect of evidentiality; inference based on 
indirect evidence, or inference based on report, as in (42). The speaker makes an 
inference based on indirect evidence such as empty wine bottles, according to the 
ordering source as in (42i). In the case of (42ii), the indirect evidence is Mary‘s 
report and the speaker makes an inference based on the ordering source that Mary is 
reliable. Let us consider whether or not these two types of interpretations apply to the 
Indirect evidential hazi and tee in Luchuan.  The first one, inference based on visual 
evidence, can be applied to example (41). If there is visual evidence, such as empty 
bottles in Taruu‘s office, the infelicity we have seen in examples (41a) and (41b) 
would disappear. However, if the indirect evidence is a report by someone, it is 
unlikely for the speaker to use the Inferential and the Assumed evidentials because 
s/he would use the Reportative evidential instead. Recall example (19) which I 
presented in 3.3.1, to explain a less common usage of tee. The speaker of example 
(19) infers that her mother came because her son said that there was bread, which is 
his grandmother‘s specialty. In this case, it is possible to use tee when the speaker 
makes an inference based on somebody‘s report, but as I pointed out there, that case 
was different from the reportative because the speaker does not utter what is reported 
by someone. Instead, the speaker makes inference based on the information 
conveyed by the other person. The difference between examples (19) and (42ii) is 
that in example (19), the reported information which the speaker acquires is not that 
the speaker’s son saw his grandmother come but that he just said that there was 
bread, and the speaker infers that the bread must have been baked by her mother. 
There is room for inference for the speaker. On the other hand, in the case of (42ii), 
the information which the speaker acquires is the report that Mary says that Ivan 
drank all the wine. In this context, a speaker of Luchuan would use the Reportative 




     As it has been discussed, the second interpretation (42ii) that Izvorski 
presented as available for the perfect of evidentiality does not apply to the use of -tee 
or -hazi in Luchuan. If however reported information is part of the basis for inference, 
as we have seen in example (19), the Inferential and Assumed evidentials, both tee 
and hazi, are licensed to be used here.  
     It should be noted that interpretations (42i) and (42ii) were the cases of the 
perfect of evidentiality which Izvorski investigated. My example (41) has resultative 
aspect, which is the closest match in Luchuan to the examples Izvorski uses. 
Therefore, the interpretation in (42i) is the primary interpretation of resultative aspect 
with the Indirect evidential, but the interpretations in (42) are not available to all 
kinds of aspect and tense. In the next section, I will present how the Indirect 
evidential hazi interacts with other aspect and tense. 
 
3.4.2  How hazi interacts with aspect and tense  
 
The function of hazi is to indicate that the speaker makes an assumption based on 
his/her knowledge about habit or general knowledge. The assumption has to be based 
on such knowledge; the use of hazi is not licensed merely by the speaker‘s belief or 
conjecture. Taking this as given, let us now investigate whether hazi can co-occur 
with all aspects and tenses, beginning with non-past tense. The generalization to be 
made here is that hazi can appear with all kinds of aspect and tense. Basic aspect in 
non-past tense is used with hazi, as in example (43). Imperfective aspect in non-past 
tense does not require observable evidence, unlike the case of resultative, as we have 
seen in the previous section, 3.4.1.  
 
(43) Yoko ga  ʔic-u-ru     hazi.
47
   
    Yoko NM go-IMPF-ATTR ASSUM 
    p = ‗She will go.‘ 
    EV = Speaker assumes p. 
 
Sentence (43) can be used when the speaker knows that Yoko will go, for example, 
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because it is Yoko‘s habit, or because Yoko is the only one who can go there by car 
and so on. The speaker can make an inference based on general knowledge or habit. 
In the previous section we have seen a similar usage that is marginally available for 
tee, but for hazi, making an assumption based on general knowledge or habit is the 
primary usage. As this suggests, the use of the two indirect evidentials partially 
overlaps; I will discuss the similarities and differences between them in 3.4.4.  
The concept of general knowledge or habit is still rather vague, so I will now 
attempt to provide more details of what kind of evidence hazi requires. If the speaker 
does not have sufficient grounds for his or her assertion, (43) is not appropriate. For 
example, if the speaker does not know Yoko‘s habit so well, the speaker would use 
other expressions (called dubitative mood (Uemura 2002)), like (44) instead.  
 
(44) Yoko ga  ʔic-u-ga  jaa. 
    Yoko NM go-IMPF-Q FP 
    ‗I wonder whether Yoko will go.‘ 
 
Sentence (44) implies that the speaker cannot assume anything because he/she does 
not have evidence, which triggers an assumption. In the next example (45) the 
assumed evidential appears again with the non-past, but this time with continuative 
aspect.  
 
Context: Hearer is worried about whether an important document is filled out or not. 
Speaker knows that Miki is filling out the document because Miki told the 
speaker that she would do that.  
(45) Miki ga   kac-oo-ru       hazi.  
    Miki NM  write-CON-ATTR  ASSUM 
    p = ‗Miki is writing (the document)‘ 
    EV = Speaker assumes p. 
 
As the given context shows, the speaker has evidence that makes him/her assume 
that Miki must be writing the document. Example (45) is also possible when the 
speaker makes an assumption based on Miki‘s habit or Miki‘s character; that she is 




not have this kind of information, example (45) would be inappropriate. Again 
evidence does not have to be a direct report from the agent. A speaker can use 
sentence (45) if he/she knows Miki‘s schedule well, as we have seen above.  
Next, let us look at example (46) to examine whether or not resultative aspect 
can co-occur with the Assumed evidential hazi. The context is a little different from 
example (45) according to the difference of aspect. 
 
Context: Hearer is worried whether an important document has been filled out or not. 
Speaker knows that Miki has written it because Miki told the speaker that she 
would do so. 
(46) Miki ga   kac-ee-ru     hazi.  
    Miki NM  write-RES-ATTR ASSUM 
    p = ‗Miki has written (the document).‘     
    EV = Speaker assumes p. 
 
The speaker of example (46) makes an inference based on the agent‘s report which 
was made before the time of utterance. Recall the examples of resultative aspect 
which we examined in 3.4.1. There I presented the example of the Assumed 
evidential hazi with resultative aspect in example (41b) and pointed out that 
observable evidence is required as a primary usage of the resultative with the 
Inferential and Assumed evidential according to the interpretation in (42i). Thus, the 
speaker had to have visual evidence such as empty wine bottles. This condition does 
not hold in example (46); the speaker does not have visual evidence in the context in 
example (46). This context roughly corresponds to the interpretation of (42ii), that is, 
where the speaker acquires indirect evidence through reported information. The 
content of the reported information in examples (46) and (42ii) is different because in 
the context of example (46), the agent said she would write the document, while on 
the other hand, in (42ii), a third party (Mary) said that she saw the event happen. 
However, the generalization to be made here is that both cases share the condition 
that the speaker makes an inference based on someone‘s (possibly the agent‘s) report. 
Examples (43), (45), and (46) suggest that hazi, unlike tee, does not require visual or 





     Now we move on to the observation of hazi in the past tense. Unlike the 
situation with tee, hazi can co-occur with all aspects in past tense.  
 
Context: Hearer is worried whether an important document has been filled out or not. 
Speaker knows that Miki wrote it because Miki told the speaker that she would 
do so. 
(47) a. Miki ga  kac-a-ru hazi. 
      Miki NM write-PAST-ATTR ASSUM 
      p = ‗Miki wrote (it).‘ 
      EV = Speaker assumes p. 
 
    b. ?? Miki ga  kac-u-ta-ru          hazi. 
        Miki NM write-IMPF-PAST-ATTR  ASSUM 
        Intended meaning : Speaker assumes that Miki wrote (it). 
 
There is no problem in example (47a) but awkwardness is found in example (47b), 
even though I have just stated that all forms can be used with hazi above. It is 
particularly notable that the morpheme -u-, which indicates imperfective aspect with 
past marker -ta-, behaves differently relative to other forms. The morpheme -u- can 
appear with hazi but with a different meaning. Consider the next example (48), 
which contains this combination of -u- with hazi. (Note that ‗IRR‘ is an abbreviation 
for irrealis.) 
 
(48) Miki jaree  kac-u-ta-ru           hazi. 
Miki be-IRR write-IMPF-PAST-ATTR  ASSUM 
    ‗If it were Miki, she would write.‘ 
 
In example (48) the sentence has an irrealis interpretation, like a subjunctive. In 
contrast, (49) has no such irrealis interpretation. On the other hand, the speaker of 
(49) assumes realis. I suppose that this phenomenon is caused by the presence of the 
morpheme -u- because other aspect forms which contain the past tense marker -ta- 





(49) a. Miki ga   kac-oo-ta-ru         hazi. 
      Miki NM  write-CON-PAST-ATTR  ASSUM 
      p = ‗Miki was writing (it).‘ 
      EV = Speaker infers p. 
 
    b. Miki ga   kac-ee-ta-ru         hazi. 
      Miki NM  write-RES-PAST-ATTR  ASSUM 
      p = ‗Miki has written (it).‘ 
      EV = Speaker assumes p. 
 
As can be seen in (49a) and (49b), the speaker assumes the situation in the real world, 
unlike what is indicated in (48). In both cases, the feature of hazi is the same. It 
constantly expresses the speaker‘s assumption, whatever aspect it is combined with. 
It can also be seen that hazi appears with any aspect, but when it appears with 
imperfective aspect in the past tense, it expresses irrealis meaning. When the event 
did not actually take place, the speaker cannot have direct evidence. Evidence, for an 
event which has not actually occurred, would not be accessible. I suppose that this is 
the reason why (48) conveys irrealis meaning. But since this issue has never been 
closely investigated,
48
 it should be pursued further. In 6.3.1, I will mention that there 
are some remaning issues concerning the relation between evidentiality and aspect, 
providing examples of resultative aspect.  
Sentences which contain resultative aspect, as in example (46) and its past 
form in example (49b), are of course different, but the differences are not well 
conveyed in the translation. Consider for example (49b), which is the past form of 
example (46), which I have translated with the perfect ‗have + past participle‘; 
therefore, some people may think that pluperfect ‗had + past participle‘ would be 
suitable for the translation of example (49b). But the meaning of example (49b) is 
different from the pluperfect, which has two temporal references in the past. Both 
(46) and (49b) indicate that the speaker assumes that Miki has written the document 
before the time of utterance, and evidence for this assumption has to be available 
before the time of utterance. For example, when Miki said she would write the 
document by that night on that day, naturally the speaker thinks Miki will have 
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finished it by then. Thus, one minute after hearing Miki‘s promise, speaker would not 
use sentence (46) because it is obvious that she has not written the document. 
Speaker has to wait to use (46) till night comes. When night comes, (46) can be used 
but not (49b).  
When the evidence of the event (in this case, the completed letter) is not 
available, perhaps because it has been disposed of or lost, resultative in non-past as 
in (46) cannot be used any longer. In this case, the past resultative as in (49b) should 
be used. For the usage of (49b), speaker just has to have a clue for deduction in the 
past, and whether or not the letter exists at the time of utterance is not important.  
 
3.4.3  Whether hazi can appear in negative or interrogative 
sentences 
 
As we have seen in 2.2.2, there are three negation markers, -aN, -uraN and -neeN. 
-aN is used for the imperfective aspect, as in (50a), -uraN for continuative aspect, as 




(50) a Miki  ja juubaN  kam-aN   hazi. 
     Miki TOP dinner   eat-NEG   ASSUM 
     p = ‗Miki will not eat dinner. 
     EV =Speaker assumes p. 
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   b. Miki  ja juubaN  kad-ee-uraN     hazi 
     Miki TOP dinner  eat-(CON)
50
-NEG  ASSUM 
     p = ‗Miki isn‘t eating dinner.‘ 
     EV = Speaker assumes p. 
 
   c. Miki ja  juubaN  kad-ee-neeN   hazi. 
     Miki TOP dinner  eat-RES-NEG    ASSUM 
     p = ‗Miki hasn‘t eaten dinner.‘ 
     EV = Speaker assumes p. 
 
As the examples above indicate, co-occurrence of hazi with the negation of each 
aspect is possible. Without exception, the scope of negation is inside of the assumed 
evidential. To use the assumed evidential, speaker must have appropriate information 
to negate the proposition.  
     In the cases of negative sentences in past tense, acceptability is parallel to the 
ones in non-past.  
 
(51) a Miki ja  juubaN  kam-aN-ta-ru      hazi. 
     Miki TOP dinner   eat-NEG-PAST-ATTR  ASSUM 
     p = ‗Miki did not eat dinner. 
     EV =Speaker assumes p. 
 
   b. Miki  ja juubaN  kad-ee-uraN-ta-ru        hazi 
     Miki TOP dinner   eat-(CON) -NEG- PAST-ATTR ASSUM 
     p = ‗Miki wasn‘t eating dinner.‘ 
     EV = Speaker assumes p. 
 
   c. Miki ja  juubaN  kad-ee-neeN-ta-ru     hazi. 
     Miki TOP dinner eat-RES-NEG- PAST-ATTR  ASSUM 
     p = ‗Miki hasn‘t eaten dinner.‘ 
     EV = Speaker assumes p. 
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Examples (50a)-(50c) and (51a)-(51b) illustrate that hazi can be used with all forms 
of negation both in non-past and past tense. We have seen -uta- with hazi (which has 
irrealis meaning) in (48) in 3.4.2, but since this combination does not appear in 
negative sentences, similar examples cannot be found in the cases of negative 
sentences.  
     Next, I will move on to the case of interrogative sentences. The survey of the 
uses of hazi shows that it cannot appear in interrogative sentences. In (52a) below, 
the question marker -i is attached to hazi, while in (52b) the question marker -i is 
attached to -ru, but either case is unacceptable.  
 
(52) a.*Miki ga   kac-oo-ru       hazi-i.  
      Miki NM  write-CON-ATTR   ASSUM-Q 
      Intended meaning : ‗Should Miki be writing (the document)?‘ 
 
b. *Miki ga   kac-oo-ru-i       hazi.  
      Miki NM  write-CON-ATTR-Q  ASSUM 
      Intended meaning : ‗Should Miki be writing (the document)?‘ 
 
The unacceptability of sentences (52a) and (52b) illustrates that hazi cannot be used 
in interrogative sentences. Since not all types of aspects with hazi are compatible 
with the question marker -i, I will skip other examples of interrogative sentences. 
 
3.4.4  Assumed evidential hazi and Inferential evidential 
tee 
 
As we have seen above, the major usage of hazi is to mark the speaker‘s assumption 
based on general knowledge or the speaker‘s knowledge about the agent (such as 
agent‘s habits or character). On the other hand, the major usage of tee is to indicate 
the speaker‘s inference based on sensory evidence. The issues I want to explore in 
this section are the extent to which these two evidentials are different and what they 
have in common. If the usage of tee were strictly restricted to sensory evidence, it 
would be simple to distinguish it from the usage of hazi. However, as example (21), 




an inference based on his/her knowledge about the agent‘s habit and without sensory 
evidence.  
 
Context: On the departmental meeting agenda, there is a report that someone in the 
department has to attend a linguistics conference. The speaker infers that 
Professor Brown will go because his specialty is linguistics and he never misses 
conferences. 
(53) ʔari  ga  ʔic-u-N    tee. (=21) 
    he  NM  go-IMPF-DIR INF 
    p = ‗He will go there.‘ 
    EV = Speaker infers p. 
 
In the same context, hazi also can be used, as in example (53). The meanings 
conveyed in examples (53) and (54) are similar, but example (53) sounds a little 
stronger than (54).  
 
(54) ʔari  ga  ʔic-u-ru      hazi.  
    he  NM  go-IMPF-ATTR  ASSUM 
    p = ‗He will go there.‘ 
    EV = Speaker assumes p. 
 
The fact that both examples (53) and (54) can be used in the same context indicates 
that the meanings of these two sentences are fairly close. In both cases an inference 
or assumption is made. The grounds for reasoning could be sensory evidence or 
knowledge. What then is the difference between them? I believe that the significant 
difference is that sentences with tee have a modal overtone, which indicates 
speaker‘s assertive judgement or spot decision, but those with hazi do not. This 
might be the reason why example (53) sounds stronger than example (54). Let me 
explain why I consider that sentences with tee have such a modal overtone.  
      As I have demonstrated in section 3.3.2, tee always indicates the speaker‘s 
inference at the time of utterance, because tee never appears with the past tense. This 
fact may not directly imply that tee conveys modal overtones; however, it does 




can be used with the past tense. When hazi appears with the past tense, it indicates 
that the speaker makes an assumption concerning some past event or state; the 
assumption can be made either at the time of utterance or before the time of 
utterance. 
     Tee can also be used in soliloquy while hazi does not tend to be used in 
soliloquy very often.  This implies that tee, but not hazi, expresses the speaker‘s 
subjectivity. By contrast, hazi sounds as if the speaker makes an assumption for the 
hearer. Thus, it sounds more objective. There is another feature that distinguishes tee 
from hazi, which concerns the co-occurrence of evidentials. That is, tee cannot be 
used with the Reportative evidential, although Direct and Assumed evidentials can. 
For example, example (53) cannot be used with the Reportative evidential Ndi, as in 
example (55a) but the Assumed evidential can be used with the Reportative 
evidential, as in example (55b). 
 
(55) a.*ʔari ga  ʔic-u-N      tee Ndi.  (cf.53) 
      he  NM  go-IMPF-DIR INF REP 
Intended meaning: ‗Speaker hears someone infer that Professor Brown will 
go to the conference.‘ 
 
b. ʔari  ga  ʔic-u-ru       hazi     Ndi.  (cf.54) 
       he   NM  go-IMPF-ATTR  ASSUM  REP 
       p = ‗Someone assumes he (Professor Brown) will go there.‘ 
       EV = Speaker hears p. 
 
Examples (55a) and (55b) do not directly demonstrate that tee contains modal 
element, but they do show that tee and hazi are different in some ways in addition to 
the difference of their meanings.  
     Although it is difficult to draw the firm conclusion that sentences with tee have 
a modal overtone, however here are some suggestions (I assume that this sense of 
subjectivity comes from the existence of the Direct evidential -N rather than tee 
itself.) As I mentioned in Chapter 2, the Direct evidential -N tends to indicate the 
speaker‘s certainty toward information. I showed that expressing the speaker‘s 




concepts do not exclude each other. I assume that this modal property of -N is 
reflected in the sentences with tee because tee always follows -N. Therefore, 
although tee and hazi can be often used in the same context and their meanings often 
sound similar, they are different in that sentences with tee contain a modal overtone 
because of the existence of Direct evidential -N. Contrastively, hazi sounds objective 
because it does not co-occur with Direct evidential -N as we have seen in 3.4 above.  
 
3.5  Whether Inferential and Assumed evidentials express 
the speaker’s degree of (un)certainty 
 
The main purpose of this section is to clarify whether the Inferential and Assumed 
evidentials really should be regarded as evidential. The question that needs to be 
answered will be the clear distinction between evidentiality and epistemic modality, 
since this issue is one of the crucial arguments in existing studies of evidentiality.
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To pursue this question, in this section, I will present tests which allow us to observe 
whether evidentiality conveys speaker‘s degree of certainty, which I applied to the 
Direct evidential as well in Chapter 2. Also, the question of how all evidentials 
behave in negative and interrogative sentences to investigate whether they belong to 
the same category as evidentiality will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
To investigate whether the three indirect evidentials encode the speaker‘s 
degree of (un)certainty, I attempt to apply the test called Moore‘s Paradox. Faller 
(2002) applies this test to Quechua and checks with each evidential whether the 
speaker can deny the sentence. According to Vanderverken (1990:118), sentences 
such as ‗it is raining and I do not believe it‘ are ―linguistically odd, because their 
utterances are analytically unsuccessful‖. First, I will investigate how sentences with 
the Inferential evidential behave in this paradox. 
 
(56) a. ʔami  hut-oo-N    tee.   
      rain  rain-CON-DIR  INF 
      p = ‗It is raining.‘ 
      EV = Speaker infers p. 
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b. # ʔami hut-oo-N    tee.  jasiga ʔaN  ʔumuw-aN
52
 
      rain  rain-CON-DIR INF  but   so   think-NEG 
     # I infer it is raining but I don‘t think so.‖ 
 
Example (56b) shows that denying speaker‘s belief just after making an assertion 
makes the sentence awkward. The primary usage of the Inferential evidential is based 
on speaker‘s sensory evidence. It might be difficult to deny sensory evidence while 
simultaneously making an assertion. The next example is the case of the Assumed 
evidential. 
 
(57) a. ʔami  hut-oo-ru      hazi.   
      rain  rain-CON-ATTR  ASSUM 
      p = ‗It is raining.‘ 
      EV = Speaker infers p. 
 
b. # ʔami  hut-oo-ru     hazi.   jasiga  ʔaN  ʔumuw-aN 
        rain  rain-CON-ATTR ASSUM  but    so   think-NEG 
      # I assume it is raining but I don‘t think so. 
 
Example (57) shows the same result as in the case of the Inferential evidential tee 
above. As I discussed in section 3.4.1, the Assumed evidential is not mere guess but 
is based on general knowledge or habitual activities or events. Therefore, the 
speaker‘s degree of certainty is accompanied by choice of evidential. 
Examples (56) and (57) suggest that the Inferential evidential tee and the 
Assumed evidential hazi imply the speaker‘s degree of certainty. Considering the fact 
that inference or assumption always implies the speaker‘s degree of certainty, it may 
be necessary to consider the possibility that these two evidentials overlap both 
evidentiality and epistemic modality. (I will return to this issue in Chapter 5.) 
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3.6  Summary 
 
In this chapter, I have presented two kinds of indirect evidentials; Inferential tee, and 
Assumed hazi. The primary usage of tee is to mark inference derived from sensory 
evidence. Also as a less dominant usage, when any sensory evidence is not available, 
tee can also be used based on the speaker‘s general knowledge or habitual knowledge. 
Concerning the main usage of Assumed evidential hazi, the speaker has to have some 
grounds on which to base his/her assumption, such as general knowledge or habitual 
knowledge; however, we have seen that the grounds cannot be mere guessing or 
belief. In this the Inferential evidential and Assumed evidential are alike. However, 
although they share this feature, they are fairly different in terms of their 
co-occurrence with tense: the Inferential tee cannot appear in the past tense, whereas 
the Assumed evidential hazi can. Lastly, I demonstrated that the Inferential evidential 























Chapter 4  The Reportative Evidential  
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The Reportative evidential is used to mark information acquired from another person. 
A sentence with the Reportative evidential differs from reported speech because the 
Reportative evidential does not require a lexical verb such as ‗said‘ or ‗tell‘. 
Sentences without the Reportative evidential are grammatical sentences; however, 
using the Reportative evidential is indispensible for Luchuan speakers to clarify that 
the speaker acquired the information from someone else. Folktales and news are 
marked by Reportative evidential as well.  
     It is difficult to discuss how different direct speech and indirect speech is in 
Luchuan because there is no syntactic agreement of tense or person as there is in 
English. However, it is obvious that sentences with the Reportative evidential are 
different from direct speech because the first person ‗I‘ cannot appear in the subject 
position of the embedded clause. I will discuss this in section 4.2.1.  Since there is 
no overt subject as the lexical verbs such as ‗John said …‘ or ‗They told …‘, 
sometimes it is difficult to distinguish who is the source of information of sentences 
with the Reportative evidential. This will be discussed in section 4.2.2. 
     The Reportative evidential plays a crucial role in demonstrating the conceptual 
differences between evidentiality and modality because reportative Ndi does not 
convey the speaker‘s degree of certainty; it only conveys evidential meaning. In 
section 4.3, I will demonstrate this, providing the tests which determine whether or 
not the three indirect evidentials of Luchuan including Ndi encode the speaker‘s 
degree of certainty. The Direct evidential tends to be related to speaker‘s certainty 
since obtaining direct evidence contributes to speaker‘s certainty. Nevertheless, I 
have claimed that evidentiality should be separated from modality because it is not 
cross-linguistically universal for the Direct evidential to indicate the speaker‘s 
certainty (and in fact many languages distinguish them (Aikhenvald 2004)). Also, 
indicating the speaker‘s degree of certainty does not exclude indicating evidentiality.
1
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The fact that the Reportative evidential Ndi carries purely evidential meaning 
suggests that the concept of evidentiality should be identified as a separate 
grammatical category. This issue will be discussed in section 4.3. 
In this chapter, I will attempt to clarify the functions of Ndi, focusing on the 
following three points: 
(1) What kind of evidence licenses the use of Ndi 
(2) How Ndi interacts with aspect/tense and the direct evidential -N 
(3) Whether Ndi can appear in negative or interrogative sentences 
Point (1) will be discussed in section 4.2.1 so that we can understand the spheres 
which the Reportative evidential covers. Points (2) and (3), which clarify the 
morphosyntactic functions of Ndi, will be discussed in sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 
respectively. 
 
4.2  Reportative evidential Ndi 
 
4.2.1. What kind of evidence licenses the use of Ndi 
 
The typical usage of the Reportative evidential is to convey ―information acquired 
through somebody else‘s report, without any claim about the exact authorship or the 
speaker‘s commitment to the truth of the statement‖ (Aikhenvald 2004:176-177). 
The reportative evidential in Luchuan can indeed mark information acquired from 
someone else with or without explicitly clarifying the source of information. 
Basically the speaker needs to have obtained the information from someone else 
apart from the hearer. The information can have as its source the agent of the 
sentence reporting him/herself or someone else. Let me introduce an example.  
 
                                                                                                                                                





Context : Speaker is explaining who drew the picture.  
(1) a. kunu  ii   ja  Ryu ga  kac-a-N      Ndi. 
    this picture TOP Ryu NM draw-PAST-DIR  REP 
     p = ‗Ryu draw this picture.‘ 
     EV = Speaker heard that p. 
 
    b. mata gasoriN dee  ʔagaj-u-N   Ndi. 
      again petrol price rise-IMPF-DIR  REP 
      p = ‗Price of petrol is going to rise again.‘ 
      EV = Speaker heard p (from news program). 
 
Example (1a) indicates that the speaker obtained the information that Ryu had drawn 
the picture before the time of utterance. This utterance can be understood in two 
ways. The source of the information may be the agent of the action reported
2
 (Ryu in 
this case), or it may be a third party. In either case, the reportative evidential 
indicates that the information was reported by someone else. The speaker may have 
obtained the information directly from the agent or someone else, or alternatively the 
speaker may have acquired the information indirectly, which means the speaker may 
just have overheard someone talking to someone else. Also the information can be 
indirectly conveyed by TV or radio, as example (1b) shows. The reportative 
evidential is used when the speaker simply wants to show that the information was 
conveyed by someone.  
     Reportative can also be used to indicate that the information was handed down 
as in a folktale, as in example (2). 
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 If there is another participant in addition to the agent, he/she also could be the source of 
information.  For example, if the there are two participants as in example (i) below, either of 
them (Ryu or his brother in this case) could be source of information.  
(i) Ryu  ga  ʔuQtu  Nkai  kunu  ii    ʔagi-ta-N     Ndi. 
   Ryu NM  brother  to   this  picture give-PAST-DIR  REP 
p = ‗Ryu gave this picture to his brother.‘ 




(2)  […] kugani  nu  ʔiQc-oo-ta-N      Ndi. 
         treasure NM  put-CON-PAST-DIR  REP 
     ‗It is said that the treasure was there (in the box).‘ (Folklore) 
(Igei 1991:37) 
 
     Willet (1988) states that in using a Reportative ‗the speaker claims to know of 
the situation described via verbal means, but may not specify whether it is hearsay 
(i.e. second-hand or third-hand), or is conveyed through folklore‘ (p96). Since 
examples (1a), (1b) and (2) are all marked by the Reportative evidential Ndi, this 
suggests that the Reportative evidential in Luchuan does not specify whether it is 
hearsay or through folklore. 
     Before carrying forward the investigation of the Reportative, it might be 
helpful to clarify what second-hand and third-hand information refers to. According 
to Willet (1988:96), when the speaker obtains information from someone who was a 
direct witness, this information is regarded as second-hand evidence. With 
third-hand information, the speaker has heard about the situation from someone who 
is not a direct witness. While the distinctions presented by Willet appear to be clear 
enough, this generalization does not cover the case of example (1a). More precisely, 
as I have mentioned, the information source of example (1a) can be the agent himself 
or someone other than the agent. If the speaker obtains the information from 
someone other than the agent, who is a direct witness, Willet‘s definition can be 
applied without any problems. However if the information source is the agent 
himself, it is not clear whether this information should be regarded as second-hand 
evidence or not. In other words, the issue is whether ‗direct witness‘ should include 
the agent him/herself.  
To discuss this issue, let us quickly review what ‗direct evidence‘ is. In the 
literature, when the speaker claims to have perceived the situation described, it 
means he/she has direct evidence
3
 (Willet 1988:96). Also Aikhenvald (2004:26) 
states that ‗the first-hand term typically refers to information acquired through vision 
(or hearing, or other senses)‘. Considering these definitions of first-hand, it will be 
reasonable to regard direct experience as first-hand or direct information. 
                                                   
3
 The speaker may or may not specify that it is sensory evidence of any kind: visual, auditory or 




Considering the agent to have direct evidence as direct perceivers, a slight revision of 
Willet‘s definition for second-hand evidence is required. That is, to mark 
second-hand evidence, a speaker should obtain the information from a person who 
has direct evidence, which refers to ―direct experience‖ or ―direct perception/sense‖ 
as was defined in Chapter 2. Recall that in Chapter 2, I used the term ‗best evidence‘ 
as shorthand for ―best possible ground‖ in Faller‘s terminology. Best evidence 
contains both direct evidence and the more indirect cases. So, note that what I call 
direct evidence here is not equivalent to best evidence, since direct evidence is 
limited to direct experience or direct perception in my definition. 
Let us return to example (1a) with this definition for second-hand evidence in 
mind. In cases where the speaker has second-hand evidence, this means that he/she 
has obtained information from someone who has direct evidence. The speaker of (1a) 
must have heard of the situation described from either the agent himself or someone 
who witnessed the event, namely from Ryu, or the person who saw Ryu drawing the 
picture. Then, in cases where the speaker has third-hand evidence, he/she is 
understood to have got the information from someone who does not have direct 
evidence.  
We have now discussed the clear definitions of the terminology and I have 
explained that the Reportative evidential Ndi in Luchuan covers second-hand 
evidence, third-hand evidence and folktales as well. Now, let me specify that the 
reportative Ndi does not distinguish reported information from quotative information. 
Some languages have two reported types of evidential, ―reported‖ and ―quotative‖: 
the former states what someone else has said without specifying the exact authorship, 
while the latter specifies the exact author of the quoted report (Aikhenvald 2004:177). 
The Reportative evidential Ndi in Luchuan covers these two usages, so there is not a 
special marker for quotative. For example, in case of example (1), when the speaker 
means the first-hand evidence is Ryu himself, (1) specifies Ryu as the author of the 
quoted report; therefore, Ndi in this case behaves as a quotative. On the other hand, 
when the speaker means that Ryu in (1) is the agent of drawing the picture but not 
the author of the quoted report, Ndi in this case serves as a reported because the 
author of the report is not specified.  
     As we have seen, the Reportative evidential Ndi can be used to mark 




marks information acquired from a source other than a third party‘s report.  
 
Context: Speaker is reading a newspaper. He has found a controversial article and 
reports the content to the hearer. 
(3)  Ucinaa  nu  sango  ja  zikoo  ʔikiraku  nat-oo-N   Ndi. 
    Okinawa GM  coral  TOP  much  reduce  be-CON-DIR  REP 
    p = ‗Coral reefs in Okinawa are dying away.‘ 
    EV=Speaker reads that p. 
 
The examples of the Reportative evidential which we have seen so far have in 
common that all the information sources are hearsay. However, example (3) is 
different from these other examples of the Reportative evidential, in that the 
information source is written sentences
4
 not oral report. The speaker of example (3) 
cannot omit the Reportative evidential marker. If the sentence ends without the 
Reportative evidential, the Direct evidential marker -N appears at the end of the 
sentence, and the wrong meaning would be conveyed, namely that the speaker has 
direct evidence.  
     As example (3) illustrates, the secondary usage of the Reportative evidential is 
to mark information acquired through verbal means. This demonstrates that the 
crucial condition for the use of the Reportative evidential is that the information is 
conveyed through the use of language; it does not matter whether the medium is 
speech or writing. Since the source of information does not need to be restricted to 
information which is obtained orally, example (3) is licensed to be marked with the 
Reportative Ndi. That is, a speaker can use the Reportative evidential to indicate that 
he/she has acquired the information through the use of language. The following 
examples further illustrate this property of Ndi. 
 
                                                   
4
 Newspapers issued in Okinawa are written in standard Japanese not Luchuan, though there is a 
―newspaper‖ in Luchuan issued by the organization which takes action to preserve Luchuan. 
There may be other similar newspapers but the newspapers read by the majority in Okinawa are 




 (4) a. kuma  maQsugu ja-sa.  
      here  straight   COP-FP 
      ‗Go straight here (to get to the station).‘ 
 
     b. kuma maQsugu (ja-N)    Ndi. 
       here straight   (COP-DIR)  REP 
      p = ‗Go straight here (to get to the station).‘ 
      EV = Speaker heard p. 
 
Suppose the speaker is looking at the map to find out how to get to the station. She 
can use example (4a) to tell this information to her companion when she has found 
the directions. In such a context, the Reportative Ndi cannot be used. Instead, the 
speaker would choose -sa, which marks objective information.
5
 On the other hand, if 
the speaker gets the information through the use of language, whether from someone 
else or through written information, the Reportative evidential should be used, as in 
example (4b). Examples (4a) and (4b) demonstrate that the use of language is an 
essential factor for the Reportative.
6
 
     Next, I will introduce an important feature which demands attention when 
investigating the reportative. The obligatory usage of Ndi can be suspended in a 
particular situation. Consider the next example.  
 
                                                   
5
 Sa appears in the same slot as -N. For morphological analysis, see section 2.2.2. According to 
the Dictionary of Okinawan Language (1963), this suffix is used to slightly emphasize the 
statement. Uemura (1961) also states that this suffix is used to objectivize the information. In 
other words, I believe that -sa is used to mark objective information which could anchor both 
speaker and hearer. Contrastively when information belongs to the speaker, the Direct evidential 
-N tends to be used.  
6
 To be precise, it is possible to use the Reportative as long as the ‗utterance‘ is a part of 
communication. For example, in babies‘pre-speech period, ‗utterance‘ such as crying or 
murmuring can be regarded as a deliberate use of symbol through the use of language. A mother 
can say that the baby is hungry with Reportative if she understands that that is what her baby is 
trying to tell her. The same thing can be applied to the case of animals such as a dog or cat. If the 
speaker understands that they are trying to communicate through animal call, it could be regarded 




Context: Mother learned that her son, Ken passed the entrance exam. She tells this 
information to her husband. 
(5)  Ken ja gookaku  s-a-N. 
    Ken TOP pass    do-PAST-DIR 
    p = ‗Ken passed the entrance exam.‘ 
    EV = Speaker has direct evidence of p. 
 
Since example (5) is marked by the Direct evidential -N, it means that Mother 
conveys the news as something for which she has direct evidence.
7
 This usage is the 
normal one that we have already seen illustrated. Let us consider the next example. 
The context is related to the previous one. 
 
Context: Ken‘s father, Tatsuya, receives a phone call from his wife at work and learns 
that Ken passed the entrance exam. One of his colleagues sees Tatsuya‘s happy 
face and asks what has happened. To answer the question, Tatsuya would say: 
(6) Ken  ga
8
  gookaku  s-a-N      Ndi. 
   Ken NM   pass     do-PAST-DIR  REP 
   p = ‗Ken passed the entrance exam.‘ 
   EV = Speaker heard that p. 
 
Reportative Ndi is used in example (6) because the speaker acquired the information 
from a verbal report. This series of actions – receiving the phone call and answering 
the colleague‘s question – should take place in an immediate sequence. If a certain 
amount of time passes, curiously, reportative Ndi should be omitted. Consider (7) for 
an example of a slightly different situation. 
 
                                                   
7 If Mother obtained this information from someone else, she would use Reportative Ndi after -N. 
If she directly finds her son‘s pass at school or on a website, she will use the Direct evidential as 
in (5). 
8 
I have changed the topic marker ja in (5) to the nominative case marker ga because it sounds 
more natural in the case of example (6). But the topic marker can also appear in example (6) 
without changing the grammaticality of the sentence. The reason why the nominative case marker 
sounds better is probably that the nominative case marker marks new information and the topic 
marker marks old information, like their counterparts in Japanese. In example (5), Ken is known 
information between Ken‘s parents; on the other hand, Ken is newly introduced information in 
example (6). Functions of the nominative case marker and topic marker in Japanese and those in 





Context: Ken‘s father, Tatsuya heard that Ken passed the entrance exam. On the next 
day, Tatsuya‘s colleague asks if Ken passed the exam. Tatsuya will answer this 
question as follows. 
(7)  Ken ja  gookaku s-a-N.
9
  
    Ken TOP pass    do-PAST-DIR  
    p = ‗Ken passed the entrance exam.‘ 
    EV = Speaker has direct evidence of p. 
 
Although Ken‘s father Tatsuya uses the Reportative in example (6), on the other hand, 
he would not use Reportative in example (7) even though he is conveying the same 
information, only after some time has passed. Why can the speaker use the Direct 
evidential, despite the fact that he actually obtained the information through other‘s 
report? To solve this problem, two concepts need to be introduced: first, the concept 
of assimilation and second, the concept of ‗the territory of information‘.  
     Faller (2002) discussed similar examples of Quechua making use of the 
concept of assimilation developed by Aksu-Koç and Slobin (1986). According to 
Aksu-Koç and Slobin, there are two past tense forms in Turkish, -dI and -mIş. The 
verb suffix -dI marks direct experience and -mIş marks indirect experience, which 
covers inference, hearsay, and surprise. Aksu-Koç and Slobin (1986) explain that a 
significant property which differentiates between the use of these two past forms is 
whether the speaker is well prepared or unprepared. Their examples show that even 
hearsay can be marked as direct experience by -dI when the speaker is well prepared 
for the event. However, when the speaker‘s mind is unprepared, the indirect 
experience marker -mIş should be used to mark the information. Aksu-Koç and 
Slobin (1986) provide the examples of two resignations: Nixon‘s resignation, which 
people were prepared for, and the Turkish premier‘s resignation, which people were 
unprepared for. When people learned Nixon‘s resignation through the news media, it 
was natural for them to report the event using -dI, which indicates direct experience, 
but when the Turkish premier Bülent Ecevit suddenly resigned, there was no choice 
to report the event using -mIş because it was totally unexpected. But as the news of 
                                                   
9 
In natural discourse, the phrase ―Ken ja‖ is normally omitted because Tatsuya‘s colleague asks 
a question using Ken‘s name. In Luchuan, when both speaker and hearer have clear 
understanding of what or whom they are talking about, that part is often omitted. But I 






the resignation of the Turkish premier was gradually acknowledged as time went by, 
-dI came to be used. These examples indicate that hearsay information can be marked 
by a direct experience marker once the information is assimilated after a certain 
period, and it takes time for the unprepared mind to assimilate the information.  
     In Quechua, the direct evidential
10
 cannot be used to describe an unassimilated 
event. Faller (2002:136) states that ―claiming authority over a piece of encyclopedic 
information requires that that piece be assimilated in the sense that is must be 
connectable to a network of related beliefs‖. Therefore, Quechua -mi for 
encyclopedic information
11
 cannot be used unless the information has been 
assimilated. Faller also points out that assimilation seems to be relevant to mark 
personal information. Examples (8) in Quechua are cited from Faller (2002). 
 
(8) a. Tura-y-qa    Italia-pi-s  llank‘a-sha-n kay semana-pi 
     brother-1-TOP Italy-LOC-si work-PROG-3 this week-LOC 
     p= ‗My brother is working in Italy this week.‘ 
     EV= speaker was told that p 
   
   b. Tura-y-qa    Italia-pi-n  llank‘a-sha-n kay semana-pi 
     brother-1-TOP Italy-LOC-mi work-PROG-3 this week-LOC 
     p= ‗My brother is working in Italy this week.‘ 
     EV= speaker has best possible grounds for p 
(Faller 2002:139-140) 
 
The background of these examples is that speaker‘s sister tells the speaker on the 
phone that her brother was sent to Italy on assignment for a week. If the speaker 
wants to tell this news to someone shortly after finishing the phone conversation, she 
would have to use example (8a) with the Reportative -si; on the other hand, if she 
wants to convey the same information to someone the next day, example (8b) with 
direct evidential -mi can be used. The evidence for examples (8a) and (8b) is the 
same, but the difference is whether the information has been assimilated or not.  
                                                   
10
 As we have seen, in Faller‘s terminology, the direct evidential in Quechua is called ‗best 
possible grounds‘. 
11 
Encyclopedic information is information ―which includes knowledge that is taken for granted 






     Faller provided an alternative explanation for the acceptability of example (8b) 
using the theory called territory of information, proposed by Kamio (1997). Kamio 
claims that the choice of the Japanese evidential depends on whether the information 
falls within or outside the speaker‘s or hearer‘s territory. For example, the direct 
evidential (best possible ground) is used for (8b) because the information about the 
speaker‘s brother falls into the speaker‘s territory of information. Moreover Faller 
states that if the subject of example (8b) is not the speaker‘s family member or 
someone very close to the speaker, but instead someone close to the hearer (in this 
case the hearer‘s sister), for example, the speaker‘s sister‘s academic advisor, -mi 
should not be used because the hearer‘s adviser falls into the hearer‘s territory of 
information. 
     As illustrated above, Faller provides two possible alternative explanations for 
the use of the direct evidential for hearsay information: first, whether or not the 
conveyed information is assimilated, and second, whether or not the conveyed 
information falls into the speaker‘s territory of information. Before we return to the 
problems of Luchuan, let us consider the examples of Japanese presented by Kamio. 
The speaker of examples (9a) and (9b) is Taroo‘s father. 
 
(9) a. Taroo wa  taiin               simasita. 
           TM released-from-hospital  did-F 
      ‗Taroo has been released from the hospital.‘ 
       
    b. Taroo wa  taiin               sita-rashii desu. 
           TM released-from-hospital  did-seem is-F 





According to Kamio, example (9a) is natural when the speaker is Taroo‘s father and 
the hearer is his acquaintance. Since the direct form
13
 is used in example (9), the 
addressee would normally assume that Taroo‘s father has direct evidence such as 
                                                   
12
 The glosses for examples (9a) are shown as they are in Kamio (1997); TM =Topic Marker, F= 
formal form. 
13 
Kamio (1997, 1998) does not use the term evidential in his paper. He uses ‗direct form‘ and 





direct observation. However, Kamio points out that in some contexts example (8a) is 
acceptable even though Taroo‘s father has only hearsay information. For example, 
suppose that Taroo‘s father lives separately from his family and Taroo‘s mother tells 
him over the phone that Taroo has been released from the hospital. On the next day, 
when Taroo‘s father happens to be asked by his colleagues how Taroo is doing, 
example (9a) sounds natural, despite the fact that Taroo‘s father does not have direct 
evidence. If Taroo‘s father uses the indirect form, it would sound peculiar. It would 
sound as if Taroo‘s father was very cold and emotionally distant from his son, or as if 
he was not interested in his own son‘s health. Thus, example (9a) is much more 
appropriate in the given context. 
Kamio emphasizes that the fact that the context discussed involves 
communication ‗the next day‘ is very important (Kamio 1998:109) because Taroo‘s 
father may choose the indirect form such as in example (9b) if he is asked right after 
he acquires the information. However, when the conversation takes place on the next 
day, after the information has been assimilated, he may use the direct form, as in 
example (9a). The examples which Kamio presents share the feature which Faller 
(2002) points out in terms of assimilation. Faller mentions the theory of territory of 
information as an alternative account to the account of assimilation; however, I claim 
that these two concepts are both important because assimilation alone does not solve 
the issue as far as Japanese and Luchuan are concerned. For instance, suppose a 
speaker hears the news on the radio that the Dalai Lama visited America. The 
speaker would use one of the indirect forms in Japanese if he/she wants to convey 
this information even on the next day.
14
 If assimilation was essential for the use of 
the direct evidential, as Faller suggests, the event could be conveyed without the 
Reportative, but this is not the case; this is probably because the concept of the 
territory of information plays an important role in both Japanese and Luchuan. Since 
the Dalai Lama does not fall into the speaker‘s or the hearer‘s territory of information, 
information about the event cannot be assimilated even when a night has passed. 
Based on this investigation, now let us consider the examples of Luchuan. As I 
have stated above, the concept of assimilation and the concept of territory of 
                                                   
14
 There are some indirect forms in Japanese such as rashii, yooda, and mitaida. But I do not 
pursue these Japanese usages in this thesis. I have mentioned Japanese to adapt this feature to 
analysis of Luchuan which will be discussed in the following pages. See Kamio (1997) or for 




information are both important because in Luchuan, information which does not fall 
into either the speaker‘s or the hearer‘s territory should be marked by the Reportative 
even after assimilation.  
 
(10) a.# Dalai Lama ja Amerika Nkai Nz-a-N. 
       Dalai Lama TOP America to go-PAST-DIR  
       p = ‗Dalai Lama visited America.‘ 
       EV = Speaker has direct evidence for p. 
 
     b. Dalai Lama ja Amerika Nkai Nz-a-N   Ndi. 
       Dalai Lama TOP America to go-PAST-DIR REP 
       p = ‗Dalai Lama visited America.‘ 
       EV = Speaker heard p on the radio or TV. 
 
Example (10a) is marked by the Direct evidential -N, while example (10b) is marked 
by the Reportative evidential Ndi. Even after time passes, example (10a) cannot be 
used. Even a newscaster would not use the direct form in Luchuan unless he/she had 
direct evidence.
15
 The question is what kind of information can be assimilated, and 
if it can be assimilated, how much time is required; these issues will need to be 
investigated further. Aksu-Koç and Slobin (1986) state that in Turkish, when a 
hearer‘s mind is unprepared, the event cannot be assimilated at once. In the same way, 
it may be the case that when an event is mentally distant from the speaker it may take 
time to be assimilated in Luchuan. 
     The content of example (10) would not be directly related to any speaker or 
hearer living in Okinawa, Japan. How does an example that is directly related to 
people in Okinawa, such as example (3), behave? Example (3) is about the coral 
reefs in Okinawa, repeated as example (11) below. 
 
                                                   
15
 Interestingly, in the case of Japanese, newscasters can use the direct form without a 
Reportative marker even if they do not possess direct evidence, while Luchuan requires the 
Reportative evidential or other expressions which clarify that the newscasters do not have direct 
evidence. The difference of acceptability between Japanese and Luchuan would probably depend 




(11) Ucinaa  nu  sango  ja  zikoo  ʔikiraku  nat-oo-N  Ndi. (=3) 
    Okinawa GM coral  TOP  much  reduce  be-CON-DIR  REP 
    p = ‗Coral reefs in Okinawa are dying away.‘ 
    EV=Speaker reads that p. 
 
Even if the speaker reads or hears about coral reefs, which Okinawan people are 
quite familiar with, reportative Ndi still needs to be attached. Thus, it is not easy to 
draw the conclusion that mental distance or closeness is the issue. But at least the 
discussion so far shows that new information can be assimilated when it falls into the 
speaker‘s territory, as illustrated in (7) above. As for the problem of how territory 
should be defined, further investigation will be required. 
     In this section, I have examined these three points:   
1. Reportative Ndi is used to mark the information which the speaker has acquired 
from an oral source, including second-hand, and third-hand information and 
folklore. 
2. Reportative Ndi can be used to mark information which has been acquired through 
the use of language, including written information.  
3. Reportative Ndi can be omitted when the information is both assimilated and also 
falls into the speaker‘s territory of information. 
 
4.2.2  How Ndi interacts with aspect/tense and the Direct  
evidential -N 
 
The first purpose of this section is to clarify the possible combinations of each tense 
or aspect with reportative Ndi. The second purpose is to investigate how reportative 
Ndi interacts with the Direct evidential -N. First, let us consider examples of non-past 
form. The imperfective aspect that is used to describe events in the present and future 





(12)   Ken ga  ʔacjaa    ʔic-u-N    Ndi. 
      Ken NM tomorrow  go-IMPF-DIR REP 
      p = ‗Ken will go tomorrow.‘ 
      EV=Speaker heard that p. 
 
The speaker of example (12) should have acquired the information from Ken himself 
or someone who definitely knows Ken‘s plan for tomorrow. The next examples show 
that reportative Ndi can be used with both continuative and resultative aspect in 
non-past. 
 
(13) a. Ken ja  tigami  kac-oo-N    Ndi. 
      Ken NM letter  write-CON-DIR  REP 
      p = ‗Ken is writing a letter.‘ 
      EV = Speaker heard that p. 
 
    b. Ken ga tigami  kaceeN      Ndi. 
      Ken NM letter  write-RES-DIR REP 
      p = ‗Ken has written a letter.‘ 
      EV = Speaker heard that p. 
 
Continuative aspect is used in example (13a) and resultative aspect is used in 
example (13b). Example (13a) can be used, for example, as an answer to the question 
such as ―Who is writing a letter?‖ As for resultative aspect, example (13b) can be 
used as an answer to the question like ―Who has written a letter?‖ In both cases, the 
speaker must have acquired the information expressed from Ken himself or from 
another person who knows that Ken is writing or has written a letter.  
     Next, let us investigate examples involving the past tense. In example (14), a 
simple past is used and, as its acceptability indicates, the simple past form can 





(14)   Ken ga ʔ Nz-a-N    Ndi. 
      Ken NM go-PAST-DIR REP 
      p = ‗Ken went.‘ 
      EV = Speaker heard that p. 
 
To utter example (14), the speaker usually must have obtained information from Ken 
himself or someone who accompanied Ken. If Ken said waN ga ʔNzaN ‗I went‘, or if 
a third party who accompanied Ken said Ken ga ʔNzaN ‗Ken went‘, example (14a) 
would be used by a speaker who heard either of these utterances. Therefore, the 
source of the information of example (14) could either be Ken or a third party. 
     In the next example, the imperfective aspect in the past tense is used, which is 
normally used to describe the events done by someone other than the first person.    
 
(15)   Ken ga  ʔic-u-ta-N     Ndi. 
      Ken NM  go-IMPF-DIR-N REP 
      p = ‗Ken went.‘ 
      EV = Speaker heard that p. 
 
Unlike the case of the simple past in (14), the source of the information of example 
(15) must not be Ken himself. If Ken were the source of information, it means that 
the speaker of example (15) would have heard Ken utter example (16a). However, in 
fact, example (16) is not acceptable because the first person subject cannot be used 
with an imperfective aspect in the past tense. This means that Ken cannot say 
example (16a) to describe his own activity in the past. In this case, the simple past 
form as in (14) should be chosen. 
 
(16)* a. waN ga  ʔic-u-ta-N.  
       I   NM  go-IMPF-PAST-DIR 





     b. Ken ga  ʔic-u-ta-N . 
       Ken NM  go-IMPF-PAST-DIR 
       p = ‗Ken went.‘ 
       EV = Speaker has direct evidence of p. 
 
Therefore, the source of the information of example (15) should not be Ken but 
someone else who observed Ken‘s action. For example, if a third party said Ken ga 
ʔic-u-ta-N ‗Ken went‘, as in example (16b), the one who heard this utterance would 
use example (15) attaching the Reportative Ndi.  
The next examples show continuative aspect and resultative aspect in the past 
tense. 
 
(17)  Ken  ja  tigami  kac-oo-ta-N       Ndi. 
      Ken NM  letter  write-CON-PAST-DIR  REP 
      p = ‗Ken was writing a letter.‘ 
      EV = Speaker heard that p. 
 
    b. Ken ga  tigami  kac-ee-ta-N       Ndi. 
      Ken NM  letter  write-RES-PAST-DIR  REP 
      p = ‗Ken has written a letter.‘
16
 
      EV = Speaker heard that p. 
 
Continuative aspect and resultative aspect, in past forms, as in example (17a) and 
(17b) respectively, sound fine. The information source could either be Ken or 
someone else who perceived Ken‘s continuative action or completed event. The past 
morpheme -ta- indicates that the source of the reported information heard this 
information before the time of utterance.  
     Now that we have shown that continuative aspect and resultative aspect in the 
past tense sound acceptable with the Reportative evidential, next, I will move to the 
second purpose of this section, which is to investigate how the Reportative evidential 
Ndi interacts with the Direct evidential -N. This interaction between the Direct 
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 As I explained in Section 3.4.2, the past tense of resultative aspect is not the same as the past 
perfect, therefore, it is difficult to reflect the difference in the translation. This means that the 




evidential and the Reportative evidential shows very interesting behavior. To begin 
with, it is important to understand that the Direct evidential which appears in 
sentences with the Reportative evidential always anchors to the information source, 
while the Reportative evidential carries the speaker‘s source of information. 
Consequently when the Direct evidential -N appears in the sentence with the 
Reportative Ndi, -N does not anchor to the speaker. Rather, the Direct evidential 
always anchors to the original source of the report.
17
 Thus, the speaker cannot use 
reportative Ndi to mark his/her own statement, as shown in (18).  
 
Context: One of the students in the group will go to summer camp. One of the 
students volunteered, but the teacher could not hear. The teacher asks ―Who said 
that s/he would go?‖ Speaker answers:   
(18)  # waN ga  ʔic-u-N      Ndi. 
       I   NM  go-IMPF-DIR  REP 
      Intended meaning: ‗I said that I will go.‘  
 
The unacceptability of example (18a) is probably caused by the fact that both the 
Direct evidential -N and the Reportative evidential -Ndi are anchored to the speaker 
him/herself. It is understandable for the speaker not to be able to use the Reportative 
Ndi for information for which he/she already possesses direct evidence. Therefore, if 
the possessor of direct evidence is different from the possessor of reportative 
evidence, the sentence will be acceptable. It is difficult to think of an appropriate 
context, but consider the next example. 
 
Context: One of the students in a group will go to summer camp. The teacher has 
said that the speaker is supposed to go to the camp this year because he didn‘t 
attend last year. 
(19)   waN ga  ʔic-u-N     Ndi. 
       I  NM  go-IMPF-DIR  REP 
       p= ‗I will go (to the camp).‘ 
       EV = I was told p by the teacher. 
 
                                                   
17




The speaker of example (19) was told to go to camp by his teacher.
18
 Thus, in the 
case when the person who reports the information with the Reportative evidential is 
not identical to the person who possesses the direct evidence, sentences with these 
two evidentials become grammatical. The Direct evidential anchors to the teacher, 
and the Reportative evidential anchors to the speaker. There are no conflicts in the 
co-occurrence of the two evidentials because they belong to the different individuals.  
Next, let us consider how the Reportative evidential behaves when the subject 
is the second person. Reportative Ndi cannot be used to mark the hearer‘s statement. 
Consider example (20). 
 
Context: The addressee had said she would go to summer camp, but she forgot what 
she said. The speaker tries to remind what the addressee said. 
(20)  # ʔjaa ga  ʔic-u-N      Ndi. 
       you NM  go-IMPF-DIR  REP 
       Intended meaning: You said that you will go. 
 
Example (20) suggests that possessor of direct evidence, who has directly acquired 
reported information that you will go cannot be the hearer either. In a similar way to 
the case of example (19), if the possessor of direct evidence is a third party other than 
the hearer as example (21) indicates, the sentence becomes acceptable. 
 
Context: Similar to the context for example (19). Teacher says that someone (the 
hearer ʔjaa ‗you‘ in example (21)) is supposed to go to camp this summer. The 
speaker who hears this information utters example (21).  
(21)  ʔjaa ga  ʔic-u-N     Ndi. 
      you NM go-IMPF-DIR  REP 
      p = ‗You will go (to camp).‘ 
      EV = Speaker was told p by the teacher. 
 
Example (21) is acceptable because the source of information is not the hearer but 
the third party, the teacher. This discussion may seem complicated, but the important 
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Note that this usage of Direct evidence is rather rare. Normally a speaker knows his/her own 





point is actually simple. When the possessor of direct evidence is the third person, 
sentences such as these are acceptable because the source of information is not the 
speaker or the hearer. In cases where we want to convey information which is uttered 
by the first speaker or the hearer, a lexical verb such as ‗tell‘ or ‗say‘ must be 
explicitly utilized.  
 
(22) a. waN ga  ʔic-u-N     Ndi  ʔNz-a-N.  
       I  NM  go-IMPF-DIR REP   say-PAST-DIR 
     ‗I said you would go.‘ 
 
b. ʔjaa ga ʔic-u-N     Ndi  ʔNz-a-N
19
. 
      you NM go-IMPF-DIR REP  say-PAST-DIR 
      ‗You said you would go.‘ 
 
Examples (22a) and (22b) imply that the function of the Reportative evidential is 
clearly different from that of lexical verbs.
20
 As we have observed, it is clear that the 
Direct evidential does not anchor to the possessor of the Reportative evidential. I will 
return to this issue again in 5.2. 
     In this section, I have mainly illustrated these two points. 
1. The Reportative evidential Ndi can co-occur with all types of tense and aspect. 
2. The Direct evidential -N which appears with the Reportative evidential should 
anchor to the third person, not the speaker or the hearer.  
 
4.2.3  Whether Ndi can appear in negative or interrogative 
sentences 
 
The purpose of this section is to examine whether Ndi can appear in negative 
sentences or interrogative sentences. First let us consider a negative sentence in 
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To be precise, it is not common to use the Direct evidential for what the addressee said as in 
(22a) because what the addressee said falls into the addressee‘s territory of information. To report 
the addressee‘s utterance to him/her with speaker‘s Direct evidential sounds a little unnatural but 
example (22a) is still acceptable. Putting the sentence final particle doo after -N is preferable. 
20 
Faller (2002) also points out that the Reportative -si in Cuzco Quechua cannot be used to mark 
the addressee‘s utterance. Faller explains that there is one restriction for the usage of -si, which is 





non-past tense with the Reportative evidential. As I have explained, there are three 
negative markers -(r)aN, -neeN, -uraN in Luchuan: -(r)aN is used with imperfective 
aspect which indicates present and future, -neeN is used for resultative aspect, and 
uraN is used for continuative aspect. Examples (23a)-(23c) illustrate how the 
Reportative evidential interacts with each aspect.  
 
(23) a. Ken  ja  tigami kak-aN  Ndi. 
      Ken TOP letter write-NEG REP 
      p = ‗Ken will not write a letter.‘ 
      EV = Speaker heard that p. 
 
b. Ken  ja  tigami  kac-ee-neeN  Ndi. 
      Ken TOP letter write-RES-NEG  REP 
      p = ‗Ken has not written a letter.‘ 
      EV = Speaker heard that p. 
 
c. Ken  ja  tigami  kac-ee-uraN
21
  Ndi. 
      Ken TOP  letter  write-CON-NEG  REP 
      p= ‗Ken isn‘t writing a letter.‘ 
      EV = Speaker heard that p. 
 
The acceptable examples (23a)-(23c) indicate that the Reportative evidential Ndi can 
appear in negative sentences of all kind of aspects in non-past tense.  
Next, let us investigate how the Reportative evidential behaves in negative 
sentences in the past tense. 
 
(24) a. Ken  ja  tigami kak-aN-ta-N       Ndi. 
      Ken TOP  letter  write-NEG-PAST-DIR REP 
      p = ‗Ken did not write a letter.‘ 
      EV = Speaker heard that p. 
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See footnote 49 in Chapter 3 for the morphological alternation from -oo- to -ee- in the 





b. Ken  ja  tigami  kac-ee-neeN-ta-N       Ndi. 
      Ken TOP  letter  write-RES- NEG-PAST-DIR  REP 
      p = ‗Ken hasn‘t written a letter.‘ 
      EV = Speaker heard that p. 
 
c. Ken  ja  tigami  kac-ee-uraN-ta-N      Ndi. 
      Ken  TOP letter  write-CON-NEG-PAST-DIR REP 
      p= ‗Ken was not writing a letter.‘ 
      EV = Speaker heard that p. 
 
Examples (24a)-(24c) show that the Reportative Ndi can also co-occur with negative 
markers in the past tense. As for the source of the information, it can be Ken himself 
or a third party, as we have seen in the affirmative sentences in section 4.2.2. 
Although examples (23a)-(23c) do not contain the Direct evidential -N, examples 
(24a)-(24c) contain the Direct evidential -N after the past tense marker -ta-. Since 
this -N does not anchor to the speaker, there are no problems in the co-occurrence of 
-N and the Reportative Ndi, as we have already seen in section 4.2.2.   
     Next, we will move to the investigation of interrogative sentences with the 
Reportative evidential. The Reportative cannot be generally used in an interrogative 
sentence as (25) indicates. 
 
Context: Speaker asks the addressee if he/she heard that there was an accident 
(25) #jiko    nu   a-ta-N      Ndi-i? 
     accident NM  be-PAST-DIR  REP-Q 
     p= ‗An accident happened.‘ 
     EV= Speaker heard that p from someone. 
    ―Did someone tell you that there was accident?‖ 
 
The speaker of example (25) cannot to use the Reportative Ndi with the question 
marker -i. This example demonstrates that the Reportative in Luchuan cannot be used 
in interrogative sentences, unlike English lexical verbs ‗hear‘.     
However, although the Reportative Ndi generally cannot appear in 




cases in which the Reportative can occur in an interrogative sentence. First I will 
present a type of usage in which a speaker repeats what the addressees has just said 
to confirm if he/she understands the content correctly. The second usage is simply 
reporting an interrogative sentence that has been uttered by an interlocutor. Let us 
start with the first.  
There are two question markers in Luchuan, -i and -ga. To make yes-no questions, -i 
is used; -ga is used for wh-questions. Example (26) is a yes-no interrogative sentence 
to which -i is attached.  
 
Context: Ken said waN ga tigami kacuN ‗I will write the letter.‘ Ken‘s mother, the 
speaker of (26) could not hear it properly, so repeated the sentence with a 
question marker to confirm. 
(26)  ʔjaa gaa  tigami  kac-u-N      Ndi i ? 
      you NM  letter  write-IMPF-DIR  REP Q 
      p = ‗You will write a letter.‘ 
      EV = Speaker reported p. 




The speaker of example (26) wants to make sure of what the addressee has just said. 
Thus in this case, the addressee, Ken, is the source of information for the use of -Ndi. 
In the same way, resultative aspect and continuative aspect with the Reportative can 
be followed by the question marker -i as examples (27) and (28) indicate. 
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This translation is not exactly the same meaning as what example (26) conveys because the 
main predicate of example (26) is not ‗say‘ in Luchuan even though the main predicate of the 





Context: Ken said (waNnee) tigami kaceeN ‗I have written the letter.‘ Ken‘s mother, 
the speaker of example (27) could not hear it properly so repeated the sentence 
with a question marker to confirm. 
(27)  (ʔjaa  ja)
23
 tigami  kac-ee-N     Ndi i ? 
      you TOP    letter   write-RES-DIR  REP Q 
      p = ‗You have written a letter.‘ 
      EV = Speaker repeated p. 
      ―Did you say you had (have) written a letter?‖ 
 
Context: Ken said (waNnee) tigami kacooN ‗I‘m writing the letter.‘ Ken‘s mother, the 
speaker of example (28) could not hear it properly so repeated the sentence with 
a question marker to confirm. 
(28)  (ʔjaa  ja) tigami  kac-oo-N      Ndi i ? 
      you TOP  letter  write-CON-DIR  REP Q 
      p= ‗You are writing a letter.‘ 
      EV = Speaker reported p. 
      ―Did you say you were (are) writing a letter?‖ 
 
As examples (26), (27) and (28) illustrate, the Reportative evidential can appear in 
interrogative sentences when the speaker wants to check on his/her understanding of 
a previous utterance of the addressee. If there is no such context, these sentences are 
not acceptable. Thus, usually conversation cannot be initiated using sentences with 
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 It is more natural to omit the subject and topic marker because it is likely for Ken to omit the 
subject as the parenthesis in the context implies. The same can be said for example (28). 
24 
If the speaker wants to initiate a conversation asking what somebody said, lexical verbs such 
as ‗say‘ or ‗tell‘ are usually chosen. For example, suppose you are reading a newspaper and your 
friend wants to know the result of the tennis match. She could not the Reportative Ndi to ask you 
if her favorite tennis player won the tennis match. Only if you said something about tennis match 
and she couldn‘t fully understand it, the Reportative can mark what you possibly said to her. 






Context: Ken‘s mother wants to know if Ken is studying. She asks Ken‘s father 
whether Ken said to his father that he is studying. 
(29) # Ken ja  benkyo s-oo-N     Ndi i? 
     Ken TOP study  do-CON-DIR  REP Q 
     Intended meaning: Did you hear that Ken said he is studying? 
 
     Now, let us consider the case when the subject of the sentences is a third party
―neither the speaker nor the addressee. The following example (30) contains the 
Reportative evidential and a question marker and has two possible meanings. 
 
 (30) Yoko ja  benkyo s-oo-N      Ndi i? 
     Yoko TOP study  do-CON-DIR  REP Q 
     p = ‗Yoko is studying.‘ 
     EV = (i) Speaker reports p which was uttered by the addressee. 
          (ii) Speaker reports p which was uttered by Yoko. 
 
The two readings are indicated in (i) and (ii). In order for reading (i) to be available, 
the addressee should have direct evidence of Yoko studying. For example, Yoko‘s 
mother sees Yoko studying and she tells her husband Yoko ja benkyo soon ‗Yoko is 
studying.‘ But he did not understand what she said, so he repeats her utterance to ask 
if he understands correctly, by uttering (30). A case in which the reading given in (ii) 
arises would be if Yoko herself tells her mother that she is studying. In this case, her 
mother would tell her husband, Yoko ja benkyoo sooN Ndi ‗Yoko is studying‘ with 
the Reportative evidential Ndi. She needs to attach Ndi because she does not have 
direct evidence such as witness, rather, the evidence she has is Yoko‘s utterance. The 
second reading of (30) indicates that the speaker, Yoko‘s father, could not understand 
what his wife said, thus he asks whether or not what he possibly heard is correct.  
     As Yoko‘s mother has direct evidence under the reading in (i), the Reportative 
Ndi in (i) ―belongs to‖ Yoko‘s father. On the other hand, under the reading in (ii), Ndi 
could be slightly complicated because it could mean to belong to either Yoko‘s 
mother or Yoko‘s father. When Yoko‘s father could not listen to the Reportative 
Yoko‘s mother used in her utterance, Ndi he used in (30) anchors to himself. When 





     This shows that in very particular circumstances yes-no questions are possible 
with the Reportative Ndi. In addition, it is possible to find wh-interrogatives with 
Ndi.  
 
Context: Yoko told her parents that she would go to the library. Her father did not 
catch where she was going and asks his wife (Yoko‘s mother) where Yoko is 
going. 
(31) Yoko  ja  maa  Nkai ʔic-u-N      Ndi i/ga ? 
    Yoko TOP  where to   go-IMPF-DIR  REP Q/Q 
    p = ‗Where will Yoko go?‘ 
    EV= Speaker reports p. 
    ―Did you hear where Yoko said she would go?‖ 
 
The speaker of example (31) understands that Yoko is going somewhere but he did 
not catch where she said she would go. Note that either of the two question markers 
-i and ga can appear after Ndi. Typically the question marker for wh-questions is -ga 
and the question marker for yes-no question is -i. In the case of example (31), either 
of them can be used, but these two markers cannot appear at the same time.
25
 
Example (31) indicates that two question markers can be used in wh-interrogative 
sentences with the Reportative Ndi in the restricted context.  
Also, to answer the question in (31), the addressee is required to use the 
Reportative evidential. This phenomenon of ―interrogative flip‖, where an evidential 
is anchored to the addressee in a question, is often discussed in the literature 
(Aikhenvald 2004, Faller 2002, 2006, Speas and Tenny 2003). This phenomenon 
applies to example (31), since the speaker of (31) expects the addressee to base her 
answer on reported evidence.  
     What has to be noticed here is that all the cases which we have observed in 
examples (26)-(31) suggest that evidential meaning is never the focus of the question, 
even when the Reportative evidential can co-occur with a question marker. The other 
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 The claim that either choice is equally fine is supported by my data so far. Note that the 
meaning which example (31) conveys is different from ‗Did Yoko say where she would go?‘ 
because the addressee cannot answer the example (31) with ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘. The meaning of 
example (31) is close to ‗Where did Yoko say she would go?‘ When a speaker wants to ask 




indirect evidentials tee and hazi also refuse to co-occur, with a question marker. They 
never appear even in interrogative flip or rhetorical questions. I will return to this 
issue in the next chapter. 
     The interrogative sentences which I have presented so far contain a question 
marker outside of the Reportative Ndi. Let us now turn to investigate the other type 
of Reportative in interrogative sentences, in which a question marker appears inside 
Ndi. The meaning conveyed by this type of syntactic order indicates that the speaker 
simply repeats the addressee‘s utterance as a mediator.  
 
Context: Ken‘s mother asks Ken whether he is going to school, by using a question 
such as gaQkoo Nkai ʔic-u-m-i? ‗Are you going to school?‘ Ken did not hear the 
question, so his sister who has heard what their mother said repeated it again for 
Ken. Ken‘s sister told Ken: 
(32) gaQkoo Nkai  ʔic-u-m-i     Ndi. 
    school  to    go-IMPF-DIR-Q REP 
    p = Are you going to school? 
    EV=Speaker hears p and repeats p. 
 
The speaker of example (32), Ken‘s sister simply repeated what her mother had said 
so that Ken can hear the question again. Therefore, the original question uttered by 
Mother is marked by Ndi. The closest English translation would be ‗Mother asked if 
you were going to school‘, though the subject and main verb ‗ask‘ is not actually 
uttered. In this case, speaker is simply playing a role as a mediator.
26
 This usage can 
be observed in wh-questions, as in (33). 
 
Context: Ken‘s mother asks Ken where he is going, with an utterance such as maa 
Nkai ʔic-u-ga? ‗Where are you going?‘ Ken did not hear the question, so his 
sister who has heard what their mother said repeated it again for Ken. Ken‘s 
sister told Ken: 
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(33) maa  Nkai  ʔic-u-ga  Ndi. 
    where to    go-IMPF-Q REP 
    p = Where are you going? 
    EV=Speaker hears p and repeats p. 
 
The closest English translation of example (33) would be ‗Mother asked where you 
were going.‘ Since there is a wh-question maa ‗where‘, a question marker ga is used 
before Ndi. Recall example (31) which allows the appearance of either of two kinds 
of question markers, either ga or -i. When the original question is embedded inside 
of the Reportative Ndi as in example (33), there is no option to choose -i instead of 
ga in interrogative sentences with a wh-question marker. It implies that the speaker 
in this case is simply a mediator of the utterance; therefore the speaker should repeat 
what the original source of the report had said.  
     In this section, I have demonstrated the following points. 
1) The Reportative Ndi can appear in negative sentences. In this case, evidential 
meaning is not negated but only the proposition is negated.  
2) There are two kinds of questions that can co-occur with the Reportative evidential. 
The usages of these two kinds of questions are restricted in that neither of them 
can be used to initiate conversation.   
(i) Cases in which the speaker wants to make sure of what the original source of 
information had said. (A question marker appears outside of Ndi.) 
(ii) Cases in which the speaker simply repeats the question by the original source of 




4.3  Whether Reported evidential express the speaker’s 
degree of (un)certainty 
 
In this section, I will examine whether the Reportative evidential conveys speaker‘s 
degree of (un)certainty. This will allow us to pursue the issue of whether the 
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It is possible to have both question markers; inside and outside, when a speaker wants to make 
sure whether the addressee had asked a particular question. For example, the question marker -i 
can be attached to the end of the sentence in example (32) if the speaker wants to make sure 
whether or not the addressee asked Are you going to school?. In case of example (33), the 
question marker can be also attached to the end of the sentence, however, it seems to be very rare 





Reportative evidential should indeed be regarded as an evidential rather than as 
epistemic modality, as has been discussed in the literature. To address this question, I 
will apply the test of Moore‘s Paradox, to see how sentences with the Reportative 
evidential behave. This is the same test as I have already applied to the other 
evidentials; the direct evidential in 2.4.1 and the Inferential and the Assumed 
evidentials in 3.5.  
While the test applied to the Inferential and Assumed evidentials shows that 
denying a speaker‘s belief just after making an assertion makes the sentence 
awkward, example (34) below is a case where the Reportative behaves differently 
from the other two evidentials. 
 
(34) a. ʔami  hut-oo-N    Ndi.   
      rain  rain-CON-DIR  REP 
      p = ‗It is raining.‘ 
      EV = Speaker hears p. 
 
b. ʔami  hut-oo-N    Ndi.  jasiga ʔaN ʔumuw-aN 
      rain  rain-CON-DIR  REP   but  so  think-NEG 
      ―I heard (Someone says) it is raining but I don‘t think so.‖ 
 
As can be seen, (34b) is completely acceptable. A speaker of example (34) does not 
have to believe what he/she heard of. It is true that the reliability could vary 
depending on who the source of information is. If the source of information is a 
highly reliable person, it would be difficult to deny what this person said. However, 
even without a special context like this, example (34b) sounds natural; therefore, the 
test result of example (34b) suggests that the Reportative Ndi does not convey the 
speaker‘s degree of (un)certainty. Moreover, the Reportative Ndi does not contribute 
any information about the speaker‘s commitment to the embedded proposition at all. 
Therefore, the Reportative can be followed by sentences which indicate that the 
speaker does not believe that the proposition is true, as example (35a) indicates. 
Equally, the Reportative can be followed by sentences which indicate that the 





Context: Speaker has talked to Ken over the phone and reports what Ken has said. 
(35) a. ʔami  hut-oo-N   Ndi.  jasiga huntoo ʔaraN joo. 
      rain  rain-CON-DIR REP  but   true   not   FP 
      p = ‗It is raining. But this is not true.‘ 
      EV = It is said that it is raining.  
 
b. ʔami  hutooN      Ndi.   jakutu  ciQtu   hut-oo-sa. 
      rain  rain-CON-DIR REP    so    definitely rain-CON- FP 
      p = ‗It is raining. So it is definitely raining.‘
28
 
     EV = It is said that it is raining.‘ 
 
The speaker of example (35a) simply reported what Ken has said and just afterwards 
the speaker expresses that he/she does not believe what Ken said. It is possible that 
the speaker knows that Ken always tells lies or the speaker has more reliable 
evidence which proves that it is not actually raining. This means that the Reportative 
does not convey speaker‘s certainty. Contrastively, example (35b) shows that the 
Reportative does not convey a low degree of speaker‘s certainty either. As can be 
seen, a sentence that indicates the speaker‘s degree of certainty toward the 
proposition can follow a sentence with the Reportative. Consequently, this test 
demonstrates that the Reportative conveys neither a high nor a low degree of 
speaker‘s certainty. That means that the Reportative does not convey any information 
about the speaker‘s commitment to the proposition.  
To sum up, though the Inferential evidential tee and the Assumed evidential 
hazi imply the speaker‘s degree of certainty/belief, this test demonstrate that the 
Reportative is a pure evidential because it conveys no information about the 
speaker‘s degree of certainty or the speaker‘s commitment to the proposition.  
 
4.4  Summary  
 
In this chapter, I demonstrated that the Reportative evidential has three functions. 
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 I attempted to find an expression such as ‗This is true‘ to make the examples (34a) and (34b) 
parallel, but my consultants insist that that kind of utterance does not sound natural. Thus, I have 
used the phrase ‗It is definitely raining‘ instead. It will be worthwhile to pursue why that kind of 




First, the Reportative Ndi is used to mark information which the speaker has acquired 
from an oral source, including second-hand information, third-hand information and 
folklore. Second, the Reportative Ndi can be used to mark information which has 
been acquired through the use of language including written information. Third, the 
Reportative Ndi can be omitted when the information is assimilated and also falls 
into the speaker‘s territory of information. 
     Moreover, I demonstrated that the Reportative evidential Ndi can co-occur 
with all types of tense and aspect. With regard to the interaction between the 
Reportative evidential and the Direct evidential, it becomes clear that when the 
Direct evidential -N appears with Reportative evidential, it should anchor to the third 
person, not the speaker or the hearer.  
It was also demonstrated in this chapter that although the Reportative Ndi can 
appear in negative sentences, evidential meaning itself is not negated, but only the 
proposition is negated. As for questions, two kinds of questions can co-occur with the 
Reportative evidential, but the usages of these two kinds of questions are restricted in 
that neither of them can be used to initiate conversation.   
Finally, I discuss the question of whether or not the Reportative is a true 
evidential rather than conveying epistemic modality. I showed that when the test of 
Moore‘s Paradox is applied, the result does not indicate awkwardness. I argued 
therefore that the Reportative is a pure evidential because it conveys no information 















Chapter 5   
Evidentials as a grammatical category 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2 through to Chapter 4, I have focused on investigating each evidential in 
Luchuan. Now I move on to providing more of an overall view of all the evidentials 
in Luchuan, including interactions between evidentials and theoretical investigations 
paying attention to the functions of each evidential. In section 5.2, I will demonstrate 
that the double marking of evidentials does not give rise to any contradiction. In 5.3, 
I will investigate whether the category of evidential can be distinguished from the 
category of epistemic modality. To discuss the theoretical issues is challenging, but I 
attempt to demonstrate what I can clarify from the analysis of Luchuan. 
 
5.2  Double marking of evidentials  
 
Now that we have a clear understanding (on the basis of Chapter 2 to 4) about the 
direct and indirect evidentials and the relations between these evidentials and each 
aspect and tense in Luchuan, I will move on to discuss cases in which evidentiality is 
marked twice. I have already examine the interaction between the Direct evidential 
with other indirect evidentials (Inferential and Reportative) in 3.3.2 and 4.2.2., but in 
this section, I will investigate the all the possibilities of double marking of 
evidentials. The main purpose of this section is to show that double marking of 
evidentials does not give rise to any contradiction or incoherency. In this context, 
Aikhenvald (2004) states that ―marking evidentiality more than once is different 
from the multiple expression of any other category: it is never semantically 
redundant‖ (p88). Aikhenvald presents four types of multiple marking of evidentials 
and claims that ―having several evidentiality markers in one clause allows speakers 
to express subtle nuances relating to types of evidence and information source, either 




marking of evidentials in Luchuan and I will also show whether they are interrelated 
with or independent of each other. 
The evidential system in Luchuan, as we have seen, consists of one direct 
evidential -N and three indirect evidentials tee, hazi, and Ndi. As was shown in Table 
1 in Chapter 1 and 2 (repeated below for convenience), the Direct evidential -N 
should always precede evidential (2) (tee, hazi) and evidential (3) (Ndi), and also, the 
Reportative evidential -Ndi in the final slot should not be followed by any other 
evidential. Not all combinations of the evidential elements in the three evidential 
slots are possible. The only three that co-occur are (i) -N + tee, (ii) -N + Ndi, and (iii) 
hazi + Ndi.  
 





















                     Table 1. Morphology of finite verbs  
 
Before examining these three combinations, I first start to explain the three 
elements in the slot of evidential (1). As was illustrated in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, 
-ru and -sa do not encode evidential meaning though they implicate it. (They are 
included here under the heading of EV(1) only because this is the slot which they 
occupy when they occur in a sentence.) An example of -ru occurring without the 
Assumed evidential hazi is given in (1). The constituent marked by du is presented as 
new information, in focus, while the rest of the information is presented as old. Thus, 
(1) implies that the speaker has evidence to make an assertion in terms of old 
information, but -ru itself does not clarify the source of information.  
 
(1)  ʔari ga-du  ʔic-u-ru. 
    he  NM AP  go-IMPF-ATTR   
    ‗It is he who will go.‘ 
 
The meaning of -sa does not clarify the source of information either. For example, 




all. According to Uemura (1961), -sa is used to objectivize propositional information. 
It is different from an inferential, since it can be used to describe ongoing events, as 
shown in (2). 
 
Context: The addressee said she would have to write a document, but the speaker 
sees Ryu already writing the document now. The speaker lets the addressee 
know what he can see now.  
(2)  ʔuri,  Ryu ga  kac-oo-sa.  
    Look, Ryu NM write-CON-FP 
    ‗Look, Ryu is writing (the document).‘ 
 
The function of -sa appears to be that it describes an event as if it is well-shared by 
all participants of the conversation; thus, (3a) sounds as though the information is 
shared between the speaker and the hearer and the speaker expects that the hearer 
would agree or sympathize with the speaker. It may be useful to consider an example 
of -sa in the past tense. The sentence with -sa in past tense sounds odd in (3b). 
Probably the use of -sa is deictic in that the sentence with -sa fits well only at the 
time of utterance, though the further investigation will be required.  
 
(3) a. ʔari ga  ʔic-u-sa. 
     he NM  go-IMPF-FP   
     ‗He will go‘ 
 
   b.?? ʔari ga  Nz-a-sa. 
       he NM  go-PAST-FP 
     Intended meaning: ‗He went.‘  
 
Before returning to the argument concerning the double marking of evidentials, 
let me clarify whether -ru and -sa can appear with any evidential markers. The 
combination of -ru and hazi is obviously possible, as we already saw in 3.4. Hazi 
cannot be used with either -N or -sa. Interestingly, as Table 2 shows, tee cannot 
co-occur with either -ru or -sa, but Ndi in the final slot seems to be able to co-occur 




-ru and -sa appear with Ndi, the sentence sounds like a direct quote in which the 
lexical verb such as ‗tell‘ or ‗say‘ is omitted. Considering this, we should probably 
conclude the following: -N can be used with tee and Ndi; -ru can basically appear 
only with hazi; and -sa does not co-occur with any evidentials. Since I do not 
consider -ru or -sa to be an evidential (for the reaso stated above), the possible 
combinations of evidentials in Table 2 are two: -N+tee and -N+ Ndi.  
 







-N+ tee √ 
-ru+tee × 
-sa+ tee × 
-N+hazi× 





Table 2. Possible combinations of -N, -ru, -sa and indirect evidentials 
 
Next, let us start investigating the co-occurrence possibilities among all three indirect 
evidentials.   
 







  Table 3. Possible combinations of indirect evidentials 
 
The two elements in evidential (2), tee and hazi, are mutually exclusive; thus let us 
examine whether these two elements can co-occur with Ndi which appears in the 
final slot. As Table 3 shows, tee does not co-occur with Ndi, but hazi does. Table 2 
and Table 3 show that three combinations in total are actually possible; (i) -N + tee, 
(ii) -N + Ndi, (iii) hazi + Ndi as illustrated in (4)-(6) below. Example (4) illustrates 
the combination of -N and tee, example (5) the combination of -N and Ndi, and 





Context: Speaker sees the wet ground and infers that it rained. 
(4) ami  hut-ee-N  tee.    [ (i)-N + tee] 
    rain rain-M-DIR  INF 
    p=‗It must have rained.‘ 
EV1=Speaker has direct evidence (wet ground). 
EV2=Speaker infers p based on EV1. 
 
Context: Someone told the speaker that Yoko had bought a hat. 
(5)  Yoko  ja  boosi  koo-ta-N  Ndi.     [(ii)-N + Ndi] 
    Yoko TOP  hat  buy-PAST-DIR REP 
    p =‗Yoko bought a hat.‘ 
    EV1= Source of information has direct evidence of p. 
    EV2=Speaker acquires p from someone.  
 
Context: Someone told the speaker that Lisa may be coming. 
(6) Lisa ga  cu-u-ru         hazi   Ndi.      [(iii) hazi + Ndi] 
   Lisa NM  come-IMPF-ATTR ASSUM  REP 
   p=‗Lisa is coming‘ 
   EV1:The source of information infers p. 
   EV2:The speaker hard p which contains EV1. 
 
Now let me mention two combinations which do not actually occur, namely 
-N+hazi or tee+hazi. Taking -N+hazi first, recall that in Chapter 3, in 3.4, I explained 
that hazi is attached to the adnominal form marked by -ru, not the conclusive form 
marked by -N. Thus the impossibility of the combination of -ru and hazi seems to 
derive from syntactic reasons. As for tee+hazi, I have not yet reached a conclusion on 
why tee and Ndi can co-occur but tee and hazi does not; I assume that these two 
concepts, inference and assumption, are too close to co-occur. This issue needs 
further investigation.  
Next, let us consider the meanings which these combinations (4)-(6) convey. 
At first glance, they may appear to be semantically redundant or incoherent because 
of the meanings of each evidential concerned. But I will demonstrate that this is not 




we need to pay attention to is who the evidential is anchored to or ―belongs to‖; Who 
gained the information (from whatever kind of source) is indicated by the evidential. 
It is possible that both evidentials could anchor to the speaker him/herself, or that one 
of the evidentials could anchor to someone other than the speaker. That is, the two 
evidentials are independent in terms of who each one anchors to. Example (4) 
actually demonstrates the most complex type of double marking, and so I will leave 
it for now and return to it after discussing the other two combinations.      
Example (5) contains the Direct evidential -N and the Reportative Ndi and 
each evidential is anchored to a different speaker. For instance, the Direct evidential 
-N is anchored to either the subject (Yoko) herself or the (unspecified) person who 
told the speaker about Yoko‘s purchase, and the Reportative Ndi is anchored to the 
speaker who utters the sentence. To be precise, -N indicates that the person whose 
speech is being reported by the utterer of (5) had direct evidence that Yoko bought a 
hat; Ndi indicates that the speaker then heard this information. Moreover, (5) could 
be interpreted as secondhand (from the agent or a witness of the agent‘s action) 
information. In this case, the Direct evidential -N should be regarded as anchoring to 
the unspecified person other than the source of information and the speaker. In either 
case, the two evidentials in (5) should be interpreted as belonging to two different 
people.  
In (6), the Assumed evidential hazi could perhaps reflect the assumption of an 
unspecified person who then reported their assumption to the speaker; the 
Reportative Ndi is then anchored to the speaker who utters the example (6). However 
the most natural interpretation is that hazi indicates that the person whose speech is 
being reported by the utterer of (6) assumed the proposition; Ndi indicates that the 
speaker then heard this information. In addition to this typical reading, this 
combination could be ambiguous, that hazi might also be anchored to the current 
speaker. For example, the speaker was told p, which does not include the assumption 
by the reported speaker, but the current speaker assumes that p is true based on the 
report.
1
 In this case, hazi is anchored to the current speaker.  
As these examples (5) and (6) show, both the Direct and Assumed evidential 
can be combined with the Reportative without any semantic incoherence or 
inconsistency.  
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     Similar cases have been observed in other languages. Aikhenvald (2004) 
describes a similar usage in Tsafiki, which has a four-term evidential system. 
Aikhenvald states that in Tsafiki, ―Reported evidential can combine with any of the 
other three, indicating ‗the type of information the original informant had for the 
assertion‘‖ (p90). The Reportative Ndi in Luchuan cannot combine with all the other 
three, but only the two, Direct and Assumed. The type of information the original 
information had for the assertion always comes first in Luchuan and the speaker‘s 
own evidential, Ndi, comes later. According to Aikhenvald (2004), ―the position of 
individual evidential markers is language specific. In Tsafiki, the final evidential in a 
string refers to the source of information for the speaker who produces the actual 
utterance. In Bora, the evidential with the same type of reference comes first in the 
string‖ (p.91). In the case of Luchuan, if a Luchuan sentence contains any evidentials, 
at least the final one must anchor to the speaker. If there is more than one evidential, 
only the pre-final ones may anchor to some other person, although they may also 
anchor to the speaker - such as the Direct evidential -N in the combination of [(i) -N 
+ tee] and the Assumed evidential hazi in the combination of [(ii) hazi + Ndi], which 
I introduced as an ambiguous usage addition to the typical usage.  
     Now let us return to example (4). Unlike the other two cases (5) and (6), in (4) 
both -N and tee anchor to the speaker; they are interrelated. According to Aikhenvald 
(2004), four types of double markings of information source occur in language; one 
of the ones that she lists seems to be what we find with the combination of -N and tee. 
She defines it as follows (7). 
 
(7) Information acquired by the author of the statement comes from two sources, one 
marked by E(vidential) 1 and the other by the E2. E1 and E2 either confirm or 
complement each other. (Aikhenvald 2004:88) 
 
Valenzuela (2003:44-6), cited in Aikhenvald (2004:89), states that ―the direct 
evidential in Shipibo-Konibo can combine with an inferred evidential, to indicate 
that the reasoning or speculation is based upon evidence coming from the speaker‖. 
The speakers of Shipibo-Konibo use the inferred evidential ―as a way of interpreting 
the evidence acquired visually‖ (Aikhenvald 2004:89). The case of Luchuan is not 




some type of evidence they have acquired: in Shipibo-Konibo the evidence must 
have been acquired visually, but as I discussed in Chapter 2, in Luchuan the meaning 
of the Direct evidential is wider. As I showed in Chapter 3, section 3.3.2, the primary 
meaning conveyed by this combination (-N + tee) is that the speaker acquired 
evidence for inference based on direct evidence (perception, typically visual, but 
possibly also auditory or olfactory). More precisely, this combination indicates that 
the speaker draws an assumption based on direct evidence or best evidence (best 
possible ground) as I discussed in Chapter 3. For example, the utterance in (4) above 
could be used in a number of different contexts, but in this context the natural 
interpretation is that the evidence was perceptual. And further, as we have seen, when 
perceptual evidence is unavailable, best evidence, such as a report from a person who 
witnesses the wet ground, licenses the use of the combination of -N and tee.      
These facts show that the combination of the Direct evidential -N and the 
Inferential evidential tee encodes that the speaker makes an inference based on what 
I have called ―best evidence‖ – overwhelmingly the most common case of which is 
perceptual evidence.
2
 Therefore, in this case, the direct evidential and the indirect 
evidential can be considered to complement each other, as described in Aikhenvald‘s 
type (ii) double evidentials, cited above.  
     Double evidential marking in Luchuan can be summarized as follows. 
(1) There are three kinds of combinations of two evidentials; (i) -N + tee, (ii) -N + 
Ndi, (iii) hazi + Ndi. At least the evidential which appears in final position in the 
string must anchor to the speaker.  
(2) When -N and tee occur together they are interrelated in that both of them are 
anchored to the speaker. This combination means that the speaker makes an 
inference based on direct/best evidence, generally perceptual evidence.  
(3) With the other two combinations (-N + Ndi and hazi + Ndi), each evidential is 
anchored to a different person. The first one in the string (i.e. either -N or hazi 
respectively) anchors to the person who reported what the speaker of the 
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 A possible example of best evidence other than report from a participant in the event would be 
the speaker‘s habitual knowledge, as in (i) below. Context: The window frame is broken. The 
speaker knows that Chris, her brother, is good at fixing and that he always helps her. 
(i) Chris ga noosj-u-N tee.  
   Chris NM fix-IMPF-DIR INF 
   p= ‗Chris will fix (it).‘ 
   EV=Speaker infers p.  




utterance then relays, with the Reportative thus anchoring to this speaker. (Note 
that hazi in the combination of hazi + Ndi could be anchored to the current 
speaker as a less dominant usage when the speaker makes an assumption on the 
basis of someone‘s report.) 
 
5.3  Epistemic modality and Evidentials in Luchuan 
 
In this section, I will review what I examined for each evidentials, focusing on 
speaker‘s degree of certainty in direct and indirect evidentials, and how each 
evidential behaves in negative and interrogative sentences. Through these 
investigations, I attempt to construct my own proposal on the question of whether or 
not evidentiality should be distinguished from epistemic modality.  
 
5.3.1  Speaker’s degree of certainty in Direct and Indirect 
evidentials 
 
In Chapter 2, Section 2.4.1, using Moore‘s Paradox, I discussed whether the Direct 
evidential -N conveys thr speaker‘s degree of certainty. I alo discussed the cases of 
the Inferred and Assumed evidentials in Chapter 3, Section 3.5, and then discussed 
the cases of the Reportative evidential in Chapter 4, Section 4.3. In this chapter, I 
attempt to compile these discussions in order to distill what I can conclude from 
these investigations. 
     The test result shows that the speaker cannot immediately deny the truth of a 
proposition that s/he has just expressed in a sentence that makes use of the Direct 
evidential. This implies that sentences with the Direct evidential communicate the 
degree of certainty on the part of the speaker.  
With regards to the Inferred and Assumed evidentials, the test results show that 
the speaker cannot immediately deny the truth of a proposition when the sentences 
contain either of the Inferred or Assumed evidentials. On the other hand, I 
demonstrated that the Reportative evidential does not convey the speaker‘s degree of 
certainty nor uncertainty, since the speaker can deny or agree to the proposition.  
     This results indicate that the Direct evidential -N, the Inferential evidential tee, 




Reportative evidential Ndi conveys no information about the speaker‘s degree of 
certainty or the speaker‘s commitment to the proposition.  What we need to 
consider next is that this test result can conclude that evidentiality in Luchuan should 
be considered as epistemic modality because three of the four appear to convey 
speaker‘s degree of certainty. This discussion will continue in the next section. 
 
5.3.2  Direct and Indirect evidentials in negative and 
interrogative sentences 
 
1n 2.4.2, I examined whether or not the Direct evidential can be the focus of negation 
or questioning, in order to see whether or not the evidential takes wider scope than 
other grammatical categories including epistemic modality (for example, see de Haan 
1999). I explained that the Direct evidential does not appear in negative sentences in 
non-past tense; but the sentences imply that the speaker has direct evidence, as the 
positive sentence does. Then, I argued that the Direct evidential -N possibly does 
exist, but it appears to be omitted because it is phonetically identical to the final 
consonant immediately after the negative morphemes -aN. Thus the lack of overt 
realization of the Direct evidential may be simply for this phonological reason. In 
fact, the Direct evidential -N appears in the past tense, where the phonological 
environment is different from the one in non-past tense. That is to say, since the same 
phonemes, double -N, do not appear in past tense, the Direct evidential maintains its 
overt realization. We saw from the existence of the Direct evidential in negative 
sentence that the direct evidential does not scope below negation since the evidential 
meaning itself is not negated.  
     Regarding the behavior of the Direct evidential in interrogative sentences, I 
explained that the Direct evidential appears in non-past tense but not in past tense. I 
demonstrated that when it appears in interrogative sentences, again, the evidential 
meaning is not questioned. Evidential meaning is maintained as an interrogative flip, 
which means that the speaker expects the addressee to base his/her answer on the 
Direct evidential. Even the fact that the Direct evidential does not appear in the 
interrogative in the past tense is congruent with my proposal that evidential meaning 
cannot be the focus of a question. To recap, the survey in 2.4.2 shows that the 




meaning of the direct evidential is not questioned. 
     Now, let us move on to investigate indirect evidentials. I will summarize the 
properties of the three indirect evidentials concerning negation and questions, which 
I mentioned in Chapter 3, Section 3.3.3, Section 3.4.3, and Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3. 
First, Table 1 summarizes the behaviour of the three indirect evidentials which I have 
analyzed in this chapter in terms of their occurrence in negative sentences. 
 
 non-past past 
tee √ X 
hazi √ √ 
Ndi √ √ 
Table 1  Acceptability of three indirect evidentials in negative sentences. 
 
Table 1 shows whether or not each evidential can appear in negative sentences. Table 
1 shows that all three evidentials can appear in non-past tense. Although the 
inferential evidential tee does not appear in past negative sentences,
3
 the Assumed 
evidential and the Reportative evidential can appear in past negative sentences.  
     Next, let us consider which part of the sentence is negated; the proposition or 
evidential meaning.  
 
 Proposition Evidentiality 
tee √ n/a 
hazi √ X 
Ndi √ X 
Table 2 The scope of negation. 
 
Table 2 shows that there is no case in which the evidential meaning is negated; the 
part that is negated is always the proposition only. This result indicates that all 
indirect evidentials can appear together with negative morphology (except for the 
Inferential in past tense), yet evidential meanings are never negated. In other words, 
indirect evidentials cannot scope under negation. In many languages, 
grammaticalized evidentials cannot co-occur within the scope of a negation (Willet 
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1998, de Haan 1999:3, Faller 2002). So now we have seen that this generalization 
also extends to Luchuan.
4
  
     Now, let us move to a summary of how the three indirect evidentials behave in 
interrogative sentences. Table 3 shows that the only evidential that can appear in 
interrogative sentences is the Reportative; therefore, there is no way for the 
Inferential and the Assumed to be the focus of the question. As I have explained 
above, even rhetorical questions are not possible with the other two evidentials. 
However, recall that the Reportative is used in interrogative sentences only in very 
restricted and exceptional ways, as I explained in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3. That is, 
there are two kinds of questions that can co-occur with the Reportative evidential, 
but neither of the usages of these two kinds of questions can be used to initiate 
conversation. Note that the interrogative flip is allowed when the reportative appears 
in a Wh-question, but evidential meaning, is not the focus of question even in the 
case of interrogative flip. It simply means that the speaker expects that the 
addressees‘ answer would be based on reported evidence. 
 
 non-past past 
tee n/a n/a 
hazi n/a n/a 
Ndi X X 
Table 3  The focus of questions 
 
Even the reportative cannot be the focus of the question; thus, no evidentials can be 
questioned, as Table 3 indicates. In section 4.2.3, I provided examples to help 
analyze how the Reportative Ndi behaves in interrogative sentences. Some of the 
examples were to clarify what the original source of information has said, as in 
examples (26)-(31), and the rest of them are simply to repeat what the source of 
information has said for the current addressee, as in examples (32) and (33).  
     Table 2 and Table 3 indicate that none of the indirect evidentials can appear in 
the scope of negation or in the focus of a question. Also, as I briefly reviewed in the 
beginning of this section, the Direct evidential does not appear in the scope of 
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 This is not universal but just a generalization because in some languages evidentials can be 




negation or the focus of a question. This common point is a strong argument for my 
conclusion that they belong to the same grammatical category.  
 
5.3.3  -N is an evidential not an epistemic modality marker  
 
In Section 5.3.1 above, the Direct evidential -N, the Inferential evidential tee, and the 
Assumed evidential hazi can convey speaker‘s degree of certainty, but the 
Reportative evidential Ndi conveys no information about the speaker‘s degree of 
certainty or the speaker‘s commitment to the proposition. Then in Section 5.3.2, I 
have demonstrated that the direct and indirect evidentials in Luchuan cannot be 
negated or questioned. Now, I move on to examining whether or not these evidentials 
should be classified as markers of epistemic modality. First, let us consider the case 
of the Direct evidential. 
In seeking to substantiate the claim that -N is an evidential, not a marker of 
epistemic modality, first let me introduce how -N has been analyzed in the literature, 
although unfortunately there are not many studies specifically about this morpheme. 
In the Dictionary of Okinawan Language, Uemura (1963:63) states that the 
morpheme -N which appears in the end of verb forms seems to originally come from 
*m, which used to express a speaker‘s subjective judgment in Old Japanese.
5
 
Uemura (2003:84) also calls -N the m-ending and states that ―the m-ending 
conclusive expresses a judgement or decision made at the time‖.
6
 He classifies this 
m-ending as indicative mood. Miyara (2002:84) presents a similar account, 
according to which the morpheme -N indicates the speaker‘s mental attitude. He 
states that -N is a marker of indicative mood expressing the event as a fact.
7
 It seems 
that Uemura and Miyara basically agree on two points: first, -N indicates the 
speaker‘s judgement, and second, it is a mood marker. However, as I have proposed, 
the -N ending is a direct evidential rather than a mood marker. -N does indicate the 
speaker‘s judgement as the test result in Section 2.4.1 shows, but this does not mean 
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 In diachronic studies, the mark * indicates not ungrammaticality but the reconstructed form. 
6
 Uemura compares the m-ending and another form, the ri-ending, which he considers ‗expresses 
a fact which is already known to the speaker or already decided‘ (2003:84). I will not discuss the 
ri-ending because this form is not used in Shuri dialect, which is the main subject of this 
dissertation.   
7
 To be precise, Miyara uses the term jyojyutuhoo in Japanese and I interpret it as equivalent to 




that we have to conclude that this is the primary meaning that -N encodes. But it is 
true that the concept of speaker‘s judgement is normally treated in the category of 
modality. Should -N therefore be considered to belong the category of modality? If 
not, could the concepts of evidentiality and modality be indicated at the same time? 
In existing studies, this problem has been discussed by many researchers.  
Let us review the arguments concerning the boundary between evidentiality 
and modality that were overviewed in Chapter 1. Although the details of the 
viewpoints are different among scholars, most researchers agree that the term 
―evidentiality‖ can be used in two ways; in a narrow sense or in a broad sense. The 
narrow sense is restricted in its meaning to conveying the source of information; the 
broad sense also expresses the speaker‘s attitude toward knowledge as well (Chafe 
1986:262). The narrow sense appears to indicate purely evidential meaning, but the 
broad seems to straddle the categories of evidentiality and modality, and it has 
therefore been discussed whether these two concepts are in the relation of disjunction 
(completely different), inclusion (one of the categories includes the other), or overlap 
(partial crossover) (Dendale 2001). Some researchers consider that evidentiality is a 
subcategory of modality (Bybee 1985, Palmer 1986) and some regard the categories 
as partially overlapping (Izvorski 1997, Garrett 2001, Faller 2002, McCready and 
Ogata 2007).    
On the other hand, de Haan (1999) claims that the two concepts should be 
distinguished from each other because they are semantically different, in that 
evidentiality indicates the source of information and modality indicates the speaker‘s 
commitment to the statement. He also claims that even though evidentiality and 
modality overlap in some languages, this property is not universal. Similarly 
Aikhenvald insists that evidentiality is an independent grammatical category (2003, 
2004).
8
 Aikhenvald claims that evidentiality is an independent category, but she 
does not exclude the possibility that evidentials may express the speaker‘s attitude or 
commitment. She claims that ‗evidentials may acquire secondary meanings―of 
reliability, probability, and possibility (known as epistemic extensions), but they do 
not have to‘ (2004:6).
9
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 However this does not mean that Aikhenvald (2004) and de Haan (1999) share all the essential 
grounds of the definition of evidentiality since Aikhenvald criticizes some parts of de Haan‘s 
analysis. 
9




The main purpose of this dissertation is not to attempt to clarify the universal 
boundaries of these grammatical categories; however, as far as the specific case of 
Luchuan is concerned, I claim that while evidentiality in Luchuan can express the 
speaker‘s attitude toward the proposition expressed, it does not necessarily do so. To 
be more precise, the direct and indirect evidentials in Luchuan appear to carry 
information about the speaker‘s attitude or commitment (as I reviewed in 5.3.1), but 
the reportative evidential does not. Thus, encoding the speaker‘s attitude does not 
seem to be a necessary feature of evidentials.  
There is one more reason why I consider that evidentials in Luchuan should be 
distinguished from epistemic modality. Although the direct evidential -N conveys the 
speaker‘s certainty, it does not seem appropriate to regard it as an epistemic modality 
marker. This is because in the literature, it has been suggested that modal assertions 
are weaker than non-modal assertions (Papafragou 1998, Radden and Dirven 2007). 
However, -N does not seem to convey a weaker assertion compared with other 
assertion, as I demonstrated in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.1. 
Let us apply the same strategy to investigate whether or not the other two 
indirect evidentials; the Inferential and the Assumed evidential, convey weaker 
assertions than non-modal assertions. The Inferential evidential is used in (8a), and 
the Assumed evidential is used in (8b). The non-evidential elements -sa and -ru are 




(8) a. wain ja  Ken  ga  kooj-u-N      tee 
     wine TOP Ken NM  buy-IMPR-DIR  INF 
     p=‗Ken will buy wine.‘ 
     EV= Speaker infers that p. 
 
                                                                                                                                                
depending on the individual language system. However the fact that the reportative evidential 
does not convey epistemic meaning implies that this element is not primary.  
10
 One might think that (8c) and (8d) are not pure non-modal assertions because (8b) contains a 
final particle -sa and -ru, which has a different sentence structure, the kakari-musubi construction 
as I explained in Chapter 2. However, since there are no other pure non-modal assertions which 




b. wain ja  Ken ga  kooj-u-ru       hazi. 
     wine TOP Ken NM buy-IMPR-ATTR  ASSUM 
     p=‗Ken will buy wine.‘ 
     EV= Speaker assumes that p. 
 
   c. wain ja Ken ga kooj-u-sa. 
      wine TOP Ken NM buy-IMPR-FP 
      ‗Ken will buy wine.‘ 
 
   d. wain ja  Ken ga ru  kooj-u-ru. 
     wine TOP Ken NM AP buy-IMPR-ATTR 
     ‗It is Ken who will buy wine.‘ 
 
The sentences (8a) and (8b) sound weaker than (8c) and (8d), unlike the case of the 
Direct evidential. Therefore, the Inferential evidential and the Assumed evidential 
might be an overlapped category between evidentiality and epistemic modality. 
Here I propose that evidentiality and epistemic modality in Luchuan should 
belong to different categories, though as I have just mentioned, the Inferential and 
the Assumed evidential might be overlapped between evidentiality and epistemic 
modality. I present three reasons why I consider that these two categories should be 
differentiated. 
1) Evidentials in Luchuan always clarify the information source but they only 
optionally express the speaker‘s commitment. Although they can express the 
speaker‘s attitude toward the statement, they do not always do so: the reportative 
evidential does not convey modal meaning such as speaker‘s (un)certainty.  
2) Direct evidential -N carries certainty but sentences with -N are not weaker than 
other assertions. Therefore, -N is not an epistemic modality marker. The 
reportative evidential does not convey modal meaning, but the inferential and the 
assumed evidential conveys the speaker‘s uncertainty. Even if inferential 
evidentials convey uncertainty, this does not require that they do not convey 
evidential meanings. 





    Concerning the second of these points: McCready and Ogata (2007) quote de 
Haan‘s (1999) definition that evidentiality and modality should be different, but they 
then state that ‗there is nothing that says a single form cannot encode both types of 
meaning‘ (2007:151). Then they argue that Japanese inferential evidentials indicate 
both meanings. In this dissertation, as I have explained above, I argue that the direct 
and indirect (inferential) evidential in Luchuan can indicate both meanings, but that 
the reportative conveys only evidential meaning. Therefore there is no inconsistency 
in claiming that the direct evidential -N can express both the source of information 
and the speaker‘s judgement.  
     As for the third point, it might be strong enough to claim that evidentiality 
should be differentiated from epistemic modality, because some modals also cannot 
be negated nor questioned. Therefore, I do not lay too much emphasis on this point, 
but I include it just as one more clue for further investigation. 
     
5.4  Summary  
 
In this chapter, I have examined instances of the double marking of evidentials and I 
have concluded that double marking of evidentials does not give rise to any 
contradiction or incoherency. I also demonstrated that two evidentials could be 
collaborated or that either of the evidentials could take wide scope over any other 
evidential.  
I have investigated whether the category of evidential can be separated from 
the category of epistemic modality. The Direct evidential -N conveys the speaker‘s 
degree of certainty, so it may look as if it belonged to the category of modality; 
however, I rejected this idea because the meaning which a sentence with -N conveys 
is not weaker compared with the meaning of a sentence without -N, unlike epistemic 
modality. I conclude that -N is indeed an evidential rather than an expression of 
modality. Moreover, I showed that the meaning of the direct evidential is not 
challenged; it cannot be questioned, agreed, or negated (as in 2.4.2. and 2.4.3). 
Although this is not enough to prove that this pattern is an evidential rather than an 
epistemic modality marker, this investigation indicates that the Direct evidential in 
Luchuan does not contribute to the proposition-level meaning. Further investigation 




Similarly, I argued that the Reportative evidential -Ndi is a pure evidential 
which encodes only the source of information, since it does not convey any epistemic 
meaning, and also the evidential meaning which it conveys is not challenged. With 
respect to the Inferential and Assumed evidentials, they may constitute a category 
where modality and evidentiality overlap. They convey the speaker‘s certainty, and 
unlike the case of the Direct evidential -N, a sentence with tee or hazi sounds weaker 
than a sentence without them. Thus, though the test shows that the Inferential tee and 
the Assumed hazi do not contribute to the proposition, since they possess modal 
features and convey the speaker‘s degree of certainty, I propose that the Inferential 



























Chapter 6  Conclusion 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
In this dissertation I have examined evidentiality in Luchuan from a perspective 
different from all existing studies, treating evidentiality as a grammatical category. In 
Chapter 1, I provided previous arguments concerning evidentiality focusing on the 
definition and typological classification and also I introduced an overview of 
discussions regarding Luchuan studies. In Chapter 2, I described and analysed the 
detailed functions of the Direct evidential -N, and similarly I provided my analysis 
concerning the other indirect evidentials: the Inferential, Assumed, and Reportative 
evidentials. 
     In this chapter, I will outline the main contribution of this study of evidentiality 
in Luchuan in Section 6.2. Then, in 6.3, I will mention some of the remaining issues 
and make suggestions as to how they could be approached.  
 
6.2  Summary of the arguments 
 
6.2.1  Main contributions to the study of evidentiality in 
Luchuan 
 
The main contribution of this study is the detailed description of the evidential verbal 
affixes and sentence final particles, which is discussed in Chapter 2 to Chapter 4. In 
establishing the category of evidentiality in Luchuan grammar, I have discussed four 
major points as follow: 
 
1. Clarification of the definition of evidentiality 
2. Syntactic, morphological, and semantic analysis of each evidential: the Direct 
evidential, Inferential evidential, Assumed evidential, and Reportative evidential. 
3. Morphological reanalysis of the verbal template 





     As for the definition of evidentiality, I first provided Anderson‘s definitions 
(1986: 274-275) and examined its validity, presenting what has been discussed in 
literature. I concluded I basically agreed with Anderson‘s criteria (a) to (c); (a) 
Evidentials show the kind of justification for a factual claim which is available to the 
person making that claim, (b) Evidentials are not themselves the main predication of 
the clause, but are rather a specification added to a factual claim about something 
else, (c) Evidentials have the indication of evidence as in (a) as their primary 
meaning, not only as a pragmatic inference. But I proposed that point (c) should be 
revised adopting Faller‘s (2002:9) definition that ―a true evidential encodes a type of 
source of information, as opposed to (conversationally) implicating it‖. One of the 
important conditions Anderson presented is that the indication of evidence should be 
the ‗primary meaning‘ of a proposed evidential, not only a pragmatic inference 
(Anderson 1986:274). Aikhenvald (2004:3) also states that the ‗primary meaning‘ of 
evidentiality is source of information. However、 Faller attempts to make the concept 
of evidentiality more specific by using the concept of ―encoding‖.
149
 I take encoded 
meaning to be meaning that is not cancellable; in contrast, implicated meaning can 
be cancelled. I adopted this distinction to analyze evidentiality in Luchuan rather 
than whether or not evidential meaning is primary.  
     After clarifying the definition of evidentiality, I moved on to the second point, 
syntactic, morphological, and semantic analysis of each evidential. The major claim 
that should be highlighted most concerns the detailed analysis of the Direct 
evidential -N. In the previous literature, the concept of grammatical evidential has 
not been discussed, and even though the term evidentiality has been mentioned, there 
is no discussion of what the direct evidential (or indirect evidentials) should be. In 
consequence, there is no agreement on related concepts such as what the direct 
evidence, direct experience, and witness are. Therefore, I clarified ―direct evidence‖ 
to mean ―direct experience‖ or ―direct perception‖, and I decided to use ―the best 
possible ground‖ (or, best possible source of information) to include both ―direct 
evidence‖ and the more indirect cases, following the analysis of -mi in Cuzco 
Quechua presented by Faller (2002). Then, I proposed that -N is licensed to be used 
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 What is conversationally implicated is not encoded, but implicated, based on the Cooperative 
Principle and the other more specific maxims that derive from it; therefore an implicature can be 
cancelled (Grice1989). I take this concept of cancellablity to be more specific than that of 




if and only if the speaker has best possible source of information. The similarities 
and differences between -N in Luchuan and -mi in Cuzco Quechua are also closely 
examined.  
     In addition to the Direct evidential -N, in Chapter 3, I described how the 
Inferential and Assumed evidential behave from various points of view, presenting 
specific examples in particular contexts. I claimed that the basic usage of the 
Inferential evidential is based on sensory evidence and the usage of the Assumed 
evidential is, in principle, based on information other than sensory evidence such as 
general knowledge or habitual information. 
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 Concerning the Reportative 
evidential, in Chapter 4, I demonstrated that the Reportative Ndi is used to mark the 
information the speaker acquired from oral source, but can also be used to mark 
information acquired through the use of language including written information. It 
should be noted that the Reportative Ndi can be omitted when the information is 
assimilated and also falls into the speaker‘s territory of information. 
     The third contribution of this dissertation to the study of evidentiality in 
Luchuan is the morphological reanalysis of the verbal template in Luchuan. In the 
previous literature, there is no agreement on the precise morphological constitution 
of the string of verbal affixes nor their semantic functions. Some researchers do not 
analyze the function or meaning of the constituent morphemes and as a result, this 
deficiency has made it difficult and complicated to analyse tense, aspect, mood study 
as well as evidential study in Luchuan. I attempted to assign a consistent one-to-one 
correspondence of affix and meaning.  
     Clarification of the third point above then enabled the fourth contribution of 
this study, which is the analysis of possible combinations between tense, aspect and 
each evidential. It became clear that all evidentials except the Inferential evidential  
can co-occur with all aspects and tenses. As far as the Inferential evidential is 
concerned, it can appear in non-past tense, but not in the past tense. I hypothesize 
this is because required information for the use of the Inferential evidential tee is 
sensory evidence which is available at the time of utterance, but further detailed 
investigation will be required.  
     This study constituted the first substantial investigation of evidential sentence 
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final particles in Luchuan, which includes these original discoveries and descriptions 
above. In addition to these points, the data in this study will also beneficial to the 
documentation of Luchuan as an endangered language, since it contains original data 
based on my own fieldwork.  
 
6.2.1  Contributions to the typological and theoretical 
study  
 
I also discussed typological and theoretical aspects through the overall investigation 
of evidentials in Luchuan. The first point of the typological argument is classifying 
the evidential system in Luchuan into one of the typological classes. I used the model 
presented by Aikhenvald (2004) and proposed that evidential system in Luchuan 
belongs to type C2: Direct (or Visual), Inferred, Assumed, Reported. Luchuan is 
considered as the only sister language of Japanese; therefore, this proposal will 
derive further linguistic questions; what type Japanese evidentials belong to, or how 
different these two languages may have become.  
     Second, in Chapter 5, in Section 5.2, I discussed the double marking of 
evidentials. I showed that double marking of evidentials does not give rise to any 
contradiction or incoherency and provided some similar examples which can be 
found in other languages that were compiled in Aikhenvald (2004). 
     Third, I explored whether or not evidentials convey speaker‘s (un)certainty, to 
argue whether or not evidential can be distinguished from epistemic modality. The 
discussions indicate that the Direct evidential -N, the Inferential evidential tee, and 
the Assumed evidential hazi can convey speaker‘s degree of certainty, but the 
Reportative evidential Ndi conveys no information about the speaker‘s degree of 
certainty or the speaker‘s commitment to the proposition. Moreover, I claimed that 
sentences with the Direct evidential -N do not convey a weaker assertion compared 
with other assertion, but the sentences with Inferential and Assumed evidentials do, 
so I proposed that these evidentials show an overlap between evidentiality and 
epistemic modality. Also, I claimed that the fact that the Inferential and Assumed 
evidential could belong to both evidentiality and epistemic modality does not mean 
that evidentiality should be regarded as subtype of epistemic modality because all 




      
6.3  Remaining issues and possible solutions 
 
6.3.1  Evidentiality and aspect 
 
The sentence that contains an aspect marker appears to be semantically related to 
evidential to some extent. That is, when the Direct evidential appears in simple past 
without any aspect, the sentence simply indicates that the speaker has best evidence 
for the event in the past. However, for example, resultative aspect seems to indicate 
more than just combination of aspect and a direct evidential, requiring the causing 
event besides the resulting event. In this section, I point out the necessity of further 
investigation of semantic relations between aspect and the Direct evidential -N, 
providing the data concerning resultative as examples.  
     Resultatives are described in the literature as indicating that ‗a state exists as a 
result of a past action‘ (Bybee 1994:54). In English, for example, there are two types 
of resultatives: the ‗be‘-perfect and the ‗have‘-perfect (Dahl 1999:290). Bybee (p.63) 
calls the former resultative (or precisely ‗stative passive‘) as in (1a) and the latter 
anterior, as in (1b). Both sentences indicate a sustained state caused by a past action.  
 
(1)  a. The door is closed.     ‗be‘-perfect  (resultative) 
    b. The door has closed.    ‗have‘-perfect  (anterior) 
 
Moreover, resultative constructions (‗be‘-perfect) like (1a) have a close relation to 
passive constructions like (2). With the agent made explicit by the by-phrase, a 
passive reading arises: 
 
(2) The door is closed by the guard.  (passive) 
 
Turning to the syntax: resultatives can be used with intransitive verbs with no 
alternation in the grammatical relation of the subject as in (3a); in contrast, in passive 
constructions, as in (4a), the subject of the resultative form corresponds to the object 





(3)  a They are gone.  (resultative: intransitive) 
    b. They have gone.  
 
(4)  a. The door is closed (by the guard). (resultative/passive : transitive) 
b. The guard closes the door.   
 
There is thus a difference concerning the choice of subject with intransitive and 
transitive verbs; nevertheless, it is true that resultative and passive constructions are 
often very similar when the agent is not expressed. We have seen that resultative, 
passive, and anterior share the property of signaling the state at the reference time 
caused by a past action. As for the difference between them, Bybee (1994:63) states 
that ‗only resultative consistently signals that a state persists at reference time‘. 
Therefore, sentence (5a) is acceptable, whereas (5b) is not acceptable in the 
resultative sense; only the passive reading is acceptable (Bybee 1994:63). 
  
(5)  a. The door has opened and closed several times. 
    b.# The door is closed and opened several times. 
 
The examples above imply that the resultative anchors the state to the reference time 
more firmly than the other two, anterior and passive. Bybee supports this view by 
presenting a study by Nedyalkov and Jaxontov (1988), which points out that the 
anterior (‗have‘-perfect) is not compatible with the adverb ‗still‘ but that the 
resultative (‗be‘-perfect) does allow the appearance of ‗still‘.  
 
(6)   a. The door is still closed.  
      b. The door has still closed. 
 
When still is used in a resultative construction as in (6a), this still indicates a ‗state of 
persistence‘. In contrast, when still is used with the anterior as in (6b), still can only 
have the sense of ‗nevertheless‘. The fact that still is used in the sense of ‗state of 
persistence‘ only with the resultative, not with the anterior, suggests that the 




importance to the action itself rather than the state.
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   Comrie (1976:56-60) classifies perfect into the following four uses: (1) perfect of 
result, (2) experiential perfect, (3) perfect of persistent situation, and (4) perfect of 
recent past. What I call resultative in this dissertation approximately corresponds to 
(1), the perfect of result. Comrie defines the perfect of result as follows: ‗a present 
state is referred to as being the result of some past situation‘ (1976:56).
152
  
In Luchuan, there are not distinct constructions for anteriors or resultatives. 
Therefore, it is not necessary to make a clear distinction between them. Nevertheless, 
the distinction between these concepts is important because the function of ee +N 
seems to be closer to the anterior than to the resultative (‗be‘-perfect). As (7b) shows, 
eeN avoids co-occurrence with the adverb naada ‗still‘. 
 
(7) a. hasiru  micit-ee-N. 
      door   close-RES-DIR 
     ‗The door is closed.‘ (I/somebody have/has closed the door.) 
 
b. #hasiru  naada  miciteeN. 
       door   still    close-RES-DIR 
      ‗The door is still closed.‘ 
 
In this respect, ee + N behaves in a similar way to the anterior in English as shown in 
example (6). However, I call -ee- resultative rather than perfect or anterior because 
this form covers only one function, ‗perfect of result‘, but does not cover the other 
three functions in Comrie‘s classification. Also since there is no need to distinguish 
the ‗have‘-perfect from the ‗be‘-perfect like there is in English, calling the -ee- form 
resultative is simple and sufficiently precise.  
As for the similarity between resultative and passive, no problem arises in 
Luchuan because these two constructions are different enough that the distinction can 
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 Dahl (1985:134) also suggests that anterior is different from a resultative construction 
because the former focuses more on the event than on the state but the latter focuses more on the 
state than on the event, based on the analysis of Swedish presented by Nedjalkov et al. (1983). 
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 Dahl (1985) points out that this definition of Comrie‘s is not precise enough. One of the 
reasons he gives is that this formulation does not distinguish typical resultative sentences like 





be made easily. To make a passive sentence, the suffix -rijuN (which becomes -raQt- 
when it appears with continuative aspect) is attached to the stem, as (8b) shows. 
Moreover, juubaN ‗dinner‘ in (8a) cannot be marked by the nominative case marker, 
while it can in (8b), (although as is usual in Luchuan, this case marker can be 
omitted
153
). As just described, examples (8a,b) illustrate that there is no similarity 
between the resultative and passive in Luchuan, in contrast to English.  
 
(8) a. juubaN  nic-ee-N. 
      dinner  cook-RES-DIR 
      p =‗(I) have cooked dinner.‘ 
      EV= Speaker has direct evidence of p. 
 
b. juubaN  nu ni-raQt-oo-N. 
      dinner  NM cook-PAS-CON-DIR 
      p =‗Dinner is cooked.‘ 
      EV= Speaker has direct evidence of p. 
 
To sum up, the term resultative is used to describe a present state caused by 
events or actions in the past. Comrie claims that this is one of the significant features 
of the perfect of result. This characteristic demonstrates a crucial difference between 
simple past and perfect of result, as (9) illustrates. 
 
 (9) a. John has arrived. 
     b. John arrived.    
(Comrie 1976:56) 
 
According to Comrie, while (9a) indicates persistence of the result of John‘s arrival, 
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 For example, if juubaN ‗dinner‘ is marked by the nominative case marker nu, the sentence 
would be ungrammatical, as in (8‘a). In the case of the passive, the nominative case marker can 
appear but also can be omitted, as in (8‘b). 
(8‘)  a. * juubaN nu  nic-ee-N. 
         dinner NM cook-RES-DIR 
        ‗(I) have cooked dinner.‘ 
      b.  juubaN  ni-raQt-oo-N. 
         dinner   cook-PAS-CON-DIR 




which means John is still here at the time of utterance, (9b) does not convey such a 
meaning.  
    Resultative in Luchuan also indicates persistence of the result. Therefore at the 
time when sentence (10) is uttered, the result of the event, i.e. the bread Ryu bought, 
must exist. The facts that the event took place in the past, i.e. that Ryu bought some 
bread, and the present situation of the persistence of the result, are both important for 
the use of the resultative in Luchuan, just like the English perfect of result.  
 
(10)  Ryu ga  paN   koot-ee-N. 
     Ryu NM  bread  buy-RES-DIR 
     p = ‗Ryu has bought bread.‘ 
     EV = Speaker has direct evidence of p. 
 
In addition to the two criteria I presented above, there is one more important factor 
that can affect the acceptability of the ee + N form. Let us examine example (11a) 
and (11b). 
 
Context: The speaker got to the store but the door is closed.  
(11) a. # (pro) hasiru  micit-ee-N. 
            door  close-RES-DIR 
      ‗Someone has closed the door.‘ 
 
    b. hasiru  micjat-oo-N. 
      door   close-CON-DIR 
      p =‗The door is closed.‘ (resultative not passive) 
      EV= Speaker has direct evidence of p. 
 
Sentence (11a) seems to fulfill the conditions for using resultative, in that there was a 
past event (someone closed the door before the time of utterance), and the result 
persists (the door is closed at the time of utterance). What then makes this sentence 
unacceptable? If the speaker knows who closed the door – for example, if one of the 






(12) hasiroo  Keiko  ga micit-ee-N. 
    door-TOP Keiko NM close-RES-DIR 
    p = ‗Keiko has closed the door.‘ 
    EV = Speaker has direct evidence of p. 
 
On the other hand, in the context of (11), the store is located outside the speaker‘s 
house and the speaker does not know who closed the door. This suggests that eeN 
might have a closer relationship with the agent or the causing event in addition to the 
persistence of the result. If the speaker does not have evidence about the person who 
closed the door, continuative aspect should be used, as in (11b).  
The discussion above implies that an additional factor—a clear relationship 
between the result and the agent, the causing event,—is required for the use of eeN 
on the top of the conditions which determine the use of the resultative in English, 
namely persistence of the result. More precisely, it can be proposed that as a third 
condition for the usage of ee+N, the speaker needs to have a concrete understanding 
that the present situation is produced by a certain agent when the ee+N is used. The 
next examples also illustrate that the speaker cannot use ee+N just on the basis of 
having visual evidence of result. 
 
Context: Passing the vegetable field, someone asks the farmer who is working in the 
field what is planted in the field. The farmer answers. 
(13)  tamanaa   ʔwiit-ee-N. 
     cabbages  plant-RES-DIR 
     p = ‗(I) have planted cabbages.‘
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     EV = Speaker has direct evidence of p. 
 
The translation of (13) focuses on the result (planted cabbages) but it is different 
from the passive in that the agent is also implied. The farmer can use ee+N because 
he planted the cabbages himself. The relation between the causing event and the 
result is clear. But if someone asks about the field next to this farmer‘s, he cannot use 
                                                   
154
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(13) to answer the question. Even if the farmer can see the cabbages, he cannot use 
eeN but instead he would use passive form as in (14) because the passive sentence 
does not necessarily refer to an agent.   
 
(14)  tamanaa nu  wii-raQt-oo-N.  
     cabbages NM plant-PAS-CON-DIR 
     p = ‗Cabbages are planted.‘ 
    EV = Speaker has direct evidence of p. 
 
Since ee+N requires that the speaker has to be sure of the causing event, in other 
words, ee+N cannot be used based on visual evidence only, the speaker needs to use 
a passive sentence which does not require a clear understanding of the connection 
between the result and the causing event. Passive constructions can be used as far as 
the speaker can recognize the present situation. 
    This third factor, specification of the causing event, may remind us of 
discussions of the null pronoun (pro). The phenomenon I have presented above may 
look similar to pronoun deletion. Shibatani (1990) discusses the omission of a 
pronoun and states that ‗even if a subject is overtly missing, the sentence can be 
complete if it is understood to contain a pro in subject position (1990:325)‘.
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 This 
means that a subject can be dropped if a speaker and a hearer can identify the 
dropped subject. However, recall that the farmer cannot talk about other farmer‘s 
action in the next field using sentence (13). Even if the farmer can identify who has 
planted the seeds of cabbages because he knows whose field it is, it is still awkward 
to describe another‘s action using sentence (13). The fact that the speaker cannot 
describe another‘s action with eeN form even if he/she can identify the subject 
suggests that some kind of factor other than pronoun deletion is involved. In the case 
of example (11a), the speaker cannot identify who closes the door. Thus, it may look 
as if sentence (11) is unacceptable because speaker cannot identify the dropped 
subject. But in the example of the farmers, (13) is not acceptable even if the speaker 
knows who has planted the seeds. In the case of other aspects, such as continuative 
-oo-, -oo- can appear with -N if the speaker knows who planted the cabbages. Let us 
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 Luchuan frequently allows zero pronouns, as does Japanese. When the participants of a 
conversation understand the reference, it is much more natural to omit the subject rather than 




examine one more related example. 
 
Context : Someone asks to the farmer what is planted in the next field. He answers: 
(15)  tamanaa   ʔwiit-oo-N. 
     cabbages   plant-CON-DIR 
     p = ‗(pro) is planting cabbages.‘ 
     EV= The speaker has direct evidence of p. 
 
Sentence (15) is acceptable if the speaker knows for sure that the farmer who owns 
the next field is planting the cabbages. Since ongoing action can be easily observed, 
usages of continuative aspect are less restricted than the uses of resultative aspect.  
     As we have seen so far, the use of the resultative is rather complicated and this 
complexity comes from the meaning of resultative -ee- and the direct evidential -N. 
Even if the verbs contain a change of state, speakers must know the causing event 
and must also see the result of the action. Thus visual evidence caused by past action 
should be something tangibly apparent, preferably some physical object. Overt 
evidence is required to use ee+N so that a speaker can make a statement as a fact 
with direct evidence. This kind of relation between aspectual meaning and the Direct 
evidential -N needs to be clarified in future study, including whether or not the other 
aspect such as imperfective or continuative has this kind of feature.  
 
6.3.2  Mirativity 
 
I was not able in this dissertation to investigate the category of mirativity, which 
often appears in arguments concerning evidentiality, especially inferentiality. 
However, mirativity does appear to be a less common interpretation of –ee-. The 
concept of mirativity is described by DeLancey (1997).
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 The major function of this 
category is ‗to mark sentences which report information which is new or surprising 
to the speaker, regardless of whether the information source is first- or second- hand‘ 
(DeLancey 1997: 33). Sentence (19) is acceptable although -ee- is used if it 
expresses the speaker‘s surprise. Note that the morpheme -ee- in this case, in the use 
                                                   
156
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of mirativity, indicates mood that is different from resultative aspect. Recall that -ee- 
as resultative and -ee- as a mood marker can be distinguished because a mood 




Context: Speaker is looking for her glasses and unexpectedly finds them in her own 
glasses case where she thought she had taken a look at first. 
(16) kuma Nkai  ʔat-ee-N! 
    here  LOC  be-M-DIR  
    ‗Here they are!‘ 
 
The speaker is surprised by finding her glasses there because she thought she had 
already checked the case before. When a simple past form of ʔaN, ʔataN ‗was/were‘ 
is used, the sentence with it does not convey such mirative meaning. In other words, 
(16) conveys a sense of surprise, and in fact can only be used felicitously if an 
expression of surprise or novelty is appropriate in the context. Let me provide 
another example which allows the occurrence of -ee- in slightly different sense. 
 
Context: Speaker stopped by at her husband‘s office but he wasn‘t there. But 
unexpectedly she found his bike outside a pub. She thinks he is drinking while on 
duty. 
(17) kuma Nkai  ʔut-ee-N! 
    here  LOC  be-M-DIR 
    ‗Here he is.‘ 
 
However, even though she has not actually found her husband in person, she can uses 
the Direct evidential -N after -ee- based on visual evidence, his bike. The context I 
presented above makes the sentence sound like inference which eeN usually cannot 
be used for without the Inferential evidential tee. I suppose that the reason the Direct 
evidential can be used in such context if the speaker wants to convey surprise. Other 
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 I discussed the reasons why these two morphemes can be distinguished in Chapter 3, Section 
3.2. As I have stated, since the mood marker -ee- cannot co-occur with past tense marker -ta-, 
example (16)‘ below sounds unacceptable.  
(16)‘ * kuma Nkai ʔat-ee-ta-N! 
      here  LOC be-M-PAST-DIR 




than that, sentence (17) is also acceptable if it is right after the speaker has actually 
seen him. In this case, eeN is not inference anymore in that people do not make an 
inference when they find confirming evidence. In this way, ee+N can be used to 
convey mirativity when contexts allow a mirative interpretation. But when ee+N is 
used in this sense, the speaker has to be certain that the bike in (17) is her husband‘s 
own. Although this usage is interesting, it is not typical, because not all sentences 
containing -ee- with the Direct evidential -N have such a mirative meaning. It highly 
depends on contexts in which ee+N is used. What kind of conditions license this 
mirativity reading still remains unclear; thus, further study will be required. 
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6.3.3  Other various remaining issues  
 
Lastly, let me mention briefly some other remaining issues. In the literature, it is 
claimed that evidentiality cross-linguistically takes higher scope than the 
propositional operators such as negation. This study also points out that evidentials in 
Luchuan are not negated, which means that evidentiality does not contribute to a 
propositional -level meaning. Hence, this investigation could be developed to 
consider how the data in Luchuan can be analysed in a pragmatic theory, as was done 
in Faller (2002. In this study, though I have shown that evidentials in Luchuan could 
be analysed as illocutionary modifiers, since they never occur in the scope of 
propositional operator, I have not resolved the issue of whether or not they modify 
the sincerity conditions of the speech act, or whether or not a new illocutionally act 
should be configured. Moreover, it will be necessary to seek the possibilities of 
analyzing the evidentials in Luchuan within the other theoretical frameworks. More 
detailed descriptive study as well as theoretical investigations will develop the study 
of evidentiality in Luchuan. 
     Comparative study within the Luchuan language group is another important 
direction for future research. There are some interesting studies concerning 
evidentiality in other dialects of Luchuan. For example, Izuyama (2005, 2006) 
reported there are grammatical evidentials in Miyara dialect, Ishigaki, Hirara dialect, 
Miyako, and Yonaguni dialect, which have three kinds of evidentials: Visual (Direct), 
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 To investigate this usage may revile the clue about the identical form between resultative -ee- 
and a mood marker -ee-, as resemblance of the two forms has been mentioned in literature 




Inferred, and Reported. In future I work I intend to investigate further is comparative 
studies within the Luchuan language group and comparative study with possible 
evidential system in proto-Japanese and modern Japanese as well. 
     In addition to the issues above, the origins of evidentials would be a very 
interesting topic. Some evidentials have evolved from grammaticalized verbs, others 
from from deictic, or locative markers, or from tense or aspect (Aikhenvald 2004). 
Since evidentials in Luchuan appear in different slots, it is possible that they may 
have evolved from different grammatical categories. Also, how children acquire 
evidentials or how evidentials are maintained in language contact is an interesting 
issue, since children seem to acquire evidentials at a fairly early stage, and also 
young generations who do not speak Luchuan also seem to take over certain 
evidentials in different ways, especially the Assumed and the Reportative evidentials.  
Lastly, Luchuan is rapidly vanishing. Younger generations who cannot speak 
Luchuan speak a variant of fused Japanese and Luchuan forms, which as I have just 
stated, does not have the same evidential system as the heritage language. 
Evidentiality is a category which is easily influenced by  language contact 
(Aikhenvald 2004), and this is true in the case of Luchuan as it has been influenced 
by Japanese. Further description and investigation of evidentials in Luchuan is 
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